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J. Claimant's deposition transcript of March 1, 2012 
K. Deposition transcript of Preston Wilkinson 
DEPOSITIONS: 
1. R. Tyler Frizzell, MD, taken June 4, 2012 and filed June 18, 2012 
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS: 
1. Claimant's Opening Brief for September 28, 2010 hearing, filed November 19, 2010 
2. Defendant's Brief for September 28, 2010 hearing, filed December 17, 2010 
3. Claimant's Reply Brief for September 28, 2010 hearing, filed December 28, 2010 
4. Claimant's Opening Brief for May 17, 2012 hearing, filed July 27, 2012 
5. Defendants' Brief (Employer/Surety) for May 17, 2012 hearing, filed August 15, 2012 
6. Defendant's Brief (ISIF) for May 17, 2012 hearing, filed August 15, 2012 
7. Claimant's Reply Brief for May 17, 2012 hearing, filed August 17, 2012 
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WORKER'S COMPENSATION COMPLAINT 
l.C. No. 2010-000114 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Michael P. Vawter -Donnelly, Idaho 83615 
EMPLOYER 'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
United Parcel Service, Inc. 
270 s. ]1h 
Payette, Idaho 83661 
CLAIMANT 's SOCIAL SECURITY NO. CLAIMANT 's BIRTHDA TE -
STATE AND COUNTY IN WHICH INJURY OCCURRED 
Valley County, Idaho 
CLAIMANT 's ATIORNEY 's NAME AND ADDRESS 
Rick D. Kallas 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS, T ALBOY & 
DEFRANCO, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S 
(NOT ADJUSTER) NAME AND ADDRESS 
Liberty Ins. Corp. 
Clo T.P.A Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. 
720 E. Park Blvd., Ste. 125 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
DATE OF INJURY OR MANIFESTATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 
12/18/2009 
WHEN INJURED, CLAIMANT WAS EARNING AN AVERAGE WEEKLY 
WAGE OF: 
$1,728.70, PURSUANT TO §72-419, IDAHOCODE 
DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE OCCURRED (WHAT HAPPENED): 
On the date of his 12.18.09 low back injury, the Claimant started his UPS truck on his employer's facto premises located 
at the Cascade, Idaho airport and then went inside the offices of Arnold Aviation to pick up his UPS electronic clipboard 
(DAID). Before exiting the building, the Claimant sat down to tie his work snow boots and felt a_Qop in his low back which 
was followed by shooting pain down both lower extremities. 0 
NATURE OF MEDICAL PROBLEMS ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE: 
Low Back Injury. 










All workers' compensation benefits available under Idaho law including, but not limited to the fo!l§wing:.;::::-
(1) Medical Benefits; 
(2) Time Loss Benefits (TTD/TPD); 
(3) Permanent Physical Impairment (PPI) Benefits; 
(4) Disability in excess of impairment (PPD > PPI) benefits; and, 
(5) Attorney Fees. 
Vawter I WIG Complaint PAGE 1 
DA TE ON WHICH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GIVEN TO EMPLOYER 
December 24, 2009 
December 28, 2009 
HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN: 
ISSUE OR ISSUES INVOLVED : 
( X] ORAL 
TO WHOM YOU GAVE NOTICE 
Jim Lovett 
Jim Lovett, Dax ? and 800# 
[] WRITTEN [ ] OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY 
( 1) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 bending over to tie his work I snow boots accident arise out of and in the course of 
his employment with UPS? 
(2) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident cause a new injury to his low back? 
(3) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident aggravate, accelerate, light-up, combine with or contribute to a 
pre-existing back condition and result in the need for medical treatment? 
(4) Are the Defendants liable for medical benefits as required by the Claimant's attending physician or needed 
immediately after the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury and a reasonable time thereafter pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 72-432? 
(5) Are the Defendants liable for the payment of total temporary disability (TTD) and I or temporary partial disability 
(TPD) benefits to the Claimant during his period of recovery? 
(6) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident cause the Claimant to suffer any permanent physical impairment 
(PPI) and, if so, to what extent? 
(7) Did Claimant suffer any disability in excess of his physical impairment (PPD >PPI) as the result of his 12.18.09 
industrial accident I injury, including whether the Claimant is totally and permanently disabled under the 100% 
method or the odd-lot doctrine? 
(8) Are the Defendants liable for the payment of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804? 
DO YOU BELIEVfc THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? [ ] YES [ X] NO IF SO, PLEASE STATE 
WHY: 
NOTICE: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND MUST BE FILED ON FORM J.C. 1002 
PHYSICIANS WHO TREATED CLAIMANT (NAME AND ADDRESS) 
Scott S. Harris, M.D. 
Payette Lakes Medical Clinic 
211 Forest St. 
P.O. Box 1047 
McCall, Idaho 83638 
St. Luke's RMC 
190 E. Bannock St. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
R. Tyler Frizzell, M.D., Ph.D. 
222 N. 2nd St., Ste. 307 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU INCURRED TO DATE? 
UNDETERMINED AT THIS TIME. 
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAS YOUR EMPLOYER PAID J IF ANY? Unknown WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU PAID, IF ANY? 
UNDETERMINED AT THIS TIME. 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. [ X) YES [ ] NO 
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SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT OR ATTOR '\ 
-13~.~ 
DATE 
PLEASE ANSWER THE SET OF QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY BELOW 
ONLY IF CLAIMS IS MADE FOR DEATH BENEFITS 
NAME OF DECEASED DATE OF DEATH RELATION OF DECEASED TO CLAIMANT 
WAS CLAIMANT DEPENDENT ON DECEASED? DID CLAIMANT LIVE WITH DECEASED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT? 
[ ] YES [ ] NO [ ] YES [ ] NO 
CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE, SIGN AND DA TE THE A TT ACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
hereby certify that on the 15th day of March, 2010, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Complaint upon: 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
United Parcel Service, Inc. 
270 S. ih 








SURETY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Liberty Ins. Corp. 
Clo T.P.A. Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. 
720 E. Park Blvd., Ste. 125 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
['fl U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
NOTICE! An Employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer on Form l.C. 1003 
with the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate of mailing, to 
avoid default. If no answer is filed, a Default Award may be entered! 
Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, 317 Main Street, Boise, 
Idaho 83720-6000 (208) 334-6000 
Vawter I WIG Complaint PAGES 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0041 




SSN or Case Number: 
(Provider Use Only) 
Medical Record Number _______ _ 
D Pick up Copies 
D Mail Copies 
ID Confirmed by:-----------
AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEAL TH INFORMATION 
I hereby authorize ________________ to disclose health information as specified: 
Provider Name - must be specific for each provider 
To: --:----::---=-.,----------------------------------1 n s u ran c e Company/Third Party Administrator/Self Insured Employer!ISIF, their attorneys or patient's attorney 
Street Address 
City State Zip Code 
Purpose or need for date: Worker's Compensation Claim 
(e.g. Worker's Compensation Claim) 
Information to be disclosed: Date(s) of Hospitalization/Care:--------
D Discharge Summary 
D History & Physical Exam 
D Consultation Reports 
D Operative Reports 
D Lab 
D Pathology 
D Radiology Reports 
D Entire Record 
D Other: Specify 
I understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable): 
o AIDS or HIV 
o Psychiatric or Mental Health Information 
o Drug/Alcohol Abuse Information 
I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal Law (45 CFR Part 164) and that the 
information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I understand that this 
authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking the authorization won't apply to 
information already released in response to this authorization. I understand that the provider will not condition treatment, payment, 
enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless otherwise revoked, this authorization will expire upon 
resolution of worker's compensation claim. Provider, its employees, officers, copy service contractor, and physicians are hereby 
released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of the above information to the extent indicated and authorized by me on 
this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My signature below authorizes release of all information specified in this 
Vawter I WIG Complaint PAGE4 
authorization. Any questions that I hav garding disclosure may be directed to the priv fficer of the Provider specified above. 
Signature of P~tient Date 
Signature of Legal Representative & Relationship to Patient/Authority to Act Date 
s~J.1~ Title s)q/w 'Dhte 
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Send Original To: Industrial Commission, J 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Michael P. Vawter 
P.O. Box 168 
Donnelly, ID 83615 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
United Parcel Service, Inc. 
270 s. ih 
Payette, ID 83661 
Division, 317 Main Street, Boise, Idaho 83720-600 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
l.C. NO. 2010-000114 
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Rick Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas Talboy & DeFranco 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
~nic::A 1n ~':\71? 
IC1003 (Rev. 11.91) 
ORIGINAL 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME 
AND ADDRESS 
Liberty Insurance Corporation 
C/O Gallagher Bassett 
720 E. Park Blvd, Ste. 125 
Boise, ID 83712 
ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME AND ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (NAME AND 
ADDRESS) ADDRESS) 
SUSAN RVEL TMAN 
GARDNER & BREEN 
P.O. BOX2528 
BOISE, ID 83701 
-
X The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by stating: 
D The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating: ::D;o 
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That the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complainfll&Cially 6ccurred on or about the 




That the employer/employee relationship existed. ~. 
3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. 
4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly D entirely D by an accident 
rising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment. a 
5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the nature of 
e employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of and peculiar to the 
ade, occupation, process, or employment. 
+h 
r 
6. That the notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given to the 
mployer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 70 days of the manifestation 
f such occupational disease. " 0 
7. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, notice of such was given to the employer within five months 
fter the employment had ceased in which it is claimed the disease was contracted. a 
8. That the rate of wages claimed is correct If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to Idaho 
ode, Section 72-419: $1,170.60 per Form 1 -'V 
9. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
10. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant? 
None. 
11. 
1. _ Defendants deny all .allegations ___ of the __ Complaint not admitted herein. 
2. Defendants dispute that Claimant's condition resulted from an accident arising out of his employment as a UPS driver. 
3. Defendants dispute that Claimant was on the premises or de-facto premises of Employer at the time of the claimed injury. 
4. Claimant's complete past medical records have not yet been received, but a diagnosis of "chronic low back pain" 
approximately five months prior to the claimed injury indicates that causation and apportionment may be in dispute, in the 
event Claimant establishes a compensable injury. 
5. Entitlement to medical and income benefits (PPD/PTD, PPJ and PPD) are in dispute for the reasons stated above. 
6. This is not an attorney fee case. Defendants' denial is based on a legal dispute that reflects a reasonable interpretation of 
applicable statutes and case Jaw. 
Under the Commission rules, you have twenty-one (21) days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A copy 
of your Answer must be mailed to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by regular U.S. mail or by 
personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay immediately the compensation required by Jaw, and not cause 
the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All compensation which is concededly due and accrued should be paid. 
Payments due should not be withheld because a Complaint has been filed. Rule llJ(D), Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under 
the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be filed on Form J.C. 
1002. 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. X YES, but premature at this time. ONO 
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE: 
Possibly. Not complicated, but specific fact pattern not addressed in other "arising out of' cases in Idaho. Addressed in other states. 
Amount of Compensation paid to date Dated Signature of Defendant or Attorney 
PPD no Medical I )1 
$0 $0 $0 I 
PLEASE COMPLETE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of March 2010, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon: 
CLAIMANT/ATIORNEY 
NAME AND ADDRESS 
Michael P. Vawter 
C/O Rick Kallas 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
via D personal service of process 
X regular U.S. mail 
via 
EMPLOYER/SURETY 
NAME AND ADDRESS 
United Parcel Service, Inc. 
CIO Gallagher Bassett 
720 E. Park Blvd., Ste. 125 
Boise, ID 83712 
D personal service of process 
X regular U.S. mail 
Signature Answer-Page 2 of 2 
1 
Rick D. Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Telephone: (208) 336-1843 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8945 
Idaho State Bar No. 3872 
Attorney for Claimant 
ZOiO - 3 • p lp 31.1 
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!NOUS TR!f...L COMMISSION 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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COMES NOW Claimant, Michael Vawter, and, pursuant to J.R.P. 8 (C), hereby requests 
that the Commission calendar this claim for Hearing on the following grounds: 
The requesting party hereby states: 
(1) Readiness For Hearing 
The Claimant is ready for Hearing. 
(2) Disputed Issues To Be Heard and Decided 
The following issues are before the Commission to be heard and decided: 
Vawter I Claimant's 5.3.10 Request For Calendaring Page 1 
(a) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 bending over to tie his work I snow boots accident arise out 
of and in the course of his employment with UPS? 
(b) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident either cause a new injury or aggravate, 
accelerate, light-up, combine with or contribute to a pre-existing back condition and 
result in the need for medical treatment? 
(c) Are the Defendants liable for medical benefits as required by the Claimant's attending 
physician or needed immediately after the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury 
and a reasonable time thereafter pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-432? 
( d) Are the Defendants liable for the payment of total temporary disability (TTD) and I or 
temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits to the Claimant during his period of recovery? 
(e) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident cause the Claimant to suffer any 
permanent physical impairment (PPI) and, if so, to what extent? 
(f) Did the Claimant suffer any disability in excess of his physical impairment (PPD >PPI) 
as the result of his 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury, including whether the Claimant is 
totally and permanently disabled under the 100% method or the odd-lot doctrine? 
(g) Are the Defendants liable for the payment of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-
804? 
(3) Location of Hearing 
The desired location of the Hearing is Boise, Idaho. 
(4) Claimant's Counsel's Unavailable Dates 
At the present time, the Claimant's attorney is not available for Hearing on the following 
dates: 5.6.10 - 5.7.10; 5.31.10; 6.11.10; 6.18.10; 7.2.10; 7.5.10; 7.29.10; 7.30.10, 
8.12.10; 9.6.10; 11.19.10-11.29.10; 12.24.10-12.31.10. 
( 5) Length of Hearing 
The estimated length of time to present the Claimant's case in chief is one ( 1) full day. 
( 6) Full Commission Participation 
This case does not present any unique, unusual or bizarre factual, legal or medical issues 
that need to be heard by the full Commission. 
(7) Translation Services 
Vawter I Claimant's 5.3.10 Request For Calendaring Page 2 
q 
The Claimant does require translation services. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of May, 2010. 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defiance, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of May, 2010, I served the Claimant's Request For 
Calendaring on the Defendants by the method indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Susan R. Veltman, Esq. 
GARDNER & BREEN 
1410 West Washington 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Vawter I Claimant's 5.3.10 Request For Calendaring 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 




SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850) 
GARDNER & BREEN 
1410 W. Washington - 83702 
Post Office Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
Attorney for Defendants 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MICHAEL P. VAWTER, 
Claimant, 
v. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, 
Employer, 
and 



















LC. Case No. 2010-000114 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR 
HEARING/MOTION TO 
BIFURCATE 
I. Statement of readiness for hearing and request to bifurcate issue of accident/injury: 
Defendants assert that Claimant's request for a hearing on his stated issues, including PPI and 
PPD, is premature. Claimant has not yet been certified at MMI and no physician has assigned a PPI 
rating. Since Claimant has not yet been certified at MMI, it is premature to evaluate Claimant's 
permanent restrictions and otherwise assess PPD. Additionally, once Claimant reaches MMI and 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING/MOTION TO BIFURCATE, P. 1 
l l 
receives a PPI rating, Defendants will likely need to obtain an expert opinion on the issue of 
apportionment, based on Claimant's pre-existing back injuries and conditions. A vocational 
assessment may also be necessary. 
The primary dispute in this case is whether Claimant's bending over to tie his shoe 
constitutes an accident arising out of employment as a UPS driver. Defendants are ready to proceed 
to hearing on this issue. Defendants agree that issues regarding medical treatment and temporary 
disability could also be heard at a bifurcated hearing. At the request of Claimant, the issue of attorney 
fees could also be litigated. If the Referee agrees to bifurcation of the issues, Defendants do not 
object to scheduling the hearing anytime after June 15, 2010. If the Referee concludes that all issues 
should be adjudicated at the same time, Defendants object to scheduling the hearing prior to 
November 2010, since Claimant's date ofMMI is currently uncertain and additional preparation will 
be necessary once a certification is issued. In the event that Defendants prevail on the primary 
dispute, all other issues will be moot. In the event that Claimant prevails on the primary dispute, 
informal resolution of the other issues is possible. 
II. Issues- Defendants request that the issues be bifurcated and that only the following 
issues be set for hearing at this time: 
1. Whether Claimant's injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in the 
course of employment; 
2. Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a pre-existing injury 
or disease or cause not work-related; 
3. Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as 
provided for by Idaho Code § 72-432, and the extent thereof; 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING/MOTION TO BIFURCATE, P. 2 
4. Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and/or temporary total disability 
(TPD/TTD) benefits, and the extent thereof; and 
5. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer/Surety's 
unreasonable denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804. 
III. Location of hearing: Boise, Idaho 
IV. Desired dates of hearing: Defendants anticipate being ready for hearing by September 1, 
2010 and request a hearing on or after that date. 
v. Unavailable dates of counsel: June 1, 2,3, 11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 29; 
July 7, 8, 9, 12; 
August 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 19, 20; 
September 3. 
VI. Estimated length of hearing: One-half day. 
VII. Settlement Negotiations: Have not occurred, based on the nature of the primary dispute. 
VIII. Full Commission Participation: Not required. 
IX. Special Services: None requested. 
DATED this ?' 1\day of May, 2010. 
Susan R. Veltman - of the firm 
GARDNER & BREEN 
Attorney for Defendants 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING/MOTION TO BIFURCATE, P. 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 
of the foregoing to be served upon: 
Rick Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
day of May, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, 
the last known address as set forth above. 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING/MOTION TO BIFURCATE, P. 4 
Rick D. Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Telephone: (208) 336-1843 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8945 
Idaho State Bar No. 3872 
Attorney for Claimant 
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TR!;,.l COMMISSION 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




vs. ) LC. No. 2010-000114 
) 
UPS, ) CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO 
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 








COMES NOW Claimant, Michael Vawter, and, pursuant to J.R.P. 8 (C), hereby files his 
Response to the Defendants' Motion To Bifurcate and asserts the following Objections to the 
Defendants' Motion To Bifurcate: 
1. The Claimant is scheduled to be evaluated by his neurological surgeon on 5.27.10. Based 
on comments made by the Claimant's neurosurgeon to the Claimant at their last clinical 
visit, the Claimant's neurological surgeon will probably declare the Claimant medically 
stable and issue him a permanent physical impairment rating (PPI) and permanent 
Vawter I Claimant's 5.13.10 Response to Defendants' Motion to Bifurcate Page 1 
restrictions at the 5 .27 .10 appointment. Depending on the Claimant's permanent physical 
restrictions, the Claimant may return to his pre-injury job with U.P.S. If he does return to 
his pre-injury job as a package truck driver for UPS, the Claimant will withdraw the issue 
of PPD > PPI and proceed to hearing on the remaining disputed issues. If the Claimant's 
permanent physical restrictions preclude him from returning to his pre-injury position, the 
Claimant and the Defendants will both need to retain vocational experts to evaluate the 
nature and extent of the Claimant's PPD >PPL 
2. On page 2 of their Motion To Bifurcate, the Defendants indicated that they could not be 
prepared to litigate the issues of PPI and PPD > PPI until November of 2010. However, 
in , (III) on page 3 of their Motion, the Defendants indicated that they would be ready to 
proceed to hearing by September 1, 2010. The Claimant respectfully requests that the 
Referee set this matter for final hearing of all disputed issues listed in the Claimant's 
5.3.10 Request For Calendaring in September of 2010. That hearing date would give 
both parties approximately 90 days to retain vocational experts to complete their 
vocational evaluation. 
3. The Defendants have conceded that all of the issues in the Claimant's Request For 
Calendaring except for PPI and PPD > PPI are ripe for determination at this time. The 
issue of PPI will probably be ripe after the Claimant's 5.27.10 consultation with his 
neurosurgeon. Both parties can be prepared to address the PPD > PPI issue within 90 
days of receiving a PPI rating and permanent physical restrictions. Therefore, all 
disputed issues in this case will be ripe for determination in September of 2010. 
4. The state of Idaho has not recovered from the severe recession of 2009. State budgets 
have been slashed to the bare bones and it would constitute an inefficient waste of scarce 
Vawter I Claimant's 5.13.10 Response to Defendants' Motion to Bifurcate Page 2 
I& 
administrative and adjudicative resources for the Industrial Commission to conduct 2 
independent hearings in this case when all disputed issues in this case can be efficiently 
decided at a single hearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of May, 2010. 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defiance, P.L.L.C. 
-oftheFi 
Attorneys for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13th day of May, 2010, I served the Claimant's Response to 
Defendants' Motion To Bifurcate on the Defendants by the method indicated below and addressed to the 
following: 
Susan R. Veltman, Esq. 
GARDNER & BREEN 
1410 West Washington 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
Vawter I Claimant's 5.13.10 Response to Defendants' Motion to Bifurcate Page 3 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 


















NOTICE OF HEARING 
Pursuant to the telephone conference conducted by Referee Michael E. Powers with the 
parties on September 28, 2010, 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter on 
September 28, 2010, at 9:00 a.m., for one-half day, in the Industrial Commission hearing room, 
700 S. Clearwater Lane, City of Boise, County of Ada, State ofldaho, on the following issues: 
1. Whether Claimant suffered a personal injury arising out of and in the course of 
employment; 
2. Whether Claimant's injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in the 
course of employment; 
3. Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as provided 
for by Idaho Code § 72-432, and the extent thereof; 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
4. Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and/or temporary total disability 
(TPD/TTD) benefits, and the extent thereof; 
5. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer/Surety's 
unreasonable denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804. 
~ 
DATED this C)O- day of July, 2010. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1-lti 
I hereby certify that on the ac:i-- day of July, 2010 a true and correct copy of the NOTICE 
OF HEARING was served by United States Certified Mail upon each of the following: 
RICK D KALLAS 
1031 E PARK BLVD 
BOISE ID 83712 
SUSAN R VELTMAN 
POBOX2528 
BOISE ID 83701 
E-mailed to Dean Willis 
ge 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LA \V, 
AND RECOMMENDATION 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the above-
entitled matter to Referee Michael Powers, who conducted a hearing in Boise on September 
28, 2010. Claimant was present and represented by Rick D. Kallas of Boise. Susan R. Veltman, 
also of Boise, represented Employer, United Parcel Services, Inc., and its Surety, Liberty 
Insurance Corporation. Oral and documentary evidence was presented. No post-hearing 
depositions were taken. The parties submitted post-hearing briefs and this matter came under 
advisement on January 3, 2011. 
ISSUES 
The issues to be decided as a result of the hearing are: 
1. ·whether Claimant suffered an injury arising out of his employment; 1 
1 Defendants concede that Claimant's accident occurred during the course of his 
employment. 
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2. vVhether Claimant is entitled to total temporary disability (TTD) benefits and the 
extent thereof; 
3. Whether Claimant is entitled to medical benefits and the extent thereof; and 
4. Whether Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
CONTENTION OF THE PA.RTIES 
Claimant contends that he injured his low back while bending over to tie his boots at 
Employer's satellite facility in Cascade. He argues he is entitled to a Foust "premises" 
presumption that his injury arose out of his employment because his accident happened on 
Employer's premises and Employer has failed to rebut that presumption. Claimant seeks 
reimbursement for past medical treatment at the invoiced amounts, TTD benefits from the date 
of his injury until released to return to work by his treating physician, and attorney fees due to 
Surety's unreasonable denial of his claim without legal or factual support. 
Defendants contend that the Foust premises presumption is not applicable because 
Claimant's injury did not occur on Employer's "premises" in that Employer did not own, control, 
or maintain the property where Claimant was injured. Further, Claimant should have been 
prepared for work before beginning his duties, including having his boots properly laced and 
tied. The act of tying his boots was purely personal and occurred as the result of a risk Claimant 
himself created versus a risk created by his employment. Moreover, Claimant was, at best, a 
travelling employee who is not afforded the benefit of the Foust presumption. Also, Claimant 
was engaged in no physical activity incidental to his work duties when he bent down to tie his 
boot laces. Finally, because the primary issue presented herein is an issue of first impression in 
Idaho, Defendants did not unreasonably deny this claim and attorney fees should not be awarded. 
Defendants agree that they owe some TTD benefits if this claim is found to be compensable. 
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EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
The record in this matter consists of the following: 
1. The testimony of Claimant and Employer's business manager Dax Wilkinson, 
taken at the hearing; 
2. Claimant's Exhibits 1-20, admitted at the hearing; 
3. Defendants' Exhibits 1-8, admitted at the hearing; and 
4. The pre-hearing deposition of Mike McGuire, taken by Claimant and attended by 
the Referee on September 16, 2010. 
After having considered all the above evidence and the briefs of the parties, the Referee 
submits the following findings of fact and conclusions oflaw for review by the Commission. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Claimant was 51 years of age and has resided in the McCall/Donnelly area for 40 
years. He is a graduate of McCall/Donnelly High School and has had no further formal 
education. He is a Marine Corps veteran. 
2. At the time of his industrial accident, Claimant had been employed as a package 
driver for UPS for 26 years. For about 14 of those years, Claimant worked out of Employer's 
McCall facilities; during the remaining 13 years he worked out of Employer's Cascade satellite 
facility at Arnold Aviation (AA) located at the Cascade Airport. 
3. Claimant reported for work at the AA facility at the Cascade Airport at around 
6:20 a.m. on December 18, 2009. The temperature was approximately 20 degrees below zero. 
Claimant was required to travel from his home to AA in his private vehicle. Once at AA, 
Claimant placed his gloves and thermos in UPS's familiar brown truck, started the vehicle to let 
it warm up, then proceeded into the AA facilities where he kept his DIAD computer2 and other 
2 The DIAD hand-held computer needed to be stored overnight inside the building 
because its batteries would fail ifleft out in Claimant's delivery truck. 
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work-related items. Once inside, Claimant clocked in, sat down on a couch and bent over to tie 
his boot laces when he felt a pop and immediate pain in his low back. 
4. As it was the busy Christmas season for UPS, Claimant did not seek medical care 
until December 281h. At that time, Claimant was diagnosed with a herniated disk and early cauda 
equina symptoms. He was taken to surgery on January 19, 2010. Unfortunately, the surgery was 
unsuccessful, and Claimant was again brought to surgery on July 21, 2010 for a recurrent disk 
and a one level fusion at L4-5. 
5. Surety denied Claimant's claim on the ground that his injury did not arise out of 
his employment. 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS 
6. There is no dispute that Claimant suffered an accident and injury on December 
18, 2009, as those terms are defined in Idaho Code §§ 72-102(18)(a)(b) and (c), and that the 
accident causing the injury occurred during the course of Claimant's employment. The question 
is whether his accident and injury arose out of his employment. 
The Foust presumption 
7. Claimant argues that because his accident and injury occurred at Employer's 
designated workplace, he is entitled to a presumption that his accident and injury arose out of his 
employment. He cites the Idaho Supreme Court case of Foust v. Birds Eye Division of General 
Foods Corp., 91 Idaho 418, 422 P.2d 616 (1967). There, the claimant was walking to her 
vehicle across a large parking lot maintained for employees adjacent to employer's plant when 
she was struck by a vehicle driven by a co-worker. The Court presumed that the claimant's 
injury arose in the course of and out of employment because the accident occurred on the 
employer's premises. "In the case at bar there is nothing to indicate that respondent, while on 
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the employer's premises, was engaged in any abnormal unforeseeable activity foreign to her 
employment ... To the contrary, under the circumstances of respondent's employment, her 
injury "can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and to have been 
contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation." Id., at p. 419. 
8. Defendants maintain that the Foust presumption does not apply here because 
Claimant was not injured on Employer's "premises." For the following reasons, the Referee 
disagrees. Claimant was required to report for work at AA and to end his day there and had done 
so for 12 of his 26 year employment.3 Employer had an oral agreement to let it occupy the AA 
facilities to the mutual benefit of both parties.4 AA flew Employer's packages on occasion to 
back-country destinations, and UPS would handle deliveries for AA. Employer saved time, 
money, and mileage by having Claimant use the satellite location in Cascade. Employer further 
benefitted by the arrangement in having a location to park its truck and transfer trailer and a 
place to keep the DIAD computer warm on cold winter nights. Claimant and another UPS driver 
had keys to AA and could use its bathroom, water, heater, etc. Finally, Claimant completed his 
paperwork, telephoned Employer's McCall office with DIAD information, and clocked out from 
the Cascade satellite work site, all at Employer's direction. 
9. There is no question that Claimant's normal workplace (other than in his truck) 
was at Arnold's Aviation at the Cascade Airport in Cascade. Employer occupied the facility 
based on an oral contract with its owners in order to advance its business interests. Claimant 
performed duties for Employer there. He was injured there. Claimant is entitled to the 
3 See, Colson v. Steele, 73 Idaho 348, 252 P.2d 1049 (1953) wherein the Court held that 
an employer's "premises" may be where employee was required to work by employer. 
4 That Claimant was friends with the owners of AA and initially made the arrangement 
with them to let UPS use its facilities does not alter the fact that UPS eventually entered into a 
verbal contract with AA and admittedly benefitted from the arrangement. 
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presumption that his injury arose in the course of and out of his employment. Therefore, the 
burden shifts to Employer to rebut that presumption by proving Claimant's accident and injury 
did not arise out of his employment because it was an abnormal, unforeseeable activity that was 
foreign to his employment. See, Foust Id. 
10. Defendants argue that Claimant should have had his shoes tied before he got to 
his work site, citing Employer's safety policies requiring its employees to clock in ready to work. 
Claimant testified that on December 18, 2009, he had his bootlaces shoved, untied, down the 
inside of the top of his work boots: 
Q. (By Ms. Veltman): Why didn't you have your boots tied when you 
showed up for work on December 13th7 
A. Because those boots there - - your feet get hot in them if you - -
when you tie them up and it's a 30-minute drive from my house to the airport. 
So, I can let out as much heat as I can. Keep my feet cooler. But when I start 
work I tie them up, you know, so that there is no hanging down parts, they are tied 
on my feet, good support and whatnot. But it's a - - my feet don't sweat so bad 
that way with them loose like that. 
Q. Is there any reason you didn't tie them up before you started your 
UPS vehicle? 
A. Yes. I was sitting in my little Toyota pickup. I don't have room to 
tie them in the Toyota pickup. 
Hearing Transcript, pp. 61-62. 
11. Claimant's reasoning behind waiting until he got inside his heated work area to tie 
his boot laces makes sense; he could not lace them in his pickup and it was 20 degrees below 
zero outside. While it may be argued that such a decision and the actual act of tying his 
bootlaces were purely personal to Claimant, it certainly benefitted Employer in that tied boot 
laces minimized the risk of a slip and fall, or having the loose laces become entangled in 
equipment or machinery or the accelerator/brake pedals of his truck with the potential of costing 
Employer money in the event someone was killed or injured. Defendants similarly argue that 
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Claimant violated company policy by not showing up for work ready to go. Again, that might be 
the case; however, an ostensible violation of that policy is between Claimant and UPS and will 
not serve to block his entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. (See, Gage supra). 
12. Defendants argue that Claimant's work boots were not compliant with 
Employer's work boot policies in that they had a rubber upper as opposed to the recommended 
leather uppers. The Referee is not persuaded that this slight departure from Employer's policy in 
any way contributed to Claimant's accident and injury, and had more to do with aesthetics than 
safety. Again, a violation of Employer's policy will not preclude eligibility for workers' 
compensation benefits. 
12. Further, even if Claimant's act of tying his boot laces was purely personal, 
Defendants are nevertheless liable for benefits because the evidence establishes that Claimant 
was injured while on the job at the AA office. This case is similar to the Idaho Supreme Court 
case of Gage v. Express Personnel, 135 Idaho 250, 16 P.3d 926 (2000). There, the claimant 
worked for a temporary job placement service and was sent to a location where she had worked 
before. The claimant was instructed to report to a loading dock and wait for supplies.5 The 
claimant sat down on the dock and smoked a cigarette while she waited. When the claimant's 
cigarette broke apart and fell to the ground, she jumped down to retrieve it. As she was climbing 
back up on the loading dock she fell and injured her back. The Industrial Commission found the 
claimant's injuries resulted from her smoking, which it deemed a purely personal activity. The 
Commission further found that smoking violated employer's policies so she was not " ... 
furthering any employment duty or interest of her employer." Id., at p. 253. The Commission 
5 Claimant testified that it was necessary to warm his truck up for at least 15 minutes 
because UPS would not provide an engine block heater. 
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concluded that the claimant's injuries did not arise out of or in the course of her employment and 
denied her claim. 
On appeal, the Court held: 
In this case, the evidence mandates a finding that Gage suffered an injury 
from a fall, within the period of her employment, in a place where she may 
reasonably have been and while she was reasonably fulfilling the duties of her 
employment. (Citations omitted). 
Clearly, Gage's smoking while on the rail dock did not detract from the 
benefit conferred upon the employer by Gage's being on site and prepared to 
work, as she had been directed, awaiting the arrival of labels and product. We 
hold that the Commission committed clear error when it concluded that Gage's 
smoking was a wholly personal activity not in furtherance of any interest of her 
employer. 
An injury is considered to arise out of employment when a causal 
connection exists between the circumstances under which the work must be 
performed and the injury of which the claimant complains. (Citation omitted). 
This prong of the compensability test examines the origin and cause of the 
accident. Gage asserts she was injured as she was carrying out her job 
responsibilities. She argues that her smokillg, which was in violation of company 
policy, deals only with the manner of performance of her work and should not 
foreclose her right to benefits for a work-related injury. The respondents maintain 
that smoking was the cause of Gage's injury and that by prohibiting smoking in 
the workplace, the employer removed injuries caused by smoking from the course 
of employment, making them noncompensable. 
A proscription against smoking on the job does not categorically compel 
denial of an award of benefits to a worker injured while participating in the 
prohibited activity. Although we have found no Idaho cases on the subject, other 
courts have affirmed awards of worker's compensation benefits to injured 
employees who had violated safety rules. (Citation omitted) (employee burned to 
death while smoking in violation of no smoking rule held to be doing the task 
assigned albeit in a forbidden manner); (Citation omitted) (mere violation of rule 
regulating manner and method of performing work that employee was hired to do 
did not constitute stepping away from employment so as to defeat employee's 
right to worker's compensation; (Citation omitted) ( benefits awarded for hand 
injury suffered when employee, contrary to work rule, reached into machine to 
remove steel caught in die in press) (Citation omitted) (employee who was 
assigned to work in grinding room where rule to wear goggles was posted was 
injured because he violated the rule and failed to wear goggles but would still be 
entitled to compensation). By smoking while she waited for the product she was 
to label, Gage may be said to have done an authorized act in a forbidden manner, 
but this slight deviation of the employer's rule regarding how the work was to be 
performed is not enough to deny Gage's claim. Moreover, smoking was not the 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 8 
cause of the injury. The injury could have as easily have resulted from Gage 
jumping off the rail dock to reclaim an earring, necklace or other personal item 
that had fallen to the ground. 
This Court has repeatedly recognized that in determining whether an 
accident arises out of and in the course of employment, each case must be decided 
upon its own attendant facts and circumstances under a liberal construction of the 
Worker's Compensation Act. (Citation omitted). We hold that the Commission 
erred in concluding that Gage's injury did not arise out of and in the course of her 
employment. Accordingly, we reverse the Commission's decision denying 
worker's compensation benefits. Gage at p. 254. 
13. Gage instructs that a claimant need not be performing an actual job duty at the 
time of an injury to be entitled to workers' compensation benefits. On December 18, 2009, 
Claimant, like Gage, was where he was directed to report for work at Employer's designated 
work area. Also like Gage waiting for product and labels, Claimant was waiting for his work 
truck to warm up so he could begin his actual work duties. While he was waiting, he bent over 
to lace his boots and was injured. Claimant was onsite and prepared to work, as directed by 
Employer. Further, the act of lacing his boots certainly did not rise to the level of " ... any 
abnormal unforeseeable activity foreign to [his] employment ... " See, Foust Id., at p. 419. 
14. When there is doubt about whether an accident arose out of employment, that 
doubt shall be resolved in favor of the employee. Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 
325, 179 P.3d 288 (2008). The Referee finds that Defendants have failed to rebut the Foust 
presumption that Claimant's low back injury of December 18, 2009 arose out of his employment. 
TTD benefits 
Idaho Code § 72-408 provides for income benefits for total and partial disability during 
an injured worker's period ofrecovery. 
15. Claimant contends that he is entitled to an award ofTTD benefits from December 
28, 2009 until he was declared medically stable on December 6, 2010 following his second 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LA \V, AND RECOMMENDATION - 9 
surgery. There being no evidence to the contrary, the Referee finds that Claimant is entitled to 
TTD benefits from December 28, 2009 through December 6, 2010. 
Medical benefits 
Idaho Code§ 72-432(1) obligates an employer to provide an injured employee reasonable 
medical care as may be required by his or her physician immediately following an injury and for 
a reasonable time thereafter. If the employer fails to provide the same, the injured worker may 
do so at the expense of employer. 
16. Claimant has incurred medical expenses totaling $149,033.68. See, Claimant's 
Exhibit 7. Pursuant to Neel v. Western Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), 
Defendants are liable for 100% of those invoiced medical expenses. 
Attorney fees 
Idaho Code § 72-804 provides for an award of attorney fees in the event an employer or 
its surety unreasonably denies a claim or neglect or refused to pay an injured employee 
compensation within a reasonable time. 
17. Claimant contends he is entitled to an award of attorney fees because the factual 
evidence in this case establishes a clear causal connection between the safe work environment 
and safety policies Claimant was required to follow and his act of tying his boots. Likewise, 
Claimant asserts there is no legal basis for Defendants' denial because the evidence is 
overwhelming that Claimant's injury occurred on Employer's satellite work premises, and 
Defendants have produced no evidence to overcome the Foust presumption. Further, within 
days of the denial, Claimant's counsel wrote Surety a five-page letter setting out Claimant's view 
of the presumption raised, the absence of evidence necessary to rebut the presumption and the 
liberal construction afforded to claimants in like cases. Surety did not even respond. 
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18. Defendants argue that Idaho case law is conflicting regarding "arising out of' 
cases and that there are no Idaho cases regarding shoe tying. Further, Surety asserts that it 
should not be found liable for attorney fees because it conducted an investigation and secured a 
legal opinion prior to denying the claim. 
19. vVbile a close call, the Referee tends to side with Defendants on this point. 
Because shoe tying is such a commonplace occurrence, at first blush it would seem that such an 
act could not be related to employment unless changing or selling shoes was one's occupation. 
Also, there is no definition of "premises" regarding the premises presumption. Moreover, there 
is no bright line in Idaho case law regarding when an accident arises out of employment and 
there are no cases involving boot lace tying. Further, cases cited by Defendants from other 
jurisdictions are not uniform in treating the subject and one case cited denied compensation to a 
UPS employee who was injured while re-tying his boot after it came untied while unloading 
packages from his truck. See, United Parcel Service of America v. Fetterman, 336 S.E. 2d 892, 
(1985). Finally, the mere fact that an injury occurred on Employer's premises is only one factor 
to be considered. See, Dinius v. Loving Care & Afore, Inc., 133 Idaho 572, 990 P.2d7387. 
(1999). 
20. The Referee finds that Claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees for 
Surety's unreasonably denying his claim. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Claimant suffered an accident arising in the course of and out of his employment 
causing an injury on December 18, 2009. 
2. Claimant is awarded TTD benefits from December 28, 2009 through December 6, 
2010. 
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3. Claimant is awarded medical benefits in the amount of$149,033.68. 
4. Claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
RECOMMENDATION 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation, 
the Referee recommends that the Commission adopt such findings and conclusions as its own 
and issue an appropriate final order. 
DATED this '10-fl" day of ~ '2011. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Michael E. Powers, Referee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of , 2011, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
RECOMMENDATION was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following: 
RICK D KALLAS 
1031 EPARKBLVD 
BOISE ID 83712 
SUSAN R VELTMAN 
PO BOX 2528 
BOISE ID 83701 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
E 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the 
above-entitled matter to Referee Michael E. Powers, who conducted a hearing in Boise on 
September 28, 2010. Claimant was present and represented by Rick D. Kallas of Boise. 
Susan R. Veltman, also of Boise, represented Employer, United Parcel Services, Inc., and its 
Surety, Liberty Insurance Corporation. Oral and documentary evidence was presented. No post-
hearing depositions were taken. The parties submitted post-hearing briefs and this matter came 
under advisement on January 3, 2011. The undersigned Commissioners have chosen not to 
adopt the Referee's recommendation and hereby issue their own findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and order. 
ISSUES 
The issues to be decided as a result of the hearing are: 
1. Whether Claimant suffered an injury arising out of his employment; 1 
1 Defendants concede that Claimant's accident occurred during the course of his 
employment. 
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2. Whether Claimant is entitled to total temporary disability (TTD) benefits 
and the extent thereof; 
3. Whether Claimant is entitled to medical benefits and the extent thereof; 
and 
4. Whether Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
CONTENTION OF THE PARTIES 
Claimant contends that he injured his low back while bending over to tie his boots at 
Employer's satellite facility in Cascade. He argues he is entitled to a Foust "premises" 
presumption that his injury arose out of his employment because his accident happened on 
Employer's premises and Employer has failed to rebut that presumption. Claimant seeks 
reimbursement for past medical treatment at the invoiced amounts, TTD benefits from the 
date of his injury until released to return to work by his treating physician, and attorney fees 
due to Surety's unreasonable denial of his claim without legal or factual support. 
Defendants contend that the Foust premises presumption is not applicable because 
Claimant's injury did not occur on Employer's "premises" in that Employer did not own, control, 
or maintain the property where Claimant was injured. Further, Claimant should have been 
prepared for work before beginning his duties, including having his boots properly laced 
and tied. The act of tying his boots was purely personal and occurred as the result of a risk 
Claimant himself created versus a risk created by his employment. Moreover, Claimant was, 
at best, a travelling employee who is not afforded the benefit of the Foust presumption. Also, 
Claimant was engaged in no physical activity incidental to his work duties when he bent down 
to tie his boot laces. Finally, because the primary issue presented herein is an issue of 
first impression in Idaho, Defendants did not umeasonably deny this claim and attorney 
fees should not be awarded. Defendants agree that they owe some TTD benefits if this claim is 
found to be compensable. 
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EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
The record in this matter consists of the following: 
1. The testimony of Claimant and Employer's business manager 
Dax Wilkinson, taken at the hearing; 
2. Claimant's Exhibits 1-20, admitted at the hearing; 
3. Defendants' Exhibits 1-8, admitted at the hearing; and 
4. The pre-hearing deposition of Mike McGuire, taken by Claimant 
and attended by the Referee on September 16, 2010. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Claimant was 51 years of age and has resided in the McCall/Donnelly area for 
40 years. He is a graduate of McCall/Donnelly High School and has had no further formal 
education. He is a Marine Corps veteran. 
2. At the time of his industrial accident, Claimant had been employed as a package 
driver for UPS for 26 years. For about 14 of those years, Claimant worked out of Employer's 
McCall facilities; during the remaining 13 years he worked out of Employer's Cascade satellite 
facility at Arnold Aviation (AA) located at the Cascade Airport. 
3. Claimant reported for work at the AA facility at the Cascade Airport at around 
6:20 a.m. on December 18, 2009. The temperature was approximately 20 degrees below zero. 
Claimant was required to travel from his home to AA in his private vehicle. Once at AA, 
Claimant placed his gloves and thermos in UPS' s familiar brown truck, started the vehicle to let 
it warm up, then proceeded into the AA facilities where he kept his DIAD computer2 and 
other work-related items. Once inside, Claimant clocked in, sat down on a couch and bent 
over to tie his boot laces when he felt a pop and immediate pain in his low back. 
2 The DIAD hand-held computer needed to be stored overnight inside the building 
because its batteries would fail if left out in Claimant's delivery truck. 
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4. As it was the busy Christmas season for UPS, Claimant did not seek medical care 
until December 28th. At that time, Claimant was diagnosed with a herniated disk and early 
cauda equina symptoms. He was taken to surgery on January 19, 2010. Unfortunately, the 
surgery was unsuccessful, and Claimant was again brought to surgery on July 21, 2010 for 
a recurrent disk and a one level fusion at L4-5. 
5. Surety denied Claimant's claim on the ground that his injury did not arise out of 
his employment. 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS 
6. There is no dispute that Claimant suffered an accident and injury on 
December 18, 2009, as those terms are defined in Idaho Code §§ 72-102(18)(a)(b) and (c), and 
that the accident causing the injury occurred during the course of Claimant's employment. 
The question is whether his accident and injury arose out of his employment. 
The Foust presumption 
7. Claimant argues that because his accident and injury occurred at Employer's 
designated workplace, he is entitled to a presumption that his accident and injury arose out of 
his employment. He cites the Idaho Supreme Court case of Foust v. Birds Eye Division of 
General Foods Corp., 91 Idaho 418, 422 P.2d 616 (1967). There, the claimant was walking to 
her vehicle across a large parking lot maintained for employees adjacent to employer's plant 
when she was struck by a vehicle driven by a co-worker. The Court presumed that the 
claimant's injury arose in the course of and out of employment because the accident occurred on 
the employer's premises. "In the case at bar there is nothing to indicate that respondent, while 
on the employer's premises, was engaged in any abnormal unforeseeable activity foreign to her 
employment ... To the contrary, under the circumstances of respondent's employment, her 
injury "can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and to have been 
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contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation." Id., at p. 419. 
8. Defendants maintain that the Foust presumption does not apply here 
because Claimant was not injured on Employer's "premises." For the following reasons, the 
Commission disagrees. Claimant was required to report for work at AA and to end his day 
there and had done so for 12 of his 26 year employment.3 Employer had an oral agreement to let 
it occupy the AA facilities to the mutual benefit of both parties.4 AA flew Employer's packages 
on occasion to back-country destinations, and UPS would handle deliveries for AA. Employer 
saved time, money, and mileage by having Claimant use the satellite location in Cascade. 
Employer further benefitted by the arrangement in having a location to park its truck and 
transfer trailer and a place to keep the DIAD computer warm on cold winter nights. Claimant 
and another UPS driver had keys to AA and could use its bathroom, water, heater, etc. Finally, 
Claimant completed his paperwork, telephoned Employer's McCall office with DIAD 
information, and clocked out from the Cascade satellite work site, all at Employer's direction. 
9. There is no question that Claimant's normal workplace (other than in his truck) 
was at Arnold's Aviation at the Cascade Airport in Cascade. We find that for purposes of 
this matter, the subject accident occurred on Employer's premises. 
10. Having found that the accident occurred on employer's premises, it is next 
necessary to consider the nature of the presumption created by that finding. In Foust, the fact 
that the accident occurred on employer's premises was found to create a presumption that the 
injury arises out of and in the course of the injured worker's employment. See also, Kessler on 
3 See, Colson v. Steele, 73 Idaho 348, 252 P .2d 1049 (1953) wherein the Court held that 
an employer's "premises" may be where employee was required to work by employer. 
4 That Claimant was friends with the owners of AA and initially made the arrangement 
with them to let UPS use its facilities does not alter the fact that UPS eventually entered into a 
verbal contract with AA and admittedly benefitted from the arrangement. 
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behalf of Kessler v. Payette County, 129 Idaho 855, 934 P.2d 28(1997). The Kessler Court 
provided further guidance on the question of the type of proof that must be adduced to overcome 
the presumption. In this regard, the Kessler Court referred to I.R.E. 301, which specifies: 
Presumptions in General in Civil Actions and Proceedings. (a) Effect. In all civil 
actions and proceedings, when not unless otherwise provided for by statute, by 
Idaho appellate decisions or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party 
against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or 
meet the presumption, but dces not shift to such party the burden of proof in the 
sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the 
party on whom it was originally cast. The burden of going forward is satisfied by 
the introduction of evidence sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude 
that the presumed fact does not exist. If the party against whom a presumption 
operates fails to meet the burden of going forward, the presumed fact shall be 
deemed proved. If the party meets the burden of going forward, no instruction on 
the presumption shall be given, and the trier of fact shall determine the existence 
or nonexistence of the presumed fact without regard to the presumption. 
Therefore, in order to overcome the presumption that the accident is one arising out of 
and in the course of employment, Defendant must come forward with proof sufficient to permit 
reasonable minds to conclude that the accident is not one arising out of and in the course of 
employment. If the opposing party does come forward with such evidence, then the Commission 
must ascertain whether the facts are sufficient to demonstrate that the accident is one arising out 
of and in the course of employment without the benefit of the presumption. 
11. Finally, one recent case casts some doubt on the continued validity of the Foust 
rule. In Dinius v. Loving Care and More, Inc., 133 Idaho 572, 990 P.2d 738 (1999), Claimant 
suffered severe lower extremity injuries when a vehicle operated by her boyfriend pinned her to 
the wall of employer's building as Claimant was taking out the trash. The Industrial 
Commission made no specific finding concerning whether the accident occurred on employer's 
premises. However, the Commission ruled that Claimant had failed to meet her burden of 
proving that her accident was one arising out of and in the course of employment. 
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12. On appeal, Dinius argued that she was entitled to the Foust presumption. 
Although the Court noted that the Industrial Commission had failed to make a specific finding on 
the question of whether or not the accident occurred on employer's premises, it offered the 
following comment on the Foust presumption: 
Even so, the mere fact that an injury occurs on the employer's premises is not an 
exclusive test for compensability, but rather is only one factor to be considered. 
In re Malmquist, 78 Idaho 117, 300 P.2d 820 (1956). To establish that the 
accident arose out of and in the course of employment, the fact that an injury 
occurs on the employer's premises must be accompanied by a showing of a causal 
connection between the conditions existing on the employer's premises and the 
accident involved. Nichols v. Godfrey, 90 Idaho 345, 350, 411 P.2d 763, 765 
(1966). See also Kessler, supra, 129 Idaho at 860, 934 P .2d at 31. 
Foust creates a presumption that an accident occurring on employer's premises arises out of and 
is in the course of employment. However, from the quoted language, the Dinius Court seems to 
conclude that even if the injured worker demonstrates that the accident occurred on employer's 
premises, he must also adduce evidence showing a causal connection between the conditions 
existing on the employer's premises and the accident involved. Arguably, this undermines that 
portion of the Foust rule creating the presumption that an accident occurring on the employer's 
premises "arises" out of employment. 
13. Regardless, we think the question of the current status of the Foust presumption is 
mooted in this case in view of our conclusion that Defendant's have come forward with evidence 
sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude that the subject accident is not one arising out 
of and in the course of Claimant's employment. Employer has a reasonable expectation that 
Claimant will prepare himself such that when he arrives at the work site, he is ready to go to 
work. Such pre-work preparations such as eating and dressing are not ordinarily part of the work 
that a worker is paid to perform, and therefore, such activities are not in the "course" of 
employment. That Claimant chooses, for reasons of personal convenience, to perform one of 
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these preparatory activities at the work place, as opposed to his home, arguably does nothing to 
bring this activity into the "course" of Claimant's employment, Defendants concession on the 
course question notwithstanding. Similarly, the risk of injury to which Claimant was evidently 
exposed is arguably a common risk, with no particular association to Claimant's employment. 
We therefore conclude that Defendants have overcome the presumption, leaving the Commission 
to consider whether the evidence supports a finding that Claimant has met his burden of proving 
the occurrence of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. 
Arising out of and in the course of employment 
14. The term "accident" is a term of art under the Idaho Workers' Compensation law, 
and is defined at LC.§ 72-102(18)(b) as follows: 
"Accident" means an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or 
untoward event, connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be 
reasonably located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an injury. 
Here, it is clear that the mishap described by Claimant is one that would qualify as an "accident" 
under the statutory scheme. See Wynn v. JR. Simplot Company, 105 Idaho 102, 666 P.2d 629 
(1983); Spivey v. Novartis Seed Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 43 P.3d 788 (2002); Page v. McCain Foods, 
Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 109 P.3d 1084 (2005). Moreover, there is no dispute that Claimant's injuries 
are causally related to the accident. 
15. The primary issue presented by this case is whether the accident that admittedly 
occurred satisfies the requirements of LC.§ 72-102(18)(a). That subsection provides: 
"Injury" means a personal injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the 
course of any employment covered by the worker's compensation law. 
Therefore, this subsection requires of the injured worker that he demonstrate that the subject 
accident both "arises" out of the employment and occurs in the "course" of employment. This 
statutory requirement is couched in terms very similar to the statutory language employed in 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 8 
many other jurisdictions whose workers' compensation laws are derived from the original British 
Compensation Act. As Professor Larson has noted, seldom has statutory language endured the 
scrutiny that has been devoted to the phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment." 
16. In Idaho, the seminal case treating what it is the injured worker must prove in this 
regard is Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, 72 Idaho 1, 235 P.2d 736 (1951). Although the Idaho 
rule did not originate in Eriksen, the rule is given its most lucid expression in that case. Quoting 
from the Oregon case, Larson v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 135 Oregon 137, 295 P. 
195 (1931), the Eriksen court explained what it means for an accident to arise out of and occur in 
the course of employment as follows: 
It is sufficient to say that an injury is received 'in the course of the employment 
when it comes while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to 
perform. It arises 'out of the employment, when there is apparent to the rational 
mind upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between 
the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting 
injury. Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural 
incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person 
familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the 
nature of the employment, then it arises 'out of the employment. .. 
Eriksen, supra, or the explanation it adopted, has been cited with approval in almost every 
subsequent Idaho case in which "arising" and "course" issues are discussed. See Colson v. 
Steele, 73 Idaho 348, 252 P.2d 1049 (1953); Kiger v. Idaho Corporation, 85 Idaho 424, 380 P.2d 
208 (1963); Wilder v. Redd, 111 Idaho 141, 721 P.2d 1240 (1986); O'Loughlin v. Circle A 
Construction, 112 Idaho 1048, 739 P.2d 347 (1987); Evans v. Hara 's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 849 
P.2d 934 (1993); Kessler on behalf of Kessler v. Payette County, 129 Idaho 855, 934 P.2d 28 
(1997); Dinius v. Loving Care and More, Inc., 133 Idaho 572, 990 P.2d 738 (1999); Jensen v. 
City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 18 P.3d 211 (2000). 
11. It ig t:ilear that in ord~r to prevail, Claimant must demonstrate both that the 
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accident arose out of his employment, and that the accident occurred in the course of 
employment. See Kessler on behalf of Kessler v. Payette County, supra. Here, the parties 
concede that the subject accident is one which occurred in the "course" of employment. (See 
Def. brief at pp. 19-20). Indeed, from the record it appears that by the time the accident 
occurred, Claimant had arrived at the worksite, started his truck, punched in, and was waiting for 
the engine to warm up in the sub-zero temperature before starting his deliveries. Moreover, the 
particular activity that Claimant was engaged in at the time of his injury (bending over to tie his 
shoelaces) was an activity reasonably incidental to the work that he had been hired to perform, 
such as to bring that activity within the "course" of his employment. See, Thompson v. Clear 
Springs Food, Inc., 148 Idaho 697, 228 P. 3d 378 (2010). This conclusion also finds support in 
the Court's treatment of the "course" issue in Gage v. Express Personnel, 135 Idaho 250, 16 P.3d 
926 (2000). Gage's assignment, i.e. the task which she had been hired to perform, was to wait at 
the rail dock until labeling supplies and product were delivered. Smoking was prohibited on 
employer's premises. While doing as she had been directed, Gage smoked a cigarette, and 
suffered an injury as she was attempting to extinguish the cigarette which she had inadvertently 
dropped from the edge of the loading dock. In overruling a Commission decision denying 
benefits, the Court observed that at the time of her injury, Gage was performing exactly the task 
she had been directed to perform (waiting for supplies and product), albeit in an unauthorized 
fashion. This deviation, however, was not found sufficient to justify a denial of benefits. The 
rationale of Gage applies even more strongly to the facts of the instant matter. At the time of the 
accident, Claimant was waiting for his vehicle to warm up before beginning his deliveries, an 
activity that was assuredly part of the work which he had been hired to perform. The fact that he 
took this opportunity to tie his shoelaces does nothing to undermine the conclusion that at the 
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time of the accident giving rise to his claim, he was engaged in the work of his employer. 
18. Although the "course" issue in this case is evidently not disputed, the fact that the 
Clairmint's empfoyrnent is important to inforn1ing the 
Commission's analysis of whether the accident is, as well, one which "arises" out of Claimant's 
employment. If it is conceded that the accident occurred while Claimant was performing the 
work he had been hired to perform, or some task reasonably incidental thereto, it makes it 
somewhat easier to answer in the affirmative the question of whether a causal connection exists 
between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting 
injury. However, the Eriksen test contains certain language which poses a direct challenge to the 
conclusion that Claimant's injury was one arising out of his employment. After describing the 
circumstances which support a finding that an accident does indeed arise out of employment, the 
Eriksen Court set forth a number of factors which augur against a finding that a particular 
accident arises out of employment. 
.... But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as 
a contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the 
workmen would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. The 
causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the 
neighborhood. It must be incidental to the character of the business and not 
independent of the relation of master and servant. It need not to have been 
foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in 
the risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a 
rational consequence. 
19. It has been observed that as respects an injured worker's employment, risks of 
injury come in three flavors. See 1-4 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 4.00; Mayo v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 93 Idaho 161, 457 P.2d 400 (1969). The first group comprises those risks 
clearly associated with the workplace. Included in this category of risk are injuries caused by 
things peculiar to the worksite in question, such as equipment, elevated heights, noxious fumes 
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or chemicals, assaults occurring as a result of a dispute arising out of the performance of a 
work-related task, etc. Injuries occurring as a result of this type of risk can almost universally be 
said to arise out of the injured worker's employment. 
20. The second category of risk represents those risks entirely personal to the injured 
worker, and unconnected to his employment. Questions about compensability of accidents 
occurring as a result of such risks arise mainly because the risk is imported to the workplace. An 
injured worker who happens to die at work as the result of a disease or other internal process is 
not entitled to workers' compensation benefits where it is shown that it was entirely fortuitous 
that the injured worker's death occurred at work. Similarly, a worker who is assaulted at his 
place of work by a lifelong sworn enemy who finds him there, does not suffer injury because of a 
work-created risk. Again, the fact that the assault occurred at work is entirely fortuitous since it 
would also have occurred at any other location where the assailant found the injured worker. 
Injuries occurring as a result of this type of risk are almost uniformly deemed to be injuries 
which do not arise out of employment. 
21. This brings us to the third category of risk, a category that has particular 
significance to the facts of this case. This category comprises so-called "neutral" risks. A risk of 
injury may be deemed "neutral" where, because of the peculiar facts of the case, it is impossible 
to say whether the risk of injury is personal to the claimant, or, instead, connected to the 
employment. A classic neutral risk scenario of this type is illustrated by the facts of Mayo v. 
Safeway Stores, supra. In Mayo, decedent, a grocery store employee, was killed at his workplace 
by a co-worker. Before the co-worker could be apprehended, he committed suicide. Because the 
players were both deceased, there was no way to ascertain whether the employee's death was the 
end result of a work-related dispute, or, instead, a dispute personal to the decedent and his 
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assailant, having nothing whatsoever to do with the workplace. Because there was no evidence 
that could explain the origin of the assault, it was deemed neutral. 
The other type of neutral risk case is one where the evidence affirmatively establishes 
that the risk of injury to which the worker is exposed is neither connected to his employment, nor 
personal to the worker. Examples of this type of case include injuries caused by stray bullets, 
tornadoes, acts of God, etc. In such cases, it can be said with some confidence that the risk of 
injury is neither personal to the injured worker, nor connected to the employment. Therefore, the 
risk of injury is neutral. 
22. In Mayo v. Safeway Stores, supra, after having determined that the risk of injury 
to which claimant was exposed must be considered to be a neutral risk, the court addressed the 
question of whether or not the decedent's death was nevertheless compensable as an accident 
arising out of his employment. The court noted that as respects neutral risks, Idaho has joined a 
growing minority of states that have adopted a positional risk rule which awards compensation 
for injuries resulting from accidents that are of neutral origin. The rationale for the rule is that 
when the cause of injury is truly neutral, there is no more reason to assign the loss to the 
employee than to the employer. Under such circumstances, with the scales evenly balanced, all 
that is required to tip them in claimant's favor is the recognition that it was the claimant's 
employment that brought him to the place of injury. As noted, Mayo involved an inexplicable 
assault, as did Louie v. Bamboo Gardens, 67 Idaho 469, 185 P.2d 712 (1947), the case in which 
the rule was first announced. It is unclear whether the Mayo court intended the positional risk 
rule to apply to all neutral risk cases, or merely those involving assaults. However, the decision 
does contain the following language which appears to paint with a fairly broad brush: 
We do not hold that the positional risk rule is the exclusive test of compensability, 
but only that when injury results from a neutral cause, a rebuttable presumption 
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arises that the injury arose out of employment. The burden is thus shifted to the 
employer to prove that the injury was caused by a factor personal to the 
employee. 
23. On the other hand, the proposition that the positional risk rule announced Mayo 
was only intended to apply to cases of inexplicable assault finds support in the court's continued 
adherence to the Eriksen language, most recently cited with approval in Jensen v. City of 
Pocatello, supra, in which it was noted: 
[A]n injury which cannot be traced to the worker's employment as a contributing 
proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the worker would have been 
equally exposed outside of the workplace is not compensable under our workers' 
compensation system." 
24. If the Mayo Court intended to apply the positional risk rule to all neutral risk 
injuries, then it is difficult to explain the Jensen Court's support for the Eriksen rule which 
clearly anticipates that neutral risk injuries do not arise out of employment. 
25. As respects the instant matter, the first question that might be asked is whether the 
risk of injury to which Claimant was exposed can fairly be characterized as a neutral risk of the 
type described in Mayo, supra. In answer, it seems clear that the risk to which Claimant was 
exposed is qualitatively different than the type of neutral risk discussed by Professor Larson and 
by the Court in Mayo. Here, it cannot be said that the risk in question is unconnected to 
Claimant's employment in the same sense that a tornado would be. Here, the risk of injury in 
question is connected to the employment because it was encountered by Claimant as result of the 
Claimant's performance of a task that was either part of his work, or reasonably incidental 
thereto. To conclude, as we do, that the risk of bending over to tie one's shoe preparatory to 
beginning the workday is a work-connected risk, is entirely consistent with the proposition that 
an accident does not arise out of employment unless there is proof of a causal connection 
between the conditions under which the work must be performed and the resulting injury. 
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26. Claimant has demonstrated, and no rational person would disagree, that anyone 
whose job includes the requirement of carrying boxes all day, frequently in a way that obscures 
his view of the ground immediately in front of him, would do well to keep his shoes tied. 
It strains credulity to suggest that the action Claimant took preparatory to the start of his shift 
did not confer a benefit upon Employer by reducing the chances that Claimant would suffer a trip 
and fall. It strains credulity to suggest that the risk of injury associated with the tying of the 
shoelaces was not therefore one which followed as a natural incident of the work. Claimant 
needed to have his shoes tied to perform his work, and the injury that he suffered as a result of 
performing this task is assuredly connected to his employment. This is not a case where the 
evidence establishes an absence of a work connection, or where the evidence is such that it 
cannot be ascertained whether Claimant's injury was occasioned as a result of a risk personal to 
him versus an employment connected risk. 
27. Defendants argue that the risk to which Claimant was exposed is a common risk 
at best, because he is required to tie his shoes both for work-related purposes and for reasons 
personal to him. Everyone who wears shoes (except those who wear slip-ons), ties their 
shoelaces while bending over in some fashion. However true this may be, the fact of the matter 
is that Claimant suffered this particular injury as the result of his attempts to accommodate the 
requirements of his job. Because Ciaimant was necessarily required to tie his shoelaces before 
starting work, his job clearly created an actual risk which ultimately resulted in Claimant's 
injury. Suppose, however, that Claimant had suffered the identical injury while tying his shoes 
at home before leaving for work, as Defendants evidently contend Claimant was required to do. 
Certainly, to suggest that such an injury is one arising out of and in the course of employment 
does not pass the smell test, but the reason is not that such an injury does not arise out of an 
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employment created risk: It does. Rather, such a claim would be non-compensable due to the 
fact that such an accident is well outside the course of employment. Getting out of the shower, 
dressing for work, and fixing breakfast, are not activities Employer pays Claimant to perform. 
Dressing for work is not part of Claimant's job, just as going to and coming from work are 
typically not treated as part of a worker's job. 
28. Although the risk of injury to which Claimant was exposed is not a "neutral" risk 
in the sense that term is used in Mayo v. Safeway Stores, supra, it is a neutral risk in another 
sense: As Defendants have noted, the risks associated with tying one's shoelaces are trivial. 
People in all walks of life, including Claimant, are exposed to the same risk every day, quite 
apart from their employment. Even though we have found that Claimant's employment did, 
indeed, subject him to an actual risk of injury due to workplace demands which required of him 
that his shoelaces be tied, the "arising" test explained in Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, supra, 
may still present an obstacle to the claim. 
29. As noted, Eriksen provides a good deal of guidance on the type of risk that does 
not arise out of employment. Excluded, are risks which come from a hazard to which the injured 
worker would have been equally exposed apart from employment. Excluded, are risks which are 
common to the neighborhood. Excluded, are risks which are independent of the relation of 
master and servant. See, Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, supra. In short, the excluded risks are 
those described by Professor Larson and by the Mayo court as "neutral" risks, as well as risks of 
the type at issue here, i.e. a demonstrated risk of the injured worker's employment, but a risk to 
which he is equally exposed apart from his employment. Therefore, under the rule explained in 
Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, supra, neither a "neutral" risk, in the sense described by the court 
in Mayo, supra, nor an "equal" (for lack of a better term) risk in the sense of the facts of the 
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instant matter, arise out of employment. However, as set forth above, the Mayo Court carved out 
an exception to this rule for neutral risks, specifying that injuries caused by such risks are 
compensable. A review of the Court's ruling in Spivey v. Novartis Seed, Inc., supra, reveals that 
the Court has extended the holding in Mayo, supra, to also embrace what we have distinguished 
here as actual risks created by the employment, albeit risks to which an injured worker might be 
equally exposed to apart from the employment. 
30. In Spivey, the claimant was employed as a seed sorter in a bean warehouse. Her 
job entailed standing before a moving belt and picking the small (pea-size) bits of rock and tare 
from the line. ·while so engaged, she felt an abrupt pop and burning in the top of her right 
shoulder. She was later diagnosed as having suffered a rotator cuff tear caused, or aggravated, 
by the accident she described. Defendants denied the claim, arguing that the physical activity in 
which claimant was engaged at the time of her injury was trivial, and that she could just as easily 
have sustained her injury in performing any number of activities of daily living unassociated 
with her employment. In essence, defendants argued that claimant's employment did not subject 
her to any greater risk of injury than she enjoyed apart from her employment. In this regard, 
defendants relied on the case of Wells v. Robinson Construction Company, 52 Idaho 562, 16 P.2d 
1059 (1932), which involved the claim of an outdoor construction worker who had the 
misfortune to be struck by a bolt of lightning. The rule employed by the court in that case to 
deny benefits to claimant is but a variation of the rule explained in Eriksen: 
The facts differ in each case, but the general principle runs through them all that 
in order for the injury to be compensable there must be a causal connection 
between the employment and the injury. It must be shown that the workman was 
more exposed to injury by lightning by reason of his employment than were 
others, not so engaged, in the same vicinity. That is, if the workman, in pursuit of 
his duties under his employment, is exposed to a special or peculiar danger from 
lightning, or the elements-a greater danger than other persons in the same 
locality are exposed to--and an unexpected death or injury is sustained by 
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lightning or the elements, such injury constitutes an accident "arising out of and in 
the course of' the employment. Conversely, if it is not shown that the workman 
was exposed by reason of his employment to a danger greater than, or not 
common to, other in that locality, his accident death or injury by lightning stroke 
or the elements is not compensable. 
Wells v. Robinson Construction Company, 52 Idaho at 566-567. 
Application of the rule explained in Eriksen would yield the same outcome. 
31. In Spivey, defendants urged the Court to apply the rule explained in Eriksen, and 
to rule that claimant could not prevail where it was shown that her employment subjected her to 
the same risk of injury to which she as exposed apart from her employment. Defendants urged 
the Court to rule that in order to prevail claimant must demonstrate that her employment exposed 
her to a risk of injury that was greater than the risk to which she was exposed apart from her 
employment. Without much fanfare, the Court rejected defendant's argument, relying on Mayo, 
supra, to conclude that Idaho law no longer supports the proposition that claimant must 
demonstrate that her employment subjects her to a "greater risk" before she can recover benefits. 
Implicit in the Court's decision is its rejection of the long established rule that where the risk of 
injury is neutral, or equal, an injured worker vvill not be able to satisfy the "arising" component 
of the rule. Therefore, after Spivey, it seems clear that where the risk of injury is one to which 
claimant is equally exposed both in, and without, his employment, the resulting injury is one 
which will be deemed to arise out of employment. This rule embraces coverage for both neutral 
and equal risks. However, it is clear that before benefits are payable, it must be demonstrated 
that claimant actually was exposed to the risk in question in the course of his employment, and 
that exposure to that risk led to the injury. 
32. In summary, we find that the risk of injury at issue in the instant matter is likely 
not a neutral risk, but, instead, a risk of injury that bears a causal connection to the work that 
Claimant was hired to perform. However, like a true "neutral" risk, it is a risk of injury to which 
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Claimant was equally exposed apart from his employment. Spivey v. Novartis Seed, Inc., supra, 
makes it clear that injuries resulting from both types of risks so characterized should be deemed 
to arise out of the employment. To the extent that the longstanding rule explained in Eriksen v. 
Nez Perce County, supra, is to the contrary, we perceive that rule is overruled by Spivey. Quite 
apart from the question of whether or not Claimant is entitled to a presumption favoring the 
compensability of this claim, the evidence establishes that Claimant has satisfied his burden of 
proving the occurrence of an accident both arising out and in the course of employment. 
TTD benefits 
Idaho Code § 72-408 provides for income benefits for total and partial disability during 
an injured worker's period of recovery. 
33. Claimant contends that he is entitled to an award of TTD benefits from 
December 28, 2009 until he was declared medically stable on December 6, 2010 following his 
second surgery. There being no evidence to the contrary, the Commission finds that Claimant is 
entitled to TTD benefits from December 28, 2009 through December 6, 2010. 
Medical benefits 
Idaho Code§ 72-432(1) obligates an employer to provide an injured employee reasonable 
medical care as may be required by his or her physician immediately following an injury and for 
a reasonable time thereafter. If the employer fails to provide the same, the injured worker may 
do so at the expense of employer. 
34. Claimant has incurred medical expenses totaling $149,033.68. See, Claimant's 
Exhibit 7. Neel v. Western Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), is premised on 
the assumption that an injured worker who contracts for medical care outside the workers' 
compensation system has, or may have, exposure to pay the full invoiced amount of medical bills 
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incurred in connection with his treatment. Here, there is no evidence that Claimant is obligated 
to pay anything other than the full invoiced amount. Therefore, as in Neel, we find Claimant is 
entitled to payment of the full invoiced amount of $149,033.68. 
Attorney fees 
Idaho Code § 72-804 provides for an award of attorney fees in the event an employer or 
its surety unreasonably denies a claim or neglect or refused to pay an injured employee 
compensation within a reasonable time. 
35. Claimant contends he is entitled to an award of attorney fees because the factual 
evidence in this case establishes a clear causal connection between the safe work environment 
and safety policies Claimant was required to follow and his act of tying his boots. Likewise, 
Claimant asserts there is no legal basis for Defendants' denial because the evidence is 
overwhelming that Claimant's injury occurred on Employer's satellite work premises, and 
Defendants have produced no evidence to overcome the Foust presumption. Further, within 
days of the denial, Claimant's counsel wrote Surety a five-page letter setting out Claimant's view 
of the presumption raised, the absence of evidence necessary to rebut the presumption and the 
liberal construction afforded to claimants in like cases. Surety did not even respond. 
36. Defendants argue that Idaho case law is conflicting regarding "arising out of' 
cases and that there are no Idaho cases regarding shoe tying. Further, Surety asserts that it 
should not be found liable for attorney fees because it conducted an investigation and secured a 
legal opinion prior to denying the claim. 
37. This is a close case. Because shoe tying is such a commonplace occurrence, at 
first blush it would seem that such an act could not be related to employment unless changing or 
selling shoes was one's occupation. There is no bright line in Idaho case law regarding when an 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 20 
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accident arises out of employment and there are no cases involving boot lace tying. More 
importantly, the scope and reach of the court's decision in Spivey v. Novartis Seed Inc., is a 
subject of legitimate debate. 
38. The Commission finds that Claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees 
for Surety's unreasonably denying his claim. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
Based on the foregoing analysis, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That: 
1. Claimant suffered an accident arising in the course of and out of his employment 
causing an injury on December 18, 2009. 
2. Claimant is awarded TTD benefits from December 28, 2009 through December 6, 
2010. 
3. Claimant is awarded medical benefits in the amount of $149,033.68. 
4. Claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
5. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to 
all matters adjudicated. 
DATEDthis \lK dayof __ ~--++----'2011. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ I\;~ 
I hereby certify that on the l l day of / , 2011, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
RECOMMENDATION was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following: 
RICK D KALLAS 
1031 EPARKBLVD 
BOISE ID 83712 
SUSAN R VELTMAN 
PO BOX2528 
BOISE ID 83701 
db 
Assistant Commission Secretary 
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Rick D. Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Telephone: (208) 336-1843 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8945 
Idaho State Bar No. 3872 
Attorney for Claimant 
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l.C. No. 2010-000114 
CLAIMANT'S REQUEST FOR 
CALENDARING 
COMES NOW Claimant, Michael P. Vawter, and, pursuant to J.R.P. 8 (C), hereby requests that 
the Industrial Commission calendar this claim Hearing on the following grounds: 
The requesting party hereby states: 
I) Readiness For Hearing 
The Claimant is ready for Hearing. 
2) Disputed Issues To Be Heard and Decided 
The following issues are before the Commission to be heard and decided: 
(a) What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent physical impairment (PPI) caused by the 
subject 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury? 
(b) What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent disability in excess of his physical 
Vawter I Claimant's 5.19.11 Request for Calendaring Page 1 
impairment (PPD >PPI) caused by the subject 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury, 
including whether the Claimant is totally and pennanently disabled under the 100% 
method and I or the odd-lot doctrine? 
3) Location of Hearing 
The desired location of the Hearing is Boise, Idaho. 
4) Claimant's Counsel's Unavailable Dates 
At the present time, the Claimant's attorney is not available for Hearing on the following dates: 
5.20.11; 5.23.11 - 5.24.11; 5.27.11; 5.30.11; 6.7.11 - 6.17.11; 6.23.11; 6.24.11; 6.27.11; 7.1.11 -
7.20.11; 8.12.11; 9.2.11 - 9.5.11. 
5) Length of Hearing 
The estimated length of time to present the Claimant's case in chief is one Yi day. 
6) Full Commission Participation 
This case does not present any unique, unusual or bizarre factual, legal or medical issues that 
need to be heard by the full Commission. 
7) Translation Services 
The Claimant does not require translation services. 
DATED this 19th day of May, 2011. 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC 
By 15~,~ 
RICKUALLAS 
Attorney for Claimant 
Vawter I Claimant's 5.19.11 Request for Calendaring Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day of May, 2011, I served the Claimant's Request For 
Calendaring on the Defendants by the method indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Susan R. Veltman, Esq. 
GARDNER & BREEN 
1410 West Washington 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Vawter I Claimant's 5.19.11 Request for Calendaring 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
Page 3 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850) 
GARDNER & BREEN 
1410 W. Washington- 83702 
Post Office Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
Attorney for Defendants 
ORf Gf 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MICHAEL P. VA WIER, 
Claimant, 
V. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, 
Employer, 
and 
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I. Statement of readiness for hearing: Defendants object to Claimant's Request for 
Calendaring of May 19, 2011 as premature. The Commission's decision regarding compensability 
was recently issued and Defendants are evaluating whether or not an appeal will be filed with the 
Idaho Supreme Court. Pursuant to IAR 14(b), Defendants have until June 28, 2011 to file their 
Notice of Appeal. If a timely appeal is filed, such action will potentially stay the Commission's prior 
Order on this case pursuant to IAR 13(d). As such, determination of PPI and PPD is premature. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING, P. 1 
In the event that Defendants do not appeal the underlying decision on compensability, the 
issue of PPD is not yet ripe. If and when there is a final determination of compensability, 
Defendants intend to obtain an IME to address permanent work restrictions; refer Claimant to ICRD; 
and will likely retain a vocational expert. Defendants raised the possibility of proceeding with an 
IME during pendency of the underlying compensability decision, but Claimant's counsel indicated a 
preference to wait until the compensability decision was issued. 
IL Issues: 
In addition to the issues identified by Claimant, Defendants assert that the issue of 
apportionment should be included once the case is ready for hearing . 
III. Location of hearing: Boise, Idaho 
IV. Desired dates of hearing: Defendants respectfully request that the case not be set for 
hearing at this time. In the event that Defendants opt not to appeal the compensability decision, 
Defendants would anticipate being ready for hearing after October 2011. 
IV. Unavailable dates of counsel: August 9, 10 
September 2, 21 
October 18 
V. Estimated length of hearing: One day. 
VI. Settlement Negotiations: Dismal. 
VIL Full Commission Participation: Not required. 
VIII. Special Services: None requested. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING, P. 2 
DATED this 31st day of May, 2010. 
Susan R. Veltman - of the firm 
GARDNER & BREEN 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of May, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to be served upon: 
Rick Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, 
the last known address as set forth above. 
SUSANR. VELTMAN 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING, P. 3 
Rick D. Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Telephone: (208) 336-1843 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8945 
Idaho State Bar No. 3872 
Attorney for Claimant 
2G!I - 3 P I: UC 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MICHAEL P. VAWTER, 
Claimant, 
vs. LC. No. 2010-000114 


















CLAIMANT'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR 
CALENDARING 
and 
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP., 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW Claimant, Michael P. Vawter, and, pursuant to J.R.P. 8 (C) and I.A.R. 13(d) 
hereby replies to the Defendants' Response to Claimant's Request For Calendaring as follows: 
(A) THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION SHOULD EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION UNDER 
I.A.R. 13(d) AND SET A HEARING TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING DISPUTED 
ISSUES IN THIS CLAIM 
The Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order only 
decided the following issues: 
1. Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 accident arise out of his employment? 
2. Are the Defendants liable for the payment of total temporary disability (TTD) benefits during 
the Claimant's period of recovery? 
3. Are the Defendants liable for 100% of the invoiced amount of past denied medical benefits? 
and, 
4. Are the Defendants liable for the payment of attorney's fees under Idaho Code §72-432? 
Vawter I Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Response To Claimant's Request for Calendaring Page 1 
(See Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order). 
On 5 .19 .11, the Claimant filed a Request For Calendaring on the following disputed issues that 
were not decided by the Industrial Commission in its 5 .17 .11 decision: 
1. What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent physical impairment (PPI) caused by the 
subject 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury? 
2. What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent disability in excess of his physical 
impairment (PPD >PPI) caused by the subject 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury, including 
whether the Claimant is totally and permanently disabled under the 100% method and I or the 
odd-lot doctrine? (See Claimant's 5.19.11 Request For Calendaring). 
The Defendants have objected to the Claimant's 5.19.11 Request For Calendaring based on the 
following grounds: 
1. The Defendants might file an appeal of the Industrial Commission's 5 .17 .11 decision at some 
time prior to June 28, 2011; 
2. If the Defendants file an appeal of the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 decision, that appeal 
could potentially stay the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 decision; and, 
3. The PPI I PPD issue is not yet ripe for determination. 
The Industrial Commission should not refuse to calendar the disability issue for Hearing based on 
speculation over whether the Defendants will decide to exercise their right to file an appeal of the 
Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 decision. Even if the Defendants were to exercise their statutory right to 
file an appeal, that limited appeal of the "arising out of employment issue" would not bar the Industrial 
Commission from exercising continuing jurisdiction over the remaining disputed issues in this case which 
have not yet been decided. 
The Defendants cite I.A.R. 13(d) to support their position that all issues in this case are 
automatically stayed pending the outcome of an appeal. I.A.R. 13( d) only applies to the disputed issues 
that were decided in the final and appealable Order. Even with respect to those issues that were merged 
into the final and appealable Order, the Industrial Commission retains the right to exercise continuing 
jurisdiction over those issues upon entry of an appropriate Order: 
Vawter I Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Response To Claimant's Request for Calendaring Page 2 
re r 
In administrative appeals from the Industrial Commission the order or award 
shall be stayed as provided by statute during the pendency of the appeal, unless 
otherwise ordered by the Industrial Commission or the Supreme Court. (See 
I.A.R. 13( d) (emphasis supplied). 
I.A.R. 13( d) does not bar the Industrial Commission from retaining continuing jurisdiction over 
those disputed issues which were not merged into a final Order. The Claimant has only asked the 
Commission to set a Hearing on the ultimate issues regarding the extent of the Claimant's PPI and PPD > 
PPL If the Commission were to adopt the Defendants' position and refuse to set the PPI and PPD > PPI 
issues for Hearing, the Claimant would have to wait 2 years for the Defendants' appeal of the "arising out 
of employment" issue to be decided by the Idaho Supreme Court. After the Supreme Court affirms the 
Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 Order, the Claimant would then be required to file a new Request For 
Calendaring on the PPI and PPD > PPI issues. The Claimant's new Request For Calendaring could not be 
filed until approximately June of2013. Based on the Industrial Commission's calendaring timetables, the 
new Hearing on the PPI and PPD > PPI issues would not be set for at least 6 months until December of 
2013. 
After the December 2013 Hearing, the parties would then take post-Hearing depositions of 
physicians and VRE experts for 30 days followed by 120 days of legal briefing. This case would then be 
under advisement for 6 months to a year before a final decision on PPI and PPD > PPI would be issued 
from the Commission. The Claimant would then have to wait 2.5 years until December of 2014 before he 
received a final decision from the Commission. After receiving a final decision, the Defendants could 
then file a 2nd appeal with the Idaho Supreme Court. It could take another 2 years after entry of the 
Commission's final decision before the Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission's decision on 
the PPI and PPD > PPI issues; i.e., December of 2016. 
By filing an objection to the Claimant's Request For Calendaring and asking the Commission to 
refuse to exercise continuing jurisdiction over the remaining disputed issues which have never been 
decided, the Defendants are basically asking the Claimant to wait until December of 2016 before he 
Vawter I Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Response To Claimant's Request for Calendaring Page 3 
receives a final decision on the PPI and PPD > PPI issues. Such a delay in the determination of the 
ultimate issues in this case would not provide the Claimant with fair and equitable relief. 
Idaho Code §72-708 and JRP 1 promise the Claimant the just, speedy and economical 
determination of every disputed issue. The process and procedure before the Industrial Commission is 
supposed to be as summary and simple as possible and in accordance with the rules of equity. Making 
the Claimant wait for the Supreme Court to affirm the Commission's holding on the "arising out of 
employment" issue before setting the remaining disputed issues for Hearing would not be fair or equitable 
to the Claimant. (See LC. §72-708). 
The Defendants' final argument is that they need to schedule an IME to challenge Dr. Frizzell' s 
medical opinions regarding PPI, apportionment of PPI and permanent restrictions. Although the Claimant 
recognizes that the Defendants have a statutory right to compel the Claimant to submit to an IME, the 
Industrial Commission should not set Hearing dates based on when the Defendants decide to schedule 
IME appointments or when the IME doctor is available to conduct the IME examination or when the IME 
doctor completes his IME report and delivers it to the Defendants. 
The calendaring of a Hearing date by the Industrial Commission is the event that brings structure 
and order to an otherwise haphazard and chaotic litigation process because it is the presence of that 
Hearing date hanging over the parties' heads which creates the incentive to complete the IME process and 
the Vocational Rehabilitation Expert (VRE) evaluation process in a timely manner so that all of the 
expert's reports can be filed with the Industrial Commission at least 10 days before the Hearing as 
required by JRP 10( C). 
Based on all of the reasons set forth above, the Claimant respectfully requests that the Industrial 
Commission exercise its right to retain continuing jurisdiction over all of the remaining disputed issues in 
this case that were not decided by the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 Order and set a Hearing date in the 
future which will give the parties sufficient time to complete the IME and disability evaluation processes. 
By setting a Hearing date now, the Commission will be creating the structure and predictability that is 
Vawter I Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Response To Claimant's Request for Calendaring Page 4 
necessary in order to ensure that the Claimant receives the just, speedy and economical determination of 
all disputed issues in his case in accordance with Idaho Code §72-708 and JRP l(A). 
DATED this 3rd day of June, 2011. 
ELLSWORTH, K-'\.LLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of June, 2011, I served the Claimant's Reply to the 
Defendants' Response to Claimant's Request For Calendaring on the Defendants by the method indicated 
below and addressed to the following: 
Susan R. Veltman, Esq. 
GARDNER & BREEN 
1410 West Washington 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MICHAEL P. VAWTER, 
Claimant, 
v. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC., 
Employer, 
and 























On May 19, 2011, Claimant filed a request for calendaring. Claimant seeks to have a 
hearing scheduled on the issues of permanent impairment and permanent disability. Defendants 
object to the request. They argue that the issue of permanent disability is not yet ripe. Defendants 
intend to obtain an independent medical evaluation and retain a vocational expert. 
Based on Defendant's objection, we find that this case is not yet ready for hearing. 
Therefore, Claimant's request for calendaring is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this ___ day ofJune, 2011. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR CALENDARING - 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
... -! .-I 
I hereby certify that on the :5td- day of June 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR CALENDARING was served by regular 
United States Mail upon each of the following: 
RICK D KALLAS 
1031 E PARK BLVD 
BOISE ID 83712 
SUSAN R VELTMAN 
PO BOX2528 
BOISE ID 83701 
eb 
ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR CALENDARING - 2 
























NOTICE OF TELEPHONE 
CONFERENCE 
and 
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP., 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
A telephone conference will be conducted by the Commissioners, pursuant to the Judicial 
Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Workers' Compensation Law, on September 7, 2011 
at 10:30 a.m. (MDT), to discuss refining and/or adding additional issues for hearing. 
Rick D. Kallas may be reached at (208) 336-1843 
Susan R. Veltman may be reached at (208) 921-1385 
If there are any changes to these numbers, please contact us immediately. You may do 
this by calling the Industrial Commission at (208) 334-6023. 
All parties shall be ready to proceed at the scheduled time for conference. Sanctions may 
be imposed against any party not prepared or not participating. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter 
on Tuesday, October 25, 2011 at 9:00 a.m., for a full-day, in the Industrial Commission 
hearing room, 700 South Clearwater Lane, City of Boise, County of Ada, State of Idaho, on the 
AMENDED NOTICE OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
following issues: 
1. The extent and degree of Claimant's entitlement to permanent partial impairment 
(PPI); 
2. The extent and degree of Claimant's entitlement to permanent partial disability (PPD) 
in excess of PPI, including whether or not Claimant is a totally and permanently 
disabled under the odd-lot doctrine. 
3. Whether apportionment under Idaho Code § 72-406, is appropriate. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 7th day of June, 2011. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Tufhvc~ omas . as m, omm1ss10ner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of June, 2011 a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Notice of Telephone Conference was served by Facsimile Processing Machine upon each of 
the following: 
RICK D KALLAS FAX # (208) 345-8945 
SUSAN P VELTMAN FAX# (208) 387-3501 
amw 
MIENDED NOTICE OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
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SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850) 
GARDNER & BREEN 
1410 W. Washington- 83702 
Post Office Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
sve 1 tman((Vgardnerlaw .net 
Attorney for Appellants 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, MICHAEL P. VAWTER, THROUGH HIS 
ATTORNEY,RICKKALLAS, 1031E.PARKBLVD.,BOISE,IDAHO83712,ANDTHE IDAHO 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellants, United Parcel Service and Liberty Insurance Corp., 
appeal against the above-named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order entered in the above-entitled proceeding on the 1 ih day of May 
2011, by Chairman Thomas E. Limbaugh, Commissioner Thomas P. Baskin, and Commissioner 
R.D. Maynard. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, PG. I 
2. That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the order 
described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 11 ( d) LA.R. 
Appellants represent that the appealed order did not adjudicate all of the issues or potential 
issues involved in Respondent's workers' compensation claim. However, the above described order 
appears to meet the criteria for a "final order" within the meaning of Rule 11 ( d) LA.R. as interpreted 
by Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 121 Idaho 127; 823 P.2d 161 (1992) and Hartman v. Double L. Mfg., 
141Idaho456; 111P.3d141 (2005). The appealed order does not address retention of jurisdiction 
and the order purports to be final as to all matters adjudicated. Therefore, there is no "explicit" 
retention of jurisdiction. Additionally, the appealed order provides a specific award of compensation 
with regard to the matters litigated. 
3. Preliminary statement of the issues on appeal: 
(a) Whether the Idaho Industrial Commission erred in determining that Claimant suffered 
an accident arising in the course of and out of his employment causing an injury on December 18 
2009; 
(b) Whether the Idaho Industrial Commission erred in determining that Claimant is awarded 
temporary total disability benefits from December 28, 2009 through December 6, 201 O; and 
( c) Whether the Idaho Industrial Commission erred in determining that Claimant is 
awarded medical benefits in the amount of $149,033.68. 
4. There is no order sealing any portion of the record. 
5. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Industrial 
Commission's record regardless of whether such documents would automatically be included under 
Rule 28, LA.R.: 
(a) Notice of Hearing filed July 20, 2010 
(b) The Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order filed 
May 17, 2011; 
(c) The hearing transcript of September 28, 2010; 
(d) Claimant's Exhibits 1-20, admitted at hearing; 
(e) Defendants' Exhibits 1-8, admitted at hearing; 
(f) Deposition of Mike McGuire taken September 16, 2010; 
(g) Claimant's Opening Brief filed November 19, 2010 
(h) Defendants' Response Brief filed December 17, 2010 
(i) Claimant's Reply Brief field December 28, 2010 
6. I certify: 
(a) That there is no transcript fee because the Industrial Commission provides a copy of 
the transcript upon written request, without a fee, to all parties and the transcript has already been 
prepared; 




(b) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Industrial Commission's record has been 
(c) That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
(d) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20 
DA TED THIS 20th day of June, 2011. 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850) 
GARDNER & BREEN 
Post Office Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
sve 1 tman(a),gardnerlaw. net 
Attorney for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 20th day of June, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to be served upon: 
Rick Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83 712 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, 
the last known address as set forth above. 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, PG. 3 
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Claimant/Respondent, 
v. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC., 
Employer, 
and 





Order Appealed from: 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Attorney for Respondent: 
Appealed By: 
Appealed Against: 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
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Thomas E. Limbaugh, Chairman presidin_g 
IC 2010-000114 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Caw, 
and Order, filed May 17, 2011 
Susan R. Veltman 
PO Box 2528 
Boise, ID 83702 
Rick D. Kallas 
1031 E Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83 712 
Employer/Surety, Defendants/ Appellants 
Claimant/Respondent 
June 20, 2011 
,>" 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL FOR MICHAEL P. VAWTER - 1 
FILED- ORIG!NAL 
JUN 2 2 2011 
Supreme Court_Court 
Entered on ATS b 
als-
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Name of Reporter: 
Transcript Requested: 
Dated: 
$86.00 to Supreme Court and 
$100.00 to Industrial Commission 
Checks were received. 
M.D. Willis 
PO Box 1241 
Eagle, ID 883616 
Standard transcript has been requested. Transcript 
has been prepared and filed with the Commission. 
June 21, 2011 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL FOR MICHAEL P. VAWTER - 2 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 













ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38914-2011 
Industrial Commission No. 2010-114 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC., 
Employer, LIBERTY INSURANCE 
CORPORATION, Surety, 
' % 
Ref. No. 11-338 
Respondents-Appellants, 
1. A MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF CROSS:JAPPEAL, an 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICK D. KALLAS IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL, and a 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE NOTICE 
OF CROSS-APPEAL were filed by counsel for Respondent on June 27, 2011. 
2. Additionally, CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY 
DISMISSAL OF APPEAL, an AFFIDAVIT OF RICK D. KALLAS IN SUPPORT OF 
CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF 
APPEAL, with attachments, and CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL were filed by counsel 
for Respondent on June 27, 2011. 
3. DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL, an AFFIDAVIT OF 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN IN SUPPORT OF DEENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' RESPONSE 
TO CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF 
APPEAL and DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL were filed by counsel for 
Appellant on July 8, 2011. 
The Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL be, and hereby is, GRANTED and this appeal is 
DISMISSED. 
ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL-Docket No. 38914-2011 
Il
l 
DATED this J J t-day of July, 2011. 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
Ste~ rxyon~far 
cc: Counsel of Record 
Industrial Commission Secretary 















In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
MICHAEL P. VAWTER, 
· Claimant-Respondent~ 
v. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC., 




.... ·r···-·oRDERDENYING MOTION FOR-
) CLARIFICATION 
) 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 38914-2011 
) Industri<tl Commission No. 2010-114 
) 
) Ref. No. 11-380 
) 
) 
An ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL was issued by this Court on July 27, 2011. 
Thereafter, a MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION and AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN R. VELTMAN IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION were filed by counsel for Appellants on August 
1, 2011. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellants' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION be, and 
hereby is, DENIED and counsel shall be referred to Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 121 Idaho 127, 823 
P.2d 161 (1992) and the Amended Notice of Telephone Conference and Notice of Hearing in 
Industrial Commission No. 2010-000114, which was filed on June 7, 2011. 
, ,-:::.IL 
DATED this / ,:) - day of August, 2011. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
Industrial Commission Secretary 
By Order of Jibe Supreme Court 
I 
1/ J 
~~~ /t:l 'Stephen W. Kenyon) Clerk, 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION -Docket No. 38914-2011 
II 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE 
A WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMPLAINT 
AGAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND 
Claimant's Name and Address Claimant's Attorney's Name and Address 
Michael Vawter Rick Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco 
Donnelly, ID 83615 1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
Employer's Name and Address Employer's Attorney's Name and Adrress 
United Parcel Service, 270 S. 7th, Payette, ID 83661 
Claimant's Social Security Number ::>usan R. Veltman 
Gardner & Breen 
P.O. Box 2528 
Claimant's Date of Birth Boise, ID 83701 
IC Number of Current Claim Surety's Name and Address (Not Adjuster's) 
12010-000114 Liberty Insurance Corp 
Date of the Most Recent Injury C/O Gallagher Bassett 
720 E. Park Blvd., Ste. 125 
12/18/2009 Boise ID 83712 
Claimant's Occupation Claimant's Weekly Wage 
UPS Package Driver ,$1,170.60 
Nature and cause of pre-existing impairment or condition. Submit documentation. 
See attached 
What factors render the Claimant totally and permanently disabled? Submit documentation. 
Claimant alleges total permanent disability and has applied for SSDI benefits. Defendants do not concede 
total permanent disability but acknowledge significant restrictions assigned by the treating doctor for the 
current injury, Dr. Frizzell, based on recent FCE. Defendants are in the process of obtaining expert vocational 
opinions from Nancy Collins, PhD. 
What impairment ratings has the Claimant received and from whom? Submit documentation. 
With regard to the current back injury, Dr. Frizzell assigned 12% PPL Total rating for the back is 19% PPI with 
7% PPI apportioned to Claimant's pre-existing lumbar condition based on CT scan findings following 
Claimant's 1990 back injury. Prior impairment ratings are reflected on attached page. 
Certificate of Service 
I certify that on August 18, 2011 
of Intent upon: 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
Department of Administration 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-7901 
, I served a true and correct copy of the Notice 
Claimant's Name and Address 
Michael Vawter c/o Rick Kallas 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
{( 
Employer's Name and Address 
United Parcel Service 
270 S. 7th 
Payette, ID 83661 
Surety's Name and Address 
Liberty Ins. Corp. c/o Gallagher BassE 
720 E. Park Blvd, Ste. 125 
Boise, ID 83712 
Medical Release 
I hereby authorize any defendant and defendants' legal counsel, at their sole expense to 
examine, inspect, receive or take copies of any medical reports, records, x-rays, or test 
results of hospitals, physicians or any other person, or to receive information from any 
person having examined me and their diagnosis, relative to my past, present, and future 
physical and mental condition. 
I also authorize and direct that a duplicate set of all documents or written records 
provided to said law firm, or any individual member thereof, also be provided to me or 
my attorney, . The defendant requesting my records shall bear 
the expense incurred in production of such duplicate set. 
I further authorize that copies of this authorization may be used in lieu of the original. 
THIS AUTHORIZATION IS VALID ONL YFOR THE DURATION OF THE 
PENDING LITIGATION. It is further understood that all information obtained under 
this authorization shall be regarded as confidential and maintained as such. 
Dated OBTAIN FROM CLAIMANT 
Claimant's signature 
This form is to notify the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund that you intend to file a 
formal Workers' Compensation Complaint Against the ISIF after a period of 60 days. 
This time period allows the ISIF to adjudicate the claim on a more informal basis and to 
avoid or limit necessary litigation costs. If you wish to file a Complaint Against the ISIF 
after 60 days, you may do so by the standard service process. You do not need to file a 
copy of this form with the Industrial Commission. 
Michael Vawter: 
Nature and cause of pre-existing impairment or condition: 
Previous Industrial Injuries with pennanent partial impairment ratings include: 
March 1998- crush injury to right thumb with fracture. 17% hand (9% WP) by William 
Lenzi, M.D. 
September 1990- left shoulder arthroscopic surgery. 7% WP by Steven Rudd, MD. 
October 1990- back injuries. 7% WP as forensically appo1iioned by Tyler Frizzell, MD. 
July 2004- right shoulder arthroscopic surgery. 10% WP by Ro be1i Walker, MD. 
Other pre-existing conditions that have not yet been rated: 
Type II diabetes; osteoa1ilu·itis of multiple joints, including knees; hyperlipidemia; 
hypertension; bilateral knee pain; tobacco abuse. 
Description of current injurv: 
Claimant bent over to tie his boot and felt "pop" in his back. 
79 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
MICHAEL P. VAWTER, 
Claimant-Respondent, 
v. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC., 















Supreme Court Docket 38914 
Industrial Commission 2010-114 
TO: THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, STATE OF IDAHO. 
therefore, 
DISMISSED. 
The Court having entered an Order dismissing this appeal July 27, 2011; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal herein be, and hereby is, 
C1 '\.}' 
DATED this __ \_ day of August, 2011. 
Clerk of -che Sup ,me Court 
STATE OF IDAHO 
cc: Counsel of Record 
Secretary, Industrial Commission 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850) 
GARDNER & BREEN 
1410 W. Washington - 83702 
Post Office Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
Attorney for Defendants 
! , ~ r:- I 
! 1 ' "--'I. 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MICHAEL P. VAWTER, 
Claimant, 
V. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, 
Employer, 
and 
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The Industrial Commission's hearing notice of June 7, 2011, was generated following a 
teleconference with the parties and reflects issues of permanent impairment, permanent disability and 
apportionment are to be addressed at hearing on October 25, 2011. The Commission previously 
issued a decision of May 17, 2011 on issues of compensability, medical benefits, temporary 
disability benefits and attorney fees. 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL ISSUES AT HEARING, P. 1 
vr 
Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal of the May 17, 2011 decision on June 20, 2011, and the 
Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on July 27, 2011. The Order Dismissing Appeal did not 
reflect the basis of dismissal or whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. Defendants 
filed a Motion of Clarification of that order on August 1, 2011. The Court denied the Motion for 
clarification but referred the parties to the case of Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 120 Idaho 127, 127, 823 
P.2d 161, 161 (1992), in which the Court dismissed the claimant's appeal because the Commission 
expressly reserved jurisdiction on the issues of impairment and disability. 
The Court did not agree with Defendants' arguments that the present case is distinguishable 
from the Jensen case and that the May 17, 2011 decision should be considered a final decision 
pursuant to IAR 11 ( d) which states an appeal as a matter of right may be taken to the Supreme 
Court, from any final decision or order of the Industrial Commission. The Court's reference to the 
Jensen case implies the Court does not consider the May 17, 2011 decision to constitute a final order 
of the Commission. 
Defendants believe that a discrepancy exists between the Idaho Supreme Court and Industrial 
Commission as to what constitutes a final order and that such discrepancy complicates both 
Defendants' payment obligations and Claimant's ability to enforce the Commission's May 17, 2011 
award. 
Defendants respectfully request that the Commission include the following issues at hearing 
which Defendants believe are issues of first impression: 
1. Whether the Commission's May 17, 2011 Order in this case trigger Defendants' 
payment obligations in spite of the Idaho Supreme Court's implied ruling that the Order is not a final 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL ISSUES AT HEARING, P. 2 
for purposes ofIAR 1 l(d). 
2. If so, whether Defendants are entitled to reimbursement from Claimant and/or his 
attorney ifthe Commissions' May 17, 2011 award is reversed on appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Additionally, Defendants seek to include the following issues regarding ISIF liability: 
3. Whether the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund is liable under Idaho Code§ 72-332. 
4. Apportionment under the Carey formula. 
Defendants are aware that inclusion ofISIF issues may require postponement of the October 
25, 2011 hearing. Defendants served its Notice oflntent to file a Complaint against ISIF on August 
18, 2011. Defendants believe ISIF is a necessary party to this claim based on recent expert 
consultation reflecting the possibility that Claimant's permanent restrictions render him totally 
permanently disabled based on a combination of impairment from his previous conditions and the 
current injury. 
During the June 2011 teleconference, the Commission questioned Claimant's counsel as to 
whether this might be an ISIF case and he felt it was not. Since the conference, the treating doctor 
clarified permanent restrictions on June 27, 2011 and Claimant's social security records were 
obtained. Defendants retained Nancy Collins, PhD, as a vocational expert and forwarded documents 
for her to review on July 14, 2011. Dr. Collins is scheduled to meet with Claimant for an interview 
on August 31, 2011, after which it is anticipated that she will prepare a report reflecting her 
op1mons. 
Although Claimant has alleged total permanent disability since the early stages of this claim 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL ISSUES AT HEARING, P. 3 
Although Claimant has alleged total permanent disability since the early stages of this claim 
and Claimant's multiple previous injuries and related impairments have been known to Defendants, 
evidence regarding Claimant's vocational abilities and the impact of his permanent restrictions did 
not previously cause Defendants to conclude that ISIF is a necessary party. 
For the above stated reasons, Defendants request inclusion of the four additional issues 
described above. 
DA TED this 19th day of August, 2011. 
Susan R. Veltman - of the firm 
GARDNER & BREEN 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day of August, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon: 
Rick Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, 
the last known address as set forth above. 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL ISSUES AT HEARING, P. 4 
Rick D. Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Telephone: (208) 336-1843 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8945 
Idaho State Bar No. 3872 
Attorney for Claimant 
"'"' "' ,, j i : 
ii 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 





















LC. No. 2010-000114 
CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION [REQUEST] 
TO ADD ISSUES AT HEARING 
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP., 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW Claimant, Michael Vawter, and, pursuant to J.R.P. 8 (C)(2), hereby 
objects to adding the reimbursement issue for determination at the 10.25.2011 Hearing on the 
following grounds: 
1. The reimbursement issue is not ripe for determination. The Industrial Commission does 
not have jurisdiction to determine whether a right to reimbursement exists until two (2) 
predicate events occur: (1) The Defendants pay to Claimant all benefits that were 
ordered to be paid in the Industrial Commission's 05 .17.2011 decision; and (2) The 
Vawter I Claimant's 8.31.11 Objection to Defendants' Motion [Request] to Add Issues at Hearing Page I 
Idaho Supreme Court reverses the Industrial Commission's 05 .17.2011 decision and 
holds that this claim is not compensable. After both of these events occurred, the 
reimbursement issue would then be ripe for determination. 
2. The Claimant also objects to the Defendants' attempt to hold the Claimant's attorney 
personally liable. The Claimant's attorney is not a party to a worker's compensation 
claim and does not have any legal right to receive worker's compensation benefits under 
the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. The Idaho Workers' Compensation Act places 
an obligation on employer I surety to provide "sure and certain relief for injured workmen 
and their families and dependents". (See LC. §72-201). Any relief available under the 
Act is only available to the injured worker and I or his dependents. 
3. The income benefits that employer I surety are obligated to pay under the Act must be 
paid "to the injured employee disabled by an injury or occupational disease, or his 
dependents in case of death" (See LC. §72-102(16)). 
4. The medical benefits that employer I surety are obligated to pay under Idaho Code §72-
432 must be paid to the injured worker: 
The provider asserts that it is entitled to direct payment from the surety of 
the medical expenses. We disagree. 
The workers' compensation law contains the following provision: 
The employer shall provide for an injured employee such reasonable 
medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital 
service, medicines, crutches and apparatus, as may be required by the 
employee's physician or needed immediately after an injury or disability 
from an occupational disease, and for a reasonable time thereafter. If the 
employer fails to provide the same, the injured employee may do so at the 
expense of the employer. I.C. § 72-432(1). 
By this statute, the employer is mandatorily required to provide its injured 
employees with medical care when they qualify for workers' 
compensation. Paulson v. Idaho Forest Industries, Inc., 99 Idaho 896, 902, 
591 P.2d 143, 149 (1979). St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. 
Edmondson, 130 Idaho 108, 937 P.2d 420 (1997). 
Vawter I Claimant's 8.31.11 Objection to Defendants' Motion [Request] to Add Issues at Hearing Page 2 
*** 
Accordingly, Surety is obligated to pay Mr. Neel the full invoiced amount 
for all medical bills he incurred for his industrial accident prior to June 8, 
2007, the date that his claim was deemed compensable by the 
Commission. Neel v. Western Construction, Inc., 147 Idaho 146 206 P. 3d 
852 (2009). 
5. The injured worker is the only party to a workers' compensation proceeding who has the 
legal right to collect income benefits and medical benefits from employer I surety. If the 
Defendants are ultimately entitled to assert a reimbursement claim because the Idaho 
Supreme Court reversed the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 decision and found this 
claim to be not compensable, the Defendants' right to demand reimbursement would only 
apply against the Claimant who is a party to these proceedings. 
Based on the foregoing, the Claimant respectfully requests that the Industrial 
Commission deny the Defendants' request to add the reimbursement issue to these proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of August, 2011. 
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C. 
Vawter I Claimant's 8.3 l.l l Objection to Defendants' Motion [Request] to Add Issues at Hearing Page 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31 51 day of August, 2011, I served the Claimant's Objection To 
Defendants' Motion [Request] To Add Issues At Hearing on the Defendants by the method indicated 
below and addressed to the following: 
Susan R. Veltman, Esq. 
GARDNER & BREEN 
1410 West Washington 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
Vawter I Claimant's 8.31.11 Objection to Defendants' Motion [Request] to Add Issues at Hearing Page 4 




UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, 
Employer, 
And 






















ORDER VACATING HEARING 
AND ESTABLISHING 
BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
Based on a telephone conference held with the parties on September 7, 2011, the Industrial 
Commission of the State ofldaho hereby ORDERS that the hearing set for October 25, 2011 at 9:00 
a.m., (Mountain Time) in the above-entitled matter is VACATED. 
The Commission hereby establishes the following briefing schedule, as stipulated to by the 
parties through their respective attorneys, on the issue of whether there is authority to stay payment 
of the March 17, 2011 Commission order as follows: 
1. Defendants shall have ten days (10), after the date of this order to submit a brief; 
and, 
2. Claimant shall have twenty days (20) after the date of this order to submit his 
responsive brief. 
ORDER VACATING HEARING AND 
ESTABLISHING BRIEFING SCHEDULE -1 
Pursuant to a directive from the Commissioners, three copies of all briefs shall be filed 
along with the original to facilitate review of cases. 
DATED this 1fl{ day of September, 2011. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
Assistant Commission Secretari::.#& 
4:~#.j'#~ 
£;lfifgH 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the J!! day of September, 2011 a true and correct copy of Order 
Vacating Hearing and Establishing Briefing Schedule was sent by facsimile processing machine 
upon each of the following: 
RICK KALLAS 
SUSAN VELTMAN 





Fax # (208) 345-8945 
Fax# (208) 387-3501 
ORDER VACATING HEARING AND 
ESTABLISHING BRIEFING SCHEDULE - 2 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850) 
GARDNER & BREEN 
1410 W. Washington - 83702 
Post Office Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
Attorney for Defendants 
Fl E 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MICHAEL P. VAWTER, 
Claimant, 
v. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, 
Employer, 
and 



















LC. Case No. 2010-000114 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM 
REGARDING THE ISSUE OF 
PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS 
On September 7, 2011, the Commission conducted a telephone conference to discuss the 
issues for hearing. In response to a request from the Commission, Defendants submit this 
memorandum regarding the issue of payment obligations. 
BACKGROUND 
A hearing on bifurcated issues took place on September 27, 2010, and on May 1 7, 2011, the 
DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE ISSUE OF PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 1 
Industrial Commission issued its Order. In accordance with Idaho Code § 72-718, the Order states 
that the decision is final as to all matters adjudicated. The matters adjudicated at hearing were 1) 
whether Claimant suffered an injury arising out of his employment, 2) whether Claimant is entitled 
to total temporary disability (TTD benefits and the extent thereof, 3) whether Claimant is entitled to 
medical benefits and the extent thereof, and 4) whether Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney 
fees. 
In reliance on the language in the Order that it was final as to all matters adjudicated, 
Defendants appealed the case to the Supreme Court pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule ll(d). 
Although I.A.R. 12 also provides for an appeal, it is permissive, applies to non-final interlocutory 
orders that are not otherwise appealable, and does not guarantee a remedy. Permissive appeals are 
not valid or effective until and unless the Supreme Court enters an order accepting the interlocutory 
order as appealable and grants the requesting party leave to file a notice of appeal within the 
specified time period. Accordingly, Defendants appealed pursuant to I.A.R.11 ( d). 
On appeal, Defendants' articulated the reasons the Commission's decision was 
distinguishable from previous cases that were dismissed and remanded back as non-final and 
premature. Defendants did not assert that all Commission decisions should be considered final in 
every situation, but given the facts of this particular case, the Order was final as to the matters 
adjudicated. (Exhibit 1: Defendants' I Appellants' Brief in Support of Defendants' I Appellants' 
Response to Claimant I Respondent's Motion for Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal dated July 8, 
2011). The Court rejected Defendants' argument, but did not state the grounds for its decision. 
(Exhibit 2: The Idaho Supreme Court's Order Dismissing Appeal dated July 27, 2011). Upon 
DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE ISSUE OF PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 2 
q 
Defendants' Motion for Clarification, the Court denied the Motion, citing Jensen v. Pillsbury. In 
Jensen, the Court held that "a decision of the Commission which does not finally dispose of all of the 
claimant's claims would not be a fmal decision subject to appeal pursuant to IA.R. ll(d) ... . " 
Jensen v. Pillsbury, 121Idaho127, 127, 823P.2d161, 161 (1992) (emphasis added) (citingKindred 
v.Amalgamated Sugar Co, 118 Idaho 147, 149, 795 P.2d 309, 311 (1990)). (Exhibit 3: Defendants' 
I Appellants' Motion for Clarification dated August 1, 2011, Exhibit 4: The Idaho Supreme Court's 
Order Denying Motion for Clarification dated August 15, 2011). 
ISSUES 
The issues to be addressed are: 
1. Whether the Commission's May 17, 2011, Order is final pursuant to LC.§ 72-718 
and as stated in the decision, or whether it is not final as implied by the Idaho 
Supreme Court? 
2. Whether and in what manner Defendants' payment obligations are triggered by 
the Commission's May 17, 2011, Order. 
FINALITY AND APPELLATE RIGHTS 
Pursuant to LC. § 72-718, a decision of the Industrial Commission shall be final as to all 
matters adjudicated 20 days from the date of filing with the Commission, absent fraud or the filing of 
a motion for reconsideration. Section 72-718 further provides that final decisions may be appealed 
to the Idaho Supreme Court. Additionally, I.A.R. 11 ( d) provides for appeal as a matter of right of 
"any final decision or order of the Industrial Commission." Consequently, finality of an Industrial 
DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE ISSUE OF PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 3 
Commission decision goes hand in hand with the ability to appeal such decision as a matter of right. 
Once a party appeals a final decision, payment obligations are stayed pursuant to LC. § 72-731 and 
I.AR. 13( d). 
DEFENDANTS' PAYMENT RESPONSIBLITY 
If indeed the Commission's decision in this case is not final as to the matters adjudicated, 
Defendants' responsibility to pay benefits should be deferred pending a final, appealable order. To 
hold otherwise creates an irreconcilable situation in which the decision is final as to one purpose 
(Defendants' payment responsibility), but not final as to another (their right to appeal). This 
situation would violate Defendants' due process rights and qualifies as a manifest injustice. 
Other than the general provisions that workers' compensation claimants shall be afforded 
sure and certain relief, there is a lack of guidance in the relevant statutes, rules, and regulations 
regarding the time frame for payments ordered by an Industrial Commission award. In effect, the 
Industrial Commission has no statutory authority to enforce its own awards. Though LC. § 72-735 
provides for enforcement in district court, there must be a decision from which no appeal has been 
taken within the time allowed. Similarly, while Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 69 discusses 
execution on a judgment, it requires an appealable final judgment. 
In the present case, until the Industrial Commission resolves all pending issues on Claimant's 
claim, the parties remain in the time period allowed to appeal the May 17, 2011, decision. This 
premise is consistent with the Supreme Court's Order Denying Clarification, where it indicated the 
Commission's Order is not yet an appealable final judgment. Of note, though Claimant agrees with 
the Supreme Court that the Order is not final for purposes of an appeal, at the same time, he asserts it 
DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE ISSUE OF PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 4 
is final for purposes of Defendants paying him medical benefits. In considering the issue of 
"[ w]hether Claimant is entitled to medical benefits and the extent thereof," the Commission awarded 
Claimant $149,033.68 in medical benefits. Claimant, however, apparently does not consider the 
issue final because he recently demanded Defendants pay him $24,627.85 in additional medical 
benefits beyond those awarded in the decision. (Exhibit 5: Claimant's demand for payment to 
Defendants' dated August 9, 2011). Thus, Claimant alleges a final decision for purposes of 
Defendants' payment obligations, but not final for purposes of Defendants' appealing it to the 
Supreme Court or to increase his award of medical benefits. 
Certainly there are circumstances in which it is reasonable for the Commission to expect 
payment pursuant to a bifurcated issue that is potentially non-final for appellate purposes. This is 
particularly true with regard to medical or sustenance benefits ordered as a result of an emergency 
hearing pursuant to Judicial Rule of Procedure 8(D). However, in the present case, no such exigent 
circumstances exist. Claimant has received medical treatment billed in the amount of$ l 73,661.53, 
which was paid in significant part by his health insurance through the Oregon Teamster Employers 
Trust. (Exhibit 5: Claimant's demand for payment to Defendants' dated August 9, 2011 ). Similarly, 
Claimant has received at least some amount of time-loss benefits through short-term disability 
benefits. (Exhibit 6: Claimant's May 3, 2010, answer to Interrogatory No. 16). It also appears 
Claimant has received additional disability benefits, though the precise amount is unknown because 
he has not supplemented his discovery responses to reflect payments received since March 16, 2010. 
Accordingly, Claimant has significant liens to satisfy out of any award received and any funds paid 
to him would not be immediately available to relieve hardship. Significantly, Claimant's satisfaction 
DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE ISSUE OF PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 5 
of any lien will likely prevent or complicate Defendants' right to reimbursement in the event the 
compensability determination is reversed on appeal. 
THE RATIONALE FOR BIFURCATION 
The circumstances surrounding the bifurcation of issues are relevant to the discussion of 
Defendants' payment responsibility. Claimant previously argued that Defendants intentionally 
bifurcated issues because they preferred multiple hearings. (Exhibit 7: Claimant I Respondent's 
Brief in Support of Motion for Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal dated June 27, 2011 ). Such a claim 
is unreasonable and far from accurate. Claimant filed a hearing request in May 2010 and sought to 
have all issues addressed at hearing as soon as possible. (Exhibit 8: Claimant's Request for 
Calendaring dated May 3, 2010). Defendants asserted calendaring was premature because Claimant 
had not been certified at maximum medical improvement (MMI), assigned an impairment (PPI) 
rating, or given permanent restrictions. Accordingly, Defendants proposed bifurcation of the issues 
that were ripe for adjudication. (Exhibit 9: Defendants' Response to Request for Hearing I Motion to 
Bifurcate dated May 11, 2010). Claimant objected to bifurcation and a phone conference took place 
with the Referee in June 2010 to discuss the parties' options. (Exhibit 10: Notice of Telephone 
Conference dated May 20, 2010). At the time of the second telephone conference in July, Claimant 
had still not been certified at MMI. (Exhibit 11: Notice of Telephone Conference dated July 15, 
2010). Claimant's MMI date was once again deferred, but Claimant did not want to postpone the 
hearing any longer so the case was scheduled for hearing September 28, 2010, on bifurcated issues, 
at the agreement of the parties. (Exhibit 12: Notice of Hearing dated July 20, 2010). Claimant was 
not certified at MMI until two months after the hearing, on November 23, 2010. (Exhibit 13: Dr. 
DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE ISSUE OF PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 6 
Frizzell' s November 23, 2010, letter to Dr. Harris). Defendants originally suggested the case would 
be ready for hearing in November 2010, but Claimant declined to wait and opted to go forward on 
the bifurcated issues. Both parties expressed a desire for prompt resolution of the disputed issues. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based on the above arguments and unique facts of this case, Defendants request the 
Commission exercise its limited authority afforded by LC.§ 72-719 and modify its May 17, 2011, 
award to reflect the lack of finality of its decision consistent with the Supreme Court's 
determination. Section 72-719(3) states: 
The commission, on its own motion at any time within five ( 5) years 
of the date of the accident causing the injury or date of first 
manifestation of an occupational disease, may review a case in order 
to correct a manifest injustice. 
IDAHO CODE§ 72-719 (2006). 
To treat the May the award as "final" with regard to payment obligations when it is not 
considered final for appellate purposes results in payment obligations not contemplated by LC. § 72-
718 and creates a manifest injustice. As part of the requested modification, Defendants ask that 
payment obligations be deferred until such time as the Commission files a final decision in this 
matter. Such action will afford Claimant the opportunity to present additional evidence regarding 
medical benefits not awarded in the initial decision, should he choose to do so, and will allow both 
parties to meaningfully exercise appellate rights as contemplated by LC. § 72-718 and I.A.R. 11 ( d). 
In the alternative, Defendants request the Industrial Commission order any payments made pursuant 
to the May 1 7, 2011, award be deposited in a trust account for distribution to occur upon final 
DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE ISSUE OF PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 7 
resolution of the disputed issues, following the parties' exercise of their appellate rights. This 
resolution was proposed as an alternative by the Commission, but Claimant declined to voluntarily 
resolve the issue in this manner. (Exhibit 14: Claimant's demand for payment to Defendants' dated 
September 7, 2011). 
DATED this 16th day of September, 2011. 
Susan R. Vel~an ~ of the firm 
GARDNER & BREEN 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16th day of September, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon: 
Rick Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & DeFranco 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, 
the last known address as set forth above. 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN 
DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE ISSUE OF PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 8 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850) 
GARDNER & BREEN 
1410 W. Washington - 83702 
Post Office Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
sveltman@gardnerlaw.net 
Attorney for Appellants 
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Supreme Court No. 38914 
DEFENDANTS'/ APPELLANTS' 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' 
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT/ 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF 
APPEAL 
1. The Industrial Commission's May 17, 2011, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order is a final Order as to the matters adjudicated. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled 
to file an appeal as a matter of right pursuant to I.A.R. 11 ( d). 
The right to appeal a decision from the Idaho Industrial Commission is set forth by the Idaho 
Appellate Rules (I.A.R.). Rule 1 l(d) states an appeal as a matter of right may be taken to the 
Supreme Court, 
From any f'mal decision or order of the Industrial Commission 
or from any final decision or order upon rehearing or 
reconsideration by the administrative agency. 
DEFENDANTS'/ APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDA.!~TS'/APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO 
CLAJMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL, PG. 1 
EXHIBIT 
I 
.._- _- -- qq 
I.A.R 11 ( d)( emphasis added). 
Idaho Code § 72-718 outlines when a Commission decision is final. It states, 
A decision of the commission shall be final and conclusive as to 
all matters adjudicated by the commission upon filing the 
decision in the office of the commission; provided, within twenty 
(20) days from the date of filing the decision any party may move 
for reconsideration or rehearing of the decision, or the commission 
may rehear or reconsider its decision on its own initiative, and in 
any such events the decision shall be final upon denial of a motion 
for rehearing or reconsideration or the filing of the decision on 
rehearing or reconsideration. Final decisions may be appealed to 
the Supreme Court as provided by section 72-724, Idaho Code. 
I. C. § 72-718 (2006)( emphasis added). 
It follows that when certain matters are adjudicated by the Commission and it issues a 
decision or order on those matters, the decision or order is "final" pursuant to I. C. § 72-718 and 
appealable to the Idaho Supreme Court as a matter of right. An exception exists when the 
Commission expressly retains jurisdiction. See Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 120 Idaho 127, 127, 823 
P.2d 161, 161 (1992) (the Court dismissed the claimant's appeal because the Commission expressly 
reserved jurisdiction on the issues of impairment and disability), Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar 
Co., 118 Idaho 147, 149, 795 P.2d 309, 311 (1990) (stating "Had the Commission not retained 
jurisdiction its original decision would have been final ... ), Reynolds v. Browning Ferris Industries, 
113 Idaho 965, 969, 751 P.2d 113, 117 (1988) ("The very fact that the Commission had retained 
jurisdiction in its initial decision reveals that its determination was not intended to be final ... "). 
Another exception to theruleoffinalityis found inLawv. Omarkindustries, 121Idaho128, 
823 P .2d 162 (1992). In that case, the claimant raised the issue of apportionment ofimpairment and 
disability on appeal after the hearing concluded. Law, 1990 IIC 0321 at *1. The issue was not 
argued at the original hearing, nor was it presented in the claimant's original Application for 
Hearing. Law, 121 Idaho at 128, 823 P.2d at 162. Consequently, the Referee found that the matter 
was "not properly before the Commission" because it had not been adjudicated. Id. The 
Commission confirmed and adopted the Referee's Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
DEFENDANTS'/APPELLAJ'l"TS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'/ APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO 
CLAIMAJ'l"T/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL, PG. 2 
proposed award, which found inter alia, the claimant was entitled to reasonable medical benefits 
related to his industrial accident. Id. at *8. Notably, the Commission did not enter a specific order 
awarding any type of benefits. Id. The claimant appealed the decision to the Supreme Court and 
argued that the issue of apportionment had in fact been before the Commission. Id. The Supreme 
Court disagreed, and held that similar to its decision in Jensen, supra, which was issued the same 
day, the Commission's order was not final. Law, 1990 IIC 0321 at *I. Tnus, while the Commission 
did not expressly retain jurisdiction, the Court found its decision was not final because the matter at 
issue on appeal-apportionment-had not been adjudicated, and the Commission had not entered a 
specific order on the matter. It follows that pursuant to LC. § 72-718, the Commission's decision 
could not be final as to that issue. 
Our case is distinguishable from Law, Jensen, Kindred, and Reynolds in several respects. 
First, unlike Jensen, Kindred, and Reynolds, the Commission did not expressly retain jurisdiction. 
Not only does this infer the decision is final as to the matters adjudicated, but the decision expressly 
declares it is final. The Order states, 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and 
conclusive as to all matters adjudicated. 
(Claimant I Respondent's Exhibit 7). 
This is patently different than the cases cited above, where the decisions did not contain simil.ar 
language of finality. 
Also, our case is distinguishable in that the Commission entered a specific order awarding 
Claimant I Respondent medical benefits in the amount of$149,033.68 and temporary total disability 
(TTD) benefits for a specified time period. (Claimant I Respondent's Exhibit 7). This was not the 
situation in Jensen, Kindred, or Law. Claimant I Respondent cites Law for the proposition that any 
order from the Commission is interlocutory unless it disposes of each and every issue related to a 
worker's claim for workers' compensation benefits. (Claimant I Respondent's Brief in Support of 
Motion for Involuntary Dismissal, p. 6). Were this accurate, it is dubious whether many of the 
Commission's orders would be enforceable because they rarely dispose of all of a worker's claims 
(both litigated and potential, non-litigated issues). The Commission routinely allows claims to be 
bifurcated in order to summarily resolve matters and provide workers with speedy recovery of 
DEFENDAlWS'/APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDAl'!TS'/APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO 
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compensation. This saves the Commission and all parties the time and expense of adjudicating 
issues that may be subsequently deemed moot. For example, there is no reason to put on evidence 
regarding the extent of a worker's disability if the accident is deemed not to arise out of and in the 
course of his employment (not compensable). If Claimant's I Respondent's proposition were valid 
and the Commission's Order in this case is not final, it is arguable whether Defendants I Appellants 
can be required to pay the medical benefits set forth in the Order before the remaining issues are 
disposed of In this scenario, Claimant I Respondent would have to wait until after all others were 
adjudicated before he could receive compensation. This type of outcome is contrary to Idaho Code § 
72-708, which requires process and procedure under the workers' compensation law to be as 
summary and simple as reasonably may be. LC. § 72-708 (2006). 
Claimant I Respondent asserts that because Defendants I Appellants conceded the 
Commission's May 17, 2011, Order did not dispose of all of the issues or potential issues regarding 
Claimant's I Respondent's claim, it is not final. (Claimant I Respondent's Brief in Support of 
Motion for Involuntary Dismissal, p. 7). Claimant's I Respondent's position is seemingly consistent 
with this Court's decision in Kindred that Commission decisions are not final until all matters are 
adjudicated. However, this Court has only applied this standard in cases where jurisdiction was 
expressly retained, where the Commission's decision does not include language that it is final as to 
the issues adjudicated, and/or the decision failed to provide a specific award of benefits. None of 
these situations are present in this case. As discussed above, the Order in this case expressly states it 
is final as to the matters adjudicated. In contrast to Law, the Commission in this case bifurcated the 
issues to be adjudicated. Accordingly, in the event Claimant's I Respondent's injury was found not 
compensable, there would be no need for a second hearing regarding the reserved issues. 
2. The doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply because 1) Defendants' I 
Appellants' position on appeal is consistent with the position they took in the 
bifurcated hearing before the Commission; and 2) Claimant's I Respondent's 
position on this matter is speculative and lacks authority. 
Defendants' I Appellants' position on appeal is consistent with the position they took in the 
bifurcated hearing before the Commission. Defendants' I Appellants' Response to Request for 
Calendaring and Motion for Bifurcation specifically requests bifurcation only because Claimant's I 
DEFENDANTS'/ APPELLANTS' BRJEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'/ APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO 
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Respondent's Request for Calendaring was premature as to the issues of permanent partial 
impairment (PPI) and permanent partial disability (PPD). (Claimant I Respondent's Exhibit 4). 
Claimant I Respondent had not yet reached medical stability or received an impairment rating, and 
thus any attempt to litigate these issues would be untimely. Defendants' I Appellants' Response 
expressly contemplates that a hearing on these issues may not be necessary. Accordingly, Claimant's 
I Respondent's assumption that Defendants I Appellants knew there would be multiple hearings is 
speculative and incorrect. 
The purpose of bifurcating a case with numerous issues, some of which may ultimately be 
deemed moot, is to avoid the time and expense of unnecessary litigation. As indicated above, the 
Commission routinely allows bifurcation of claims in the interest of promoting sure and certain relief 
for injured workers as contemplated LC. §72-201. A prompt appeal as a matter of right from 
outcome determinative findings denoted as "final" by the Idaho Industrial Commission is consistent 
with the statutory intent of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law; specifically, LC.§§ 72-201 and 
72-708. 
Claimant I Respondent seeks dismissal, in part, to avoid unnecessary delay associated with 
the potential for piecemeal litigation. Claimant's I Respondent's estimated time line, which he 
describes as a "reasonable" appellate scenario is possible, but unlikely. Dismissal and remand of 
Defendants' I Appellants' Appeal is more likely to extend litigation than shorten it because a 
determination regarding compensability of the industrial injury is the threshold issue necessary to 
trigger liability for all applicable benefits. 
3. Defendants I Appellants did not seek a permissive appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 
12(b) because the Industrial Commission's May 17, 2011, Order is final as to 
the matters adjudicated. Defendants I Appellants therefore filed a timely 
Notice of Appeal pursuant to I.A.R. ll(d). 
Claimant's I Respondent's Motion for Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 
32(a) is not appropriate given the facts of this case. Rule 32(a) contemplates involuntary dismissal 
of an appeal with prejudice for failure to comply with the appellate rules. Defendants' I Appellants' 
Notice of Appeal reflects it was made pursuant to I.A.R. 11 ( d) and was therefore timely filed. 
(Claimant I Respondent's Exhibit 12). In the event this Court agrees with Claimant's I Respondent's 
assertion that the Commission's May 17, 2011, Order is not final as to the matters adjudicated, the 
DEFENDANTS'/ APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'/ APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO 
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remedy is to remand this case to the Idaho Industrial Commission and not to dismiss the case with 
prejudice. Idaho v. Maynard, 139 Idaho 876, 879, 88 P.3d 695, 698 (2004) (discussing how the 
Supreme Court has the discretion to disregard an appellant's noncompliance with the appellate 
rules); see also Jensen, 120 Idaho at 127, 823 P.2d at 161 (the Court dismissed the appeal without 
prejudice and remanded to the Commission), Law, 121 Idaho at 128, 823 P.2d at 162 (the Court 
dismissed the case without prejudice and remanded to the Commission), Kindred, 118 Idaho at 150, 
795 P.2d at 312 (the Court remanded the case to the Commission for clarification of the award), 
Reynolds, 113 Idaho at 970, 751 P.2d at 118 (the Court remanded to the Commission for further 
proceedings consistent with its decision). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of July, 2011. 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850) 
GARDNER & BREEN 
Post Office Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
svel tman@gardnerlaw.net 
Attorney for Defendants/ Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8th day of July, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to be served upon: 
Rick Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, 
the last known address as set forth above. 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN 
DEFENDANTS'/ APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'/ APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO 
CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL, PG. 7 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
RECEIVED 
AUG O 1 2011 
MICHAELP. VAWTER, ) GARDNER 8t BREEN 
) 
Claimant-Respondent, ) ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL 
) 
v. ) Supreme CourtDocketNo. 38914-2011 
) IndustriaJ Commission No. 2010-114 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC., 
Employer, LIBERTY INSURANCE 
CORPORATION, Surety, 
) 




1. A MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL, an 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICK D. KALLAS IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL, and a 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE NOTICE 
OF CROSS-APPEAL were filed by counsel for Respondent on June 27, 201 L 
2. Additionally, CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY 
DISMISSAL OF APPEAL, an AFFIDAVIT OF RICK D. KALLAS IN SUPPORT OF 
CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF 
APPEAL, with attachments, and CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL were filed by counsel 
for Respondent on June 27, 2011 . 
3. DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL, an AFFIDAVIT OF 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN IN SUPPORT OF DEENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' RESPONSE 
TO CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF 
APPEAL and DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' I APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL were filed by counsel for 
Appellant on July 8, 2011. 
The Court is fully advised; ~erefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL be, and hereby is, GRANTED and this appeal is 
DISMISSED. 
EXHIBIT 
ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL-Docket No. 38914-2011 I 
~=================================================================- = z 
DATED this J 7 t" day of July, 2011. 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
cc: Counsel of Record 
Industrial Commission Secretary 
ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL - Docket No. 38914-2011 
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SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850) 
GARDNER & BREEN 
1410 W. Washington - 83702 
Post Office Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
sveltman@gardnerlaw.net 
Attorney for Appellants 
·--
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MICHAEL VAWTER, 



















MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP. 
Surety, 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
Come now, Defendants I Appellants, and each of them, by and through their attorney of 
record, Susan R. Veltman, pursuant to I.A.R. 32(c), and respectfully submit this Motion for 
Clarification ("Motion") regarding the Court's July 27, 2011, Order. 
1. On June 20, 2011, Defendants I Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal with the Idaho 
Industrial Commission regarding its May 17, 2011, Findings of Pact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order entered in LC. Case No. 2010-000114. 
DEFENDANTS'/ APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION, PG. I 
I 
{0~ 
2. On June 27, 2011, Claimant I Respondent filed a Motion for Involuntary Dismissal of 
Appeal on multiple grounds. 
3. On July 27, 2011, this Court granted Claimant's I Respondent's Motion for Involuntary 
Dismissal and issued an Order Dismissing Appeal ("Order"). 
4. Defendants I Appellants seek clarification of the Court's July 27, 2011, Order because it 
does not specify whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice, nor does it articulate 
the grounds on which the case is dismissed. 
5. Therefore, Defendants respectfully move this Court to clarify whether its Order is with or 
without prejudice. 
6. Additionally, in the event the Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the Industrial 
Commission's May 17, 2011, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order is not a 
final decision, Defendants I Appellants request the Court's Order state such. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of August, 2011. 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850) 
GARDNER & BREEN 
Post Office Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
sveltman@gardnerlaw.net 
Attorney for Defendants/ Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of August, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon: 
Rick Kallas 
DEFENDANTS'/ APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION, PG. 2 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & DeFranco 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, 
the last known address as set forth above. 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN 
DEFENDANTS'/ APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION, PG. 3 l I c 
In the Supreme Court of _the State of Idaho 
MICHAELP. VAWTER, . 
· · -c1aimant-Responaent~· 
v. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC., 











Supreme Court Docket No. 38914-2011 
Industri~l Commission No. 2010-114 
) Ref. No. 11-380 
) 
An ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL was issued by this Court on July 27, 2011. 
Thereafter, a MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION and AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN R. VELTMAN IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION were filed by counsel for Appellants on August 
1, 2011. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellants' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION be, and 
hereby is, DENIED and counsel shall be referred to Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 121 Idah9 127, 823 
P.2d 161 (1992) and the Amended Notice of Telephone Conference and Notice of Hearing 1n 
Industrial Commission No. 2010-000114, which was filed on June 7, 2011. 
,c:,·1t 
DATED this / ~ -- day of August, 2011. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
Industrial Commission Secretary 
EXHIBIT 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION -Docket No. 38914-2011 I 
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ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, P.L.L.C. 
Joseph L. Ellsworth 
Rick D. Kallas * 
John C. Defranco 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Phone: (208) 336-1843 
Fax: (208) 345-8945 
Licensed in Idaho and Oregon 
Via Facsimile & U.S. Mail 
(208) 387-3501 
Susan Veltman 
Gardner & Breen Law Offices 
P.O. Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 






Claimant's Request For Reimbursement of Mileage Expenses 
Claimant's Request For Reimbursement of Per Diem Expenses 
Claimant's Request For Reimbursement of Lodging Expenses 
Claimant's Request For Payment of Past Denied Medical Benefits 
Claimant's Request For Payment of PPI Benefits 
Vawter v. UPS and Liberty Ins. Co1p. 
I.C. No. 2010-000114 
Dear Ms. Veltman: 
AUG 1 0 2011 
(A) Employer I Surety's Obligation To Reimburse Claimant For Medical Care Travel 
Expenses 
Idaho Code §72-432(13) requires employer I surety to reimburse the injured worker for travel expenses that are 
incurred in order to obtain accident I injury related medical care at the mileage rate allowed by the state board of 
examiners for state employees. Since 10.1.09, the mileage reimbursement rate has been 45.5 cents per mile (See 
http://www.sco. idaho .gov/web/sbe/sbeweb. nsf/pages/trv 1 po [icy .htm#Appendix%20%22A %22 ). 
Submitted herewith as Exhibit A is a spreadsheet which itemizes all of Mr. Vawter's medical care related travel 
expenses. Based on the total mileage reflected in Exhibit A, employer I surety have a duty to reimburse Mr. 
Vawter $1,526.71 in medical care travel expenses. Please request a check from UPS in that amount and send it 
directly to me on Mr. Vawter's behalf. 
(B) Employer I Surety's Obligation To Reimburse Claimant For Per Diem and Lodging Expenses 
The Industrial Commission has broadly construed Idaho Code §72-432(13) to require employer I surety to 
reimburse the i1~ured worker and his medically necessary driver for meals (per diem) in those cases where it is 
Vawter/ 8.9.11 Request For Reimbursement of Mileage I Per Diem I Lodging Expenses and Request For Payment of 
Supplemental Medical Expenses and PPI Benefits EXHJBm 
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medically necessary for the injured worker to have a driver transport him to his medical appointments. The 
Industrial Commission has also required employer I surety to reimburse the injured worker for lodging where an 
overnight stay is required to attend medical appointments: 
To the contrary, where travel expenses have been awarded under Idaho Code § 72-
432(12), the Commission has consistently held that subsistence, as well as 
transportation costs, are included. See, Anderson v. Idaho State Senate, 98 IWCD 
11029 (June, 1998); Hoye v. Daw Forest Products, Inc., 92 IWCD 5311 (September 
1992) .... 
The Referee finds that necessary travel expenses include transportation at the allowed 
rate, together with lodging and per diem, and are medical services governed by Idaho 
Code § 72-432. In this case, those necessary travel expenses also include the lodging 
and per diem for Claimant's wife who must transport Claimant to and from Boise, and 
who is entitled to food and lodging during such travel and while Claimant is in the 
hospital. Cal 2004, IC 97-006770 and 98-018735 (Filed: January 16, 2004). 
Reimbursement for meals and lodging is governed by the allowable rates set by the 
state board of examiners for state employee travel. Only the injured worker is entitled 
to reimbursement for per diem, unless the record establishes that the worker requires a 
driver. In the case at bar, there is no evidence that Claimant required a driver. Hibbert 
v. Patrica D. Reynolds/Reyson Custom Stone and Tile, LC. 2008-019040 (Filed: 
8.24.10). 
Based on my review of the receipts submitted herewith as Exhibit B, the per diem expenses listed below are 
compensable and must be reimbursed by UPS. Therefore, please ask UPS to issue a per diem reimbursement 
check in the amount of $264.75 and send it directly to me on Mr. Vawter's behalf. (Note: those receipts which 
contain an "X" through them are not compensable and need not be reimbursed by UPS). 
Date Medical I Legal Purpose Per Diem Amount 
1.11.10 MRI $30.00 (*) 
1.19.10 Surgery $30.00 (*) 
1.22.10 Surgery $10.97 
5.27.10 Dr. Frizzell $30.00 (*) 
6.3.10 Dr. Binegar $30.00 (*) 
6.10.10 Deposition $22.24 
7.14.10 Dr. Montalbano $30.00 (*) 
7.24.10 Surgery No. 2 $6.54 
8.19.10 Dr. Frizzell $30.00 (*) 
10.14.10 Dr. Frizzell $15.00 
11.23.10 Dr. Frizzell $30.00 (*) 
Subtotal $264.75 
Vawter I 8.9. I I Request For Reimbursement of Mileage I Per Diem I Lodging Expenses and Request For Payment of 
Supplemental Medical Expenses and PPI Benefits Page 2 
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When Mr. Vawter had to undergo his lumbar fusion surgery in July of 2010, his wife was required to stay in a 
hotel and then drive him home from the hospital. Therefore, we must request the following lodging 
reimbursement from UPS. 
Purpose of Lodf?:ing Amount 
7.21.10- 7.23.10 Surgery No. 2 $200.01 
The total amount of compensable mileage ($1,526.71), per diem ($264.75) and lodging ($200.01) expenses that 
the Defendants are liable to reimburse Mr. Vawter for= $1,991.47. If would be more convenient for UPS to 
issue a single check, please request a check in the amount of $1,991.47 and send it directly to me on Mr. 
Vawter's behalf. 
(C) Request For Payment of Past Denied Medical Benefits Incurred by Claimant In Connection With 
his 12.18.09 Industrial Accident But Not Included in 5.17.11 Decision 
Based on Idaho Code §72-432 and the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Neel v. Western Construction, 147 
Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), the Defendants are liable for the direct payment to Claimant of 100% of the 
invoiced amount of all past medical benefits incurred by Claimant in connection with his 12.18.09 industrial 
accident I injury from the date of the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident to the date when the Industrial 
Commission deemed this claim compensable on 5.17.11. 
Submitted herewith as Exhibit C please fmd $24,627.85 in accident related medical expenses that were incurred 
by Claimant in connection with his 12.18.09 industrial accident but not covered by the Industrial Commission's 
5.17.11 Order. Based on the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Neel, the Defendants are liable for 100% of the 
invoiced amount of these accident related medical expenses. Please send me a check in the amount of 
$24,627.85 to pay Claimant 100% of the invoiced amount of these medical expenses as required by the Idaho 
Supreme Cou1i's holding in Neel. 
(Note: These expenses were extracted from a Subrogation Ledger that we received from the Oregon Teamster 
Employers Trust; i.e., the health insurance entity that paid Mr. Vawter's denied past medical bills). 
(D) Request For Payment of Retroactive and Continuing PPI Benefits 
Mr. Vawter's attending neurological surgeon, R. Tyler Frizzell, M.D., is the only physician in this case who has 
issued PPI ratings for Mr. Vawter's 12.18.09 industrial low back injury. On 12.6.10, Dr. Frizzell issued Mr. 
Vawter a 20% whole person PPI rating. On 3.10.11, Dr. Frizzell reduced Mr. Vawter's 20% PPI rating to 19% 
and then appo1iioned 7% of that rating to a preexisting lumbar spine condition and 12% to Mr. Vawter's 
12.18.09 industrial accident. 
On 6.27.11, Dr. Frizzell reiterated his 19% whole person PPI rating and reiterated his apportionment opinion 
that 7% should be appo1iioned to Mr. Vawter's preexisting lumbar spine condition and 12% should be 
apportioned to Mr. Vawter's 12.18.09 industrial accident. A 12% whole person PPI rating has a monetary value 
of$20,988.00, calculated as follows: 
Vawter/ 8.9. I l Request For Reimbursement of Mileage I Per Diem I Lodging Expenses and Request For Payment of 
Supplemental Medical Expenses and PPI Benefits Page 3 
l/4 
12% X 500 weeks= 60 weeks X 2009 PPI rate of$349.80 = $20,988.00 
Since Dr. Frizzell issued his original 20% PPI rating in December of 2010, 8 regular PPI checks should have 
been paid to Mr. Vawter. Therefore, please request that UPS issue a retroactive PPI check in the amount of 
$11,193 .60 (i.e., $349.80 per week X 4 weeks= $1,399.20 per month X 8 months= $11,193.60). 
After UPS brings Mr. Vawter's PPI benefits current by issuing a retroactive check for 8 months in the amount of 
$11,193.60, please ask them to continue making regular PPI payments each month until Mr. Vawter's PPI rating 









Summary of Benefits Requested 
Accident Related Medical Expenses 
8 months of PPI Benefits 







Please pay these benefits directly to me on Mr. Vawter's behalf within 7 days from the date hereon. If UPS will 
not pay these accident related benefits, please send me a letter within 7 days confirming that UPS will not pay 
these benefits. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. 
Enclosures I Attachments 
CC: Mike Vawter 
Very truly yours, 
lt_~,'1,~ 
Rick D. Kallas 
Vawter I 8.9 .I I Request F01· Reimbursement of Mileage I Per Diem /Lodging Expenses and Request For Payment of 
Supplemental Medical Expenses and PPI Benefits Page 4 
Exhibit A 
l f & 
REIMBURSEMENT FOR HEALTH CARE TRAVEL EXPENSES 
Claimant: Michael P. Vawter 
13005 Leland Drive 




Name of Medical Provider Date of Service 
1. McCall Memorial Hospital 12.28.09 
1000 State Street 
McCall, Idaho 83638 
2. IMl 01.11.10 
927 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 07.01.10 
3. R. Tyler Frizzell, MD. 
222 N. 2nd Street, Ste. 307 
06.17.10 
Boise, Idaho 83702 02.01.11 
04.21.11 
07.21.11 
4. St. Luke's R.i\1C 01.19.10 
190 E. Bannock St. 





5. ID Physical Medicine & 03.03.10 
Rehab 
600 N. Robbins Rd. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
6. McCall Physical Therapy 03.08.10 
305 E. Park Street, Ste. 2 
McCall, Idaho 83638 03.11.10 
03.16.10 
Vawter I Reimbursement for Health Care Travel Expenses 
Total Mileage (a4 45.5 cents f!er mile 
36.18 -15 = 21.18 miles $9.64 
188.74-15=173.74 miles $79.05 
188.74-15=173.74 miles $79.05 
188.62 - 15 = 173.62 miles $79.00 
188.62-15==173.62 miles $79.00 
188.62 - 15 = 173.62 miles $79.00 
188.62 - 15 = 173.62 miles $79.00 
188.92-15=173.92 miles $79.13 
188.92-15=173.92 miles $79.13 
188.92-15=173.92 miles $79.13 
188.92-15=173.92 miles $79.13 
188.92-15=173.92 miles $79.13 
188.92 - 15 = 173.92 miles $79.13 
188.52- 15 = 173.52 miles $78.95 
34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
Page I 
l l 
03.18.10 34.8-15=19.8 miles $9.01 
03.23.10 34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
03.25.10 34.8 - 15=19.8 miles $9.01 
03.29.10 34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
04.01.10 34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
08.23.10 34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
08.25.10 34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
08.30.10 34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
09.01.10 34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
09.14.10 34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
09.20.10 34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
09.22.l 0 34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
09.27.10 34.8 -15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
09.29.10 34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
10.07.10 34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
10.18.10 34.8 -15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
10.20.10 34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
10.25.10 34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
10.28.10 34.8 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
11.01.10 34.8 -15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
11.03.10 34.8 -15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
11.04.l 0 34.8-15=19.8 miles $9.01 
11.08.10 34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
11.10.10 34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
11.22.10 34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles $9.01 
Vawter I Reimbursement for Health Care Travel Expenses 
Page2 
7. William Binegar, M.D. 05.27.I 0 189.72-15=174.72 miles $79.50 
301 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 06.03.10 189.72-15=174.72 miles $79.50 
8. Paul J. Montalbano, M.D. 07.14.10 186.34 - 15 = 171.34 miles $77.96 
6140 W. Curtisian, Ste. 400 
Boise, Idaho 83704 
Total Mileage 
Reimbursement: $1,526.71 



















Courtyard by Marriott 
Boise Downtown 
Card#: VIXXXXXXXXXXXX2118!X',()()( 
222 S. Broadway Ave 








Amount: 200.01 Auth: 025211 Signature on File 
This card was electronically swiped on 21Ju/10 
Balance: 0.00 
200.01 
Marriott Rewards Account # XXXXX9072. Your Marriott Rewards points/miles earned on your room rate will be 
credited to your account. For account activity: 801-468-4000 or MarrlottRewards.com. 
Thank you for slaying with us at the Courtyard by Marriott Boise Downtown. 
Get all your hotel bills by email by updating your Marriott Rewards Preferences. Or, ask the Front Desk to email your 
· bill for this stay. See "Internet Privacy Statement" on Marriott.com. 
l\PPLEBEE 'S 
NEIGHBORHOOD GRILL & BAR 
7025 N. Glern~ood Street 
Garden City, ID 83714 
208--853-2330 
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2Z: '.DU. <<< VO-C \1_LS 
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OT/f7l/LO oo:gI:6o t-HS H 
008I-f7S8(806) #3NOHd r I ~l!NOS 01. :1NIWO::J HO:l DOA ){NVHl 
Kl::.U lt:S:::> I t:.K t;>;.,,:'.: •'..::I 
. Ml lwaukee St ,./ 
• ID 8"'· l-9136 ~7 
Check # :5t. .. .J::i 
Tabl ~3 42 
Jarom B · 
13:57:36 08/19/2010 Gst 3 
------------- ··-- ---"-------------··----
Guest No.1 
1 Cor• na Li ght 




1 Mango Mai ,.,I fi.50 
1 Shr l 111~1 Pa-Ha ~ ..i. 75 
Guest No.3 
1 BERRY SANGRIA 5 '~ 
1 Salmon BLT Sandwich 10 :i 
Potato Chips 
1 Slde Salad 1.9~ 
-----------·- . ------------------------
ID # 6872 09968 5944 
x~**~***i*w~~l **·~~XfWXX***~***X~X~XX* 
" We value You opfn1on. Please * 
'I< tell LI$ about your dining * 
* exper i ence by comp let i ng an " 
* onl lne· survey 111lthln 7 days of * 
* your visit. \' 1" could wln a * 
* $1, 000 Grand Pr • c~ or 1 of 100 * 
" $50 pr i 7.e~ 'rl 1. ·rs are drawn * 
" weekly! It * 
" * To comp I etu t ! • " vr: ,cl enter " 
'I< the conttist. '.. ,. 
* www.Re1dlobster:11 -.om and 
* enter thR Jf' on ... , • t.JC.ti Ir.•. 'X 
* NO PUf-·"HA'.:iE NE"' ·ssAR\' Vo Id where x 
" rv .. 1hih1ted. See Otfici111 Hules at " 
~ .-,... "~. -:iL1b(, t ·1rr;ur vt-t.,,. ·~(1i11 x 
* \lci1 ,,·amos su op111iu11. c,,,. ·,,• ) * 
.,, encuesta sabre ·0u expe·f(;!, .. 
* gar trc1n6m l ca en 
www. Redl.0bsterS11rvey 
A**~**X~**~ '***l~*Xt~XA ·~*AAAX~ 
<OFFER EXPIRE~- All!-l '2i 2010l 
Oup I ....::a L.e J{ecei t 
Stored or-de• 
Sub tot:" 70.: 
Sal es ·1., 
18:57:37 08/ 1 012~10 
PI ease pay tl" s amount 
Total 74 ·4 
Li1ne In 
~----- -... ~------ -... .,. _________ ------. ·-
Thr,i< vou for choosing to dine witl1 us! 
Come back because now there are more 
reasons to celebrate your love ' crab 
... gofn9 011 /'IOVI during v!'ai'!=e\. 
We also fnvlt u to "Beer.~ a fan 01. 
Facebookl f! at 
facebook.cor obster" 
GRATUITY NO' LUDr~ UNL-~$ NOTcD 
Please pay serwr 
Comments t 
{208) 67? 
1fiest 1 ons? 
\'ALLt:i S!URE. 
llZ MHRl<.Ei ST 







DEBIT £ritr1 Method: s~1Ptu 
folal: 50.28 
9711q;13 1q:52:Li' 
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lid l(i: ·l/(l 
s~ttl.: flat!!: l){l'J 
00 O! I 
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OLIVE GARnEN 1251 ) 
"- 320 N Ml l waqk~f >t ' 
Boise, U ?33704 / 
Check # :50922 f 
l>.ar.>le 1.02 l 
M1o>)1ael R f 
13:1'2 09/16/2010 Gst 2 / 
:::::!::_~~~~:~~~~~~~-----------------;/ 
. ' ' 
ID # \~374 60528 823~ 
I 
******11****** ~'IC/{)\'J\'>J<'llX)\''t(l\'l\'X'X');');1'·n'!:·x·xytA 
* we value your oplnion. Please /:J * 
* tel J us abou1\your dlnlng · * 
"' exper 1 enoa by "qomp 1 et 1 ng an . ;: 
* on I i ne survey w'f,,thi n 7 days of * 
* your visit. Y•JU ·qould win a j * 
* $1,000 Grand Prli'~ or 1 of 190 * 
* $50 prizes. Wlnner~ar; dra~h * 
* week!YI 11 I * 
: To co111p 1 eta the surv \v anc/ enter : 
w tha contest, go to / 'fl 
* www, o J f veGard·anSurvey. 0111 and " 
* enter the ID •Jn this r~beipt. * 
* NO PURCHASE NECESSARY ./ Vp i d where * 
* prohlbfted. S~e Offfc,fal\Rules at n 
* www.OllveGardenSurvs1.com\ * 
'ft I \ '/( 
* Valoramos su opln19n. Comprete la * 
* encuesta sabre su ,experl enot•a * 
* gastron6ml ca en / \ * 
w www. 011 veGard·anSarvey. com. i 
'llXJ\''i:1<'11>:~;:•xx'l<>:l\''lt:::!',***'ft********* ****** 
{OFFER EXPIRES Si" 23, 2010} 
I \ 
--------------7L-------------------,----
Card Number / Auth ~ode 
XXX)<XliXXXXXrX 6302 023t?5 
michael paul vawter I Vlsa 
\ 
Chec!J' Amount 24. 5~ 
I \ 
JI Lf.lf(\ T i I -- -- -- . --, " .\ 
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OLIVE GARDEN 1251 
320 N Mtlwaukee St 
Bo I se, ID 83704 
Check # :51891 
Table 20'1 
Ryan B 
17:27 06/03/2010 Gst 2 
Transaction #: 12:38251281 
ID # 7450 02979 2352 
'''"""'"'''J:'ll'llll:'kll'll:•·"""'"''J:'"'""*'k*>r•Y<'l<Y<'i(l\'ll:ll'.ll:" 
• We value your opinion. Please * 
• tell us about your dining "' 
"' experience by completing an "' 
• onllna survey within 7 days of • 
• your visit. You could win a • 
" $1,000 Grand Prize or 1 of 100 " 
* $50 prizes. Winners are drawn "' 
"' week I YI 11 " 
* • * To complete tl1e survey and enter * 
" the cor•test, go ta * 
* www. o 11 veGard•3nSurvey. cam. and "' 
• enter H11:t ID ·Jn this receipt. "' 
"' NO PURCHASE NECESSARY. Vold where * 
* prohibited. See Offlalal Rules at "' 
i< www. O l1 veGardenSurvey. cam. • 
i<:<U>:'l:'ll*'l:>::U·l\':t'l<'J:·t:t:l:'J:l\'l\'l\'ltl\'tlt:l:'ll'k'il'l<>:l\''k>:ltl\'Jll 











xKizfll!!ff~ .. -· . 
cardrnember agree,, to pay tota 1 In 
accordance with .agreement governing 
use of such card. 
Total 
Guest Copy 
OLIVE GARDEN i25i 
320 N Milwaukee St 
Bol$e, ID 83704 
Check II :32722 
Table 705 
Cody M 
12:59 11/23/2010 Gst 2 
Transaction 11:205217221 
ID # 7300 62335 9695 
*:t'i\''K*•k)l:*i\':\'}\')t)t'A'*'*°)f;JtitX"X*'H'k'k:t'*"*'ltXl:t~"K'k>t":t'fCtr'JC 
w We value your opinion. Please w 
w te J l us about you1· di nl ng ;: 
w experience by completing an * 
w onllna survey within 7 days of * 
"' your vis! t. You could win a * 
* $1, 000 Grand Prize or 1 of too it 
* $50 prizes. Winners are ' ~· * 
'1< week!yl!I * 
* To complete tha·survev and enter * 
"' the contest, go to * 
~ www.OlfveGardensurvey.com and ;: 
"' enter the ID on this receipt. * 
* NO PURCHASE NECESSARY. Void where *' 
* prohibited. See Official Rules at • 
.. www. o 11 veGardensurvey. com. 1f 
tr '1< 
* Valorarnoe su op1n16n. Complete la * 
" encueEita sabre su experlencia * 
* gastron6mica en 'k 
'le www.OlfveGardensurvey.com. "' 
ll'.lt1'lt'kl\')(ltl\''klt:l<'k:<lfll'.'klf>:'klt>::<:\'lt1<'<:>:lt'klt>l't<:l'.1<'k-Xlt* 
<OFFER EXPIRES Nov 30, 2010) 
Card Number 
xxxxxxxxxxxx 6026 
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Cardmeinber agrees to pay total In 
accordance with agreement governing 




Summar~ of Michael P. Vawter's Denied Past Medical ExQenses 
Vawter v. UPS & Liberty Insurance Corp. 
I.C. No. 2010~00114 
Medical Provider Dates of Service Total Amt. of Bill 
1) R. Tyler Frizzell, M.D. 11/23/10 $96.05 
R. Tyler Frizzell, M.D. 04/21/11 ~96.05 
$192.10 
2) St. Luke's RMC 10/14/10 $93.00 
St. Luke's RMC 11/23/10 ~93.00 
$186.00 
3) , Boise Radiology Group 10/14/10 $52.00 
Boise Radiology Group 11/23/10 ~52.00 
$104.00 
4) McCall Physical Therapy 09/20/10 $99.00 
McCall Physical Therapy 09/22/10 $99.00 
McCall Physical Therapy 09/27/10 $99.00 
McCall Physical Therapy 09/29/10 $132.00 
McCall Physical Therapy 10/07/10 $132.00 
McCall Physical Therapy 10/18/10 $132.00 
McCall Physical Therapy 10/20/10 $132.00 
McCall Physical Therapy 10/25/10 $132.00 
McCall Physical Therapy 10/28/10 $132.00 
McCall Physical Therapy 11/01/10 $99.00 
McCall Physical Therapy 11/03/10 $165.00 
McCall Physical Therapy 11/04/10 $165.00 
McCall Physical Therapy 11/08/10 $132.00 
McCall Physical Therapy 11/10/10 $99.00 
McCall Physical Therapy 11/22/10 $99.00 
$1,848.00 
5) Michael Tullis, M.D. 07/21/10 ~171232.75 
$17,232.75 
6) Orthofix, inc. 07/30/10 ~4(995.00 
$4,995.00 
7) David Hall, M.D. 07/30/10 ~70.00 
$70.00 
TOTAL: $24,627.85 
hourly, weekly or monthly rate of pay. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15: The Claimant is still employed by UPS but is cumntly in a 
period ofrecovery from his 12.18.09 industrial accident /injury and I or his 1.20.10 lumbar spine surgery and 
not receiving a paycheck from UPS. The Claimant has earned less than $1 ,000.00 from 2 snow removaljobs 
up Ulltil 1.18.10. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: If you have applied for unemployment insurance compensation, social 
secmity disability or any other type of disability payment since the date of injury, identify the name and 
address of each business or governmental agency from whom benefits have been sought, the dates when you 
filed application for benefits and the status of your application (approved, denied, under appeal, pending, 
etc.). If benefits have been received, indicate the dates and amounts paid. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY N0.16: On or about 1.11.10, the Claimant filed a Statement of 
Disability Claim with The Oregon Teamster Employers Trust Clo William C. Earhatt Co., Inc. located at P.O. 
Box 4148 Portland, OR 97208. As of 3.16.10, the Claimant had received 10 weeks of disability income 
benefits in the total amount of $2,770.52. The Claimant is no longer receiving these short-terms disability 
benefits. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: What"is the basis for your contention that the location where your injury 
occurred constituted the premises of Employer and/or should be deemed as such? 
ANSWER TO INTER R 0 GA TORY NO. 17: The Claimant has been staiting and ending each work day at 
the premises of Arnold Aviation, located at the airport in Cascade, Idaho for over 12 years. The Claimant 
parks his UPS Package Car on the premises and keeps his Diad inside the building at Arnold Aviation. The 
Claimant has been using the Arnold Aviation premises off and on for over 12 years. The Claimant lias filed 
prior worker's compensation claims that were accepted by employer and described the locations of his work 
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E-Mail: rdk@greyhawklaw.com 
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) Defendants I Appellants. 
(A) INTRODUCTION 
The Claimant I Respondent (i.e., Claimant) is asking the Idaho Supreme Court to dismiss 
the Defendants I Appellants (i.e., Defendants) Interlocutory Appeal because: 
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(1) The Industrial Commission's May 17, 2011 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order was not a final Order that fully and finally disposed of all of the Claimant's claims 
against the Defendants. Therefore, the Defendants I Appellants are not entitled to file an 
appeal as a matter of right pursuant to LA.R. 11( d); 
(2) The Defendants I Appellants filed a Motion To Bifurcate with the Industrial Commission on 
05.12.2010 and specifically requested that the Indushial Commission bifurcate the issues in 
this case so that they would have to be heard and decided at 2 separate hearings. Therefore, 
the doctrine of judicial estoppel should be applied to prevent the Defendants I Appellants 
from taking an Interlocutory Appeal of the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 Order; and, 
(3) Defendants I Appellants have waived their right to file a permissive appeal by failing to file 
a Motion For Permission To Appeal with the Industrial Commission within 14 days after the 
Industrial Commission entered its May 17, 2011 interlocutory Order as required by I.A.R. 
12(b). 
(B)- BACKGROUND FACTS 
The Claimant filed his Complaint with the Industrial Commission on 3. 5.2010 and listed the 
following disputed issues to be heard and decided by the Industrial Commission: 
(1) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 bending over to tie his work I snow boots accident arise out 
of and in the course of his employment with UPS? 
(2) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident cause a new injury to his low back? 
(3) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident aggravate, accelerate, light-up, combine 
with or contribute to a pre-existing back condition and result in the need for medical 
treatment? 
(4) Are the Defendants liable for medical benefits as required by the Claimant's attending 
physician or needed immediately after the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury 
and a reasonable time thereafter pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-432? 
(5) Are the Defendants liable for the payment of total temporary disability (TTD) and I or 
temporary paiiial disability (TPD) benefits to the Claimant during his period ofrecovery? 
(6) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident cause the Claimant to suffer any 
permanent physical impairment (PPI) and, if so, to what extent? 
(7) Did Claimant suffer any disability in excess of his physical impairment (PPD >PPI) as 
the result of his 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury, including whether the Claimant is 
totally and permanently disabled under the 100% method or the odd-lot doctrine? 
(8) Are the Defendants liable for the payment of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-
804? (See Exhibit 1 to Affidavit of Rick D. Kallas). 
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. The Claimanfs 05.03.2010 Request For Calendaring listed the following disputed issues to 
be heard and decided by the Industrial Commission: 
(1) Did the Claimanfs 12.18.09 bending over to tie his work I snow boots accident arise out 
of and in the course of his employment with UPS? 
(2) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident either cause a new injury or aggravate, 
accelerate, light-up, coml;>ine with or contribute to a pre-existing back condition and 
result in the need for medical treatment? 
(3) Are the Defendants liable for medical benefits as required by the Claimant's attending 
physician or needed immediately after the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury 
and a reasonable time thereafter pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-432? 
( 4) Are the Defendants liable for the payment of total temporary disability (TTD) and I or 
temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits to the Claimant during his period of recovery? 
(5) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident cause the Claimant to suffer any 
permanent physical impairment (PPI) and, if so, to what extent? 
(6) Did the Claimant suffer any disability in excess of his physical impairment (PPD >PPI) 
as the result of his 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury, including whether the Claimant is 
totally and permanently disabled under the 100% method or the odd-lot doctrine? 
(7) Are the Defendants liable for the payment of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-
804? (See Exhibit 3 to Affidavit ofRickD. Kallas). 
On 05.12.10, the Defendants filed a Motion To Bifurcate the issues and listed the following 
issues to be heard and decided at the 09.28.2010 Hearing: 
1. Whether Claimant's injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment; 
2. Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a pre-existing injury or disease 
or cause not work-related; 
3. Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as provided for by 
Idaho Code§ 72-432, and the extent thereof; 
4. Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and/or temporary total disability 
(TPD/TTD) benefits, and the extent thereof; and 
5. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer/Surety's unreasonable 
denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804 (See Exhibit 4 to 
Affidavit of Rick D. Kallas). 
In response to the Defendants' Motion to Bifurcate, the Industrial Commission entered a 
NOTICE OF HEARING on 07.20.2010 which bifurcated the issues and listed the following 
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disputed issues to be heard and decided at the 09.28.2010 Hearing: 
1. Whether Claimant suffered a personal injury arising out of and in the course of 
employment; 
2. Whether Claimant1s injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment; 
3. Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as provided for by 
Idaho Code § 72-432, and the extent thereof; 
4. Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and I or temporary total disability 
(TPD/TTD) benefits, and the extent thereof; 
5. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer I Surety's unreasonable 
denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804 (See Exhibit 6 to 
Affidavit of Rick D. Kallas). 
The bifurcated hearing was held on 09.28.2010. After the Hearing, the Industrial 
Commission entered its 05.17.2011 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order which only 
decided the following issues: 
1. . Claimant suffered an accident arising in the course of and out of his employment causing 
an injury on December 18,2009. 
2. Claimant is awarded TTD benefits from December 28, 2009 through December 6, 2010 
(Note: The Industrial Commission's Order did not state the amount of the Defendants' 
liability for the payment of total temporary disability benefits). 
3. Claimant is awarded medical benefits in the amount of $149,033.68. 
4. Claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
5. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all matters 
adjudicated. (See Exhibit 7 to Affidavit of Rick D. Kallas). 
Since the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 decision did not decide all of the disputed 
issues or resolve all of the Claimant's claims against the Defendants,, the Claimant filed a 2nd 
Request For Calendaring with the Commission on 05.19.2011. In his 2nd Request For Calendaring, 
the Claimant listed the following remaining issues which still need to be heard and decided by the 
Industrial Commission: 
(1) What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent physical impairment (PPI) caused by the 
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subject 12.18 .09 industrial accident I injury? 
(2) What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent disability in excess of his physical 
impairment (PPD >PPI) caused by the subject 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury, 
including whether the Claimant is totally and pennanently disabled under the 100% 
method and I or the odd-lot doctrine? (See Exhibit 8 to Affidavit of Rick D. Kallas) 
The Industrial Commission retained jurisdiction over the unresolved issues in this case and 
issued its 06.07.2011 AMENDED NOTICE OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE AND NOTICE OF 
HEARING which listed the following unresolved issues to be heard and decided at the final hearing 
which is set for 10.25.2011: 
1. The extent and degree of Claimant's entitlement to pennanent partial impairment (PPI); 
2. The extent and degree of Claimant's entitlement to permanent partial disability (PPD) in 
excess of PPI, including whether or not Claimant is a totally and permanently disabled 
under the odd-lot doctrine; 
3. Whether apportionment under Idaho Code § 72-406, is appropriate (See Exhibit 11 to 
Affidavit of Rick D. Kallas). 
(C) ARGUMENT 
(1) THE DEFENDANTS INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
BECAUSE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 5.17.2011 ORDER WAS NOT A 
FINAL AND APPEALABLE ORDER THAT DISPOSED OF ALL OF THE 
CLAIMANT'S CLAIMS AS REQUIRED BY I.A.R. ll(d) 
The Industrial Commission's 5.17.2011 Interlocutory Order only decided the following 
issues: 
1. The arise out of employment issue; 
2. The Defendants' liability for past denied medical benefits issue; 
3. The Defondants' liability for past denied temporary disability benefits issue; and, 
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4. The Defendants' liability for attorney's fees issue. (See Exhibit 7 to Affidavit of Rick D. 
Kallas). . 
By entering its 06.07.2011 AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARlNG, the Industrial 
Commission has explicitly retained jurisdiction over the remaining undecided issues and has 
scheduled a final Hearing on October 25, 2011 to decide the following unresolved issues: 
1. The extent and degree of Claimant's entitlement to permanent partial impairment (PPI); 
2. The extent and degree of Claimant's entitlement to permanent partial disability (PPD) in 
excess of PPI, including whether or not Claimant is a totally and permanently disabled 
under the odd-lot doctrine; and, 
3. Whether apportionment under Idaho Code § 72-406, is appropriate (See Exhibit 11 to 
Affidavit of Rick D. Kallas) 
The procedural posture of this case is virtually identical to the case of Law v. Omark 
Industries, 121 Idaho 128, 832 P.2d 162 (1992). In Law, Employer I Surety denied liability for 
the surgery requested by Claimant. The Claimant filed an Application For Hearing before the 
Industrial Commission seeking compensation for medical benefits and attorney's fees, but not 
for permanent physical impairment and permanent disability benefits. After the Hearing, the 
Industrial Commission entered an Order awarding the Claimant medical benefits. Employer I 
Surety appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the Employer I Surety's appeal because there 
was no final Order by the Industrial Commission which resolved the impairment and disability 
issues as required by I.AR. ll(d): 
This is a workers' compensation case. The issue we find dispositive is the 
lack of a final decision or order of the Industrial Commission. Therefore, 
we dismiss the appeal. 
Stanley "Tex" Law was injured while working for Omark Industries· in 
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1985. In 1989, Law received surgery for a condition he alleged was the 
result of the 1985 injury. Om.ark and its surety denied payment for the 
surgery. Law applied for a hearing before the Commission, seeking 
compensation for medical treatment and attorney fees, but not for 
impairment and disability benefits. 
Following a hearing, the Commission found that the question of 
impairment and disability benefits was not properly brought before the 
Commission at that time because the issue was not presented in the 
application for hearing or argued during the hearing, and because Law's 
condition had not stabilized. The Commission awarded Law reasonable 
medical benefits relating to the 1985 accident, including benefits for the 
operation performed in 1989. The Commission did not award attorney 
fees. Om.ark and its surety appealed. 
As we have ruled in Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 121 Idaho 127, 823 P.2d 161 
(1992) released this same day, there is no final order by the Commission 
as is required by I.A.R. ll(d). Therefore, we dismiss the appeal, without 
prejudice and without costs, and remand the case to the Commission. Law, 
supra, at 121 Idaho 128. 
The Defendants I Appellants have already conceded in their Notice of Appeal that "the 
appealed order did not adjudicate all of the issues or potential issues involved in Respondent's 
workers' [sic] [worker's] compensation claim" (Seep. 2 of Exhibit 12 to Affidavit of Rick D. 
Kallas). The Defendants' concession that the Commission's 5.17.2011 Order is an Interlocutory 
Order that did not dispose of all of the issues in this case should be dispositive and result in the 
immediate dismissal of the Defendants' appeal pursuant to I.AR. 1 l(d). 
After conceding that the Commission's 05.17.2011 Interlocutory Order did not resolve all 
of the disputed issues in the case, the Defendants cited Jensen v. Pillsbury Co, 121 Idaho 127, 
823 P. 2d 161 (1992) for the proposition that Commission's 05.17.2011 Order must be treated as 
a fmal and appealable Order because the Commission did not "explicitly state" in its Order that it 
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was retaining jurisdiction to decide the remaining issues in this case. 
The Defendants have placed form over substance and misinterpreted this Court's holding 
in Jensen. This Court did not hold in Jensen that all Orders issued by the Industrial Commission 
must automatically be treated as final Orders that are subject to an appeal as a matter of right 
under I.A.R. 11 ( d) unless the Industrial Commission "explicitly states" in the Order that it is 
retaining jurisdiction to decide the unresolved issues in the case. 
As a practical matter, there is no difference between the Commission explicitly stating 
that it has retained jurisdiction versus the Commission taking definitive action which confirms 
that it has already retained jurisdiction by scheduling the remaining unresolved issues of 
impairment and disability for determination at a final Hearing (See Exhibit 11). The legal effect 
is the same and proves that an appeal as a matter of right pursuant to I.AR. 11 ( d) is premature at 
this time because the Commission has retained jurisdiction in this case in order to resolve the 
remaining disputed issues which have never been resolved by a final Order. 
The Defendants' argument that Jensen requires the Commission to "explicitly state" that 
it has retained jurisdiction must be rejected based on this Court's holding in Law. The Law 
Court cited Jensen when it dismissed the Employer I Surety's Interlocutory Appeal even though 
the Commission in Law did not explicitly state that it was retaining jurisdiction to decide the 
remaining unresolved issues. The reason that the Law Court did not require the Commission to 
explicitly state that it had retained jurisdiction is because the ultimate issues of impairment and 
disability were not listed in the Request For Calendaring (Notice of Hearing) and were not 
decided by the Commission at the Hearing. That is exactly the situation in this case. 
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The Defendants in this case filed a Motion To Bifurcate with the Industrial Commission 
on 05.12.2010 which specifically asked the Industrial Commission to remove the issues of 
impairment and disability from consideration at the 09.28.2010 Hearing. Since the 
Commission's 05.17.2011 Interlocutory Order did not finally dispose of all of the Claimant's 
claims, it cannot be considered a final decision subject to appeal as a matter of right under I.AR. 
ll(d): 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11 ( d) provides that an appeal can be taken as a 
matter of right 11 [f]rom any final decision or order of the Industrial 
Commission or from any final decision or order upon rehearing or 
reconsideration by the administrative agency." This Court has held that a 
decision or order that does not ":finally dispose of all of the claimant's 
claims would not be a final decision subject to appeal pursuant to 
I.A.R.ll(d) .... 11 Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 118 Idaho 147, 149, 
795 P.2d 309, 311 (1990). The Commission has not resolved all of the 
issues regarding Blachly's liability. Because issues necessary for a "final 
order" remain unresolved, this case does not present an appeal as a matter 
of right under I.A.R. ll(d). Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 121 Idaho 127, 823 
P.2d 161 (1992). We therefore decline to rule on the issues presented by 
the parties and order that this appeal is dismissed, without prejudice and 
without costs, and the cause remanded to the Commission. State Dept. of 
Employment v. Blachly, 126 Idaho 121, 122, 879 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). 
The Claimant in this case respectfully requests that this Court apply its holdings in 
Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 118 Idaho 147, 795 P.2d 309 (1990); Jensen v. Pillsbury 
Co., 121 Idaho 127, 823 P. 2d 161 (1992); Law v. Omark Industries, 121 Idaho 128, 832 P.2d 
162 (1992) and State Dept. of Employment v. Blachly, 126 Idaho 121, 122, 879 P.2d 29, 30 
(1994) and dismiss the Defendants' Interlocutory Appeal because the Commission's 05.17.2011 
Interlocutory Order does not finally dispose of all of the Claimant's claims and therefore cannot 
be considered a final decision subject to appeal as a matter of right as required by I.AR. 11 ( d). 
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(2) THE DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE JUDICIALY ESTOPPED FROM TAKING AN 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S MAY 17, 
2011 ORDER WHICH DECIDED LESS THAN ALL OF THE ISSUES IN THIS 
CASE BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS FILED A MOTION TO BIFURCATE THE 
ISSUES AND ASKED THE COMMISSION TO DECIDE LESS THAN ALL OF 
THE ISSUES AT THE FIRST HEARJNG 
After the Claim.ant filed his Request For Calendaring on 05.03.2010, the Defendants filed 
their 05.12.2010 Motion to Bifurcate and asked the Commission to decide less than all of the issues 
in this case at the 09.28.2010 Hearing (See Exhibit 4 to Affidavit of Rick D. Kallas). When the 
Defendants filed their Motion To Bifurcate, they knew that a subsequent hearing would be required 
in order to resolve all of the Claim.ant's remaining claims against the Defendants including, but not 
limited to, the extent of his permanent physical impairment and the extent of his permanent 
disability in excess of impairment (See pp. 1-2 of Exhibit 4). 
The Claimant respectfully requests that the Court apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel to 
prevent the Defendants from now taking an Interlocutory Appeal of the Industrial Commission's 
May 17, 2011 decision because the Defendants asked the Commission to bifurcate the issues and 
hold at least 2 Hearings in this case: 
Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking 
one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an 
incompatible position. Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92 P.3d 492, 
502 (2004) .... 
The Idaho Court of Appeal_s :further explained the doctrine as follows: 
Essentially, this doctrine prevents a party from assuming a position in one 
proceeding and then taldng an inconsistent position in a subsequent 
proceeding. There are very important policies underlying the judicial 
estoppel doctrine. One purpose of the doctrine is to protect the integrity of 
the judicial system, by protecting the orderly administration of justice and 
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having regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings. The doctrine is also 
intended to prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the courts. 
Robertson Supply, 131 Idaho at 101, 952 P.2d at 916 (internal citations 
omitted). A & J Const. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684 - 685, 116 
P.3d 12, 14-15 (2005). 
By asking the Industrial Commission to bifurcate the issues for Hearing, the Defendants 
knew that the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 Interlocutory Order would not fmally decide all 
of the unresolved issues in this case and that a subsequent Hearing would be required in order to 
finally dispose of all of the Claimant's claims. The Court should apply the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel to prevent the Defendants from taking inconsistent positions which interfere with the 
orderly administration of justice. 
The Claimant should not be required to wait several years to have the remaining unresolved 
issues of impairment and disability decided while the Defendants prosecute their premature 
Interlocutory Appeal: 
While no argument is presented by the defendant as to why an immediate 
appeal would "materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation," 
it is obvious that if the defendant prevails, it will prevent the necessity of a 
trial. At the same time, it is obvious that if the defendant does not prevail 
in the appeal, the trial of the action and relief sought by the plaintiff will 
be delayed by the pendency of this interlocutory appeal and that there is a 
possibility of a second appeal after the trial in t1ie district court. 
In accepting or rejecting an appeal by certification under I.AR. 12, this 
Court considers a number of factors in addition to the threshold questions 
of whether there is a controlling question of law and whether an 
immediate appeal would advance the orderly resolution of the litigation. It 
was the intent of I.A.R. 12 to provide an immediate appeal from an 
interlocutory order if substantial legal issues of great public interest or 
legal questions of first impression are involved. The Court also considers 
such factors as the impact of an immediate appeal upon the parties, the 
effect of the delay of the proceedings in the district court pending the 
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appeal, the likelihood or possibility of a second appeal after judgment is 
finally entered by the district court, and the case workload of the appellate 
courts. No single factor is controlling in the Court's decision of acceptance 
or rejection of an appeal by certification, but the Court intends by Rule 12 
to create an appeal in the exceptional case and does not intend by the rule 
to broaden the appeals which may be taken as a matter of right under 
I.AR. 11. Budellv. Todd, 105 Idaho 2,, 665 P. 2d 701, 703 (1983). 
If the Court denies the Claimant's Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal, the 
Claimant may be required to wait 2 years before the Idaho Supreme Court decides the "arising 
out of employment" issue. After the Supreme Comt affirms the Industrial Commission;s 5.17.11 
Order, the Claimant would then be required to file a new Request For Calendaring with the 
Industrial Commission in order to resolve the physical impairment and disability issues. The 
Claimant's new Request For Calendaring would not be filed until after the Supreme Court 
decided the "arising out of employment" issue in approximately June of 2013. 
After the Claimant filed his new Request For Calendaring in June of 2013, the Industrial 
Commission would probably not set the new Hearing on the physical impairment and disability 
issues for at least 6 months until December of 2013. After the December 2013 Hearing before 
the Industrial Commission, the parties will probably be required to take post-Hearing depositions 
of physicians and vocational rehabilitation experts for 30 days followed by 120 days of legal 
briefing. The Industrial Commission would then take the impairment and disability issues under 
advisement for approximately 6 months to a year before the Commission entered a final 
decision. 
Based on this realistic assessment of the piecemeal litigation time-table that will unfold if 
the Defendants are allowed to prosecute their Interlocutory Appeal of the Industrial 
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Commission's 05.17.2011 Order, the Claimant will be required to wait approximately 2.5 years 
until December of 2014 before he receives a final decision from the Commission that addresses 
the extent of his physical impairment and disability. 
After receiving a final decision from the Industrial Commission, the Defendants will 
probably file a 2nd appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court which disputes the Commission's decision 
on the extent of the Claimant's impairment and disability. It could take another 2 years after 
entry of the Commission's final decision before the Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial 
Commission's decision on the physical impairment and disability issues. 
The Claimant could literally be forced to wait until December of 2016 before receiving 
tlie sure and certain relief promised to him by Idaho Code §72-201. During that 7 year time 
frame from his date of injury on 12.18.2009 until this case if fully and finally resolved on appeal 
in December of 2016, the Claimant will be deprived of medical benefits, temporary disability 
benefits, pe1manent physical impairment benefits and permanent disability in excess of impairment 
benefits through the Idaho workers' compensation system. 
If this Court allows the Defendants to file piecemeal appeals in this case, the Claimant will 
be deprived of the summary and simple process promised to him by the rules of equity and Idaho 
Code §72-708. Furthermore, the Claimant will be deprived of the just, speedy and economical 
determination of all of the unresolved issues in his case in direct violation of JRP 1 of the Judicial 
Rules of Practice and Procedure Under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law. 
This Court has adopted a strong policy against piecemeal appeals in order to protect the 
orderly administration of justice: 
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To require Mortimer to appeal within forty-two days after the denial of his 
motion to reconsider would contravene our policy of avoiding piecemeal 
litigation. Mortimer v. Riviera Apartments, 122 Idaho 839, 842, 840 P. 2d 
383, 386 (1992). 
The Claimant respectfully requests that the Court apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel and 
grant his Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal in order to discourage piecemeal appeals and 
protect the orderly administration of justice. 
(3) THE DEFENDANTS HA VE WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO FILE A PERMISSIVE 
APPEAL BY FAILING TO FILE A MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
WITH THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WITHIN 14 DAYS AFTER THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ENTERED ITS MAY 17, 2011 INTERLOCUTORY 
ORDER AS REQUIRED BY I.A.R. 12(B). 
Even if the Defendants could meet their burden of proof under LA.R. 12( a) and demonstrate 
that the instant appeal involved a controlling question of law as to which there are substantial 
grounds for difference of opinion and which an immediate appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court 
would materially advance the resolution of the litigation, this appeal should still be dismissed 
because the Defendants failed to file a Motion For Permission to Appeal with the Industrial 
Commission within 14 days after the Commission entered its 05.17.2011 Order. 
Based on the jmisdictional requirements set forth in I.AR. 12(c)(l), the Defendants are not 
permitted to file a Motion with the Idaho Supreme Court requesting acceptance of an appeal by 
permission until after they have first filed a Motion For Permission To Appeal with the Industrial 
Commission and received an Order from the Commission. After the Order has been received from 
the Commission, the Defendants could then :file a Motion For Permissive Appeal with the Supreme 
Court. Since the Defendants did not file a Motion For Permission To Appeal with the Industrial 
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Commission, the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to consider their cunent Notice of 
Appeal as a Motion For Acceptance of Appeal By Permission. 
(D) CONCLUSION 
The Claimant respectfully requests that the Supreme Court grant his Motion For Involuntary 
Dismissal of the Defendants' Appeal for the following reasons: 
(1) The Industrial Commission's May 17, 2011 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order was not a final Order that fully and finally disposed of all of the Claimant's claims 
against the Defendants. Therefore, the Defendants are not entitled to file an appeal from that 
Order as a matter ofright pursuant to I.AR. 11 ( d); 
(2) The Defendants filed a Motion To Bifurcate with the Industrial Commission on 05.12.2010 
and specifically requested that the Industrial Commission bifurcate the issues in this case so 
that they would have to be heard and decided at 2 separate hearings. Therefore, the doctrine 
of judicial estoppel should be applied to prevent the Defendants from taking the inconsistent 
position of an Interlocutory Appeal of the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 Order; 
(3) The Defendants have waived their right to file a permissive appeal by failing to file a 
Motion For Pennission To Appeal with the Industrial Comn1ission within 14 days after the 
Industrial Commission entered its May 17, 2011 interlocutory Order as required by I.AR 
12(b); 
(4) An immediate interlocutory appeal of less than all of the disputed issues will delay the final 
determination of the issues of pennanent physical impairment and permanent disability 
because proceedings before the Industrial Commission will be stayed pending resolution of 
the Interlocutory Appeal by the Supreme Court; 
(5) There is a substantial likelihood that the Defendants will file a 2nd appeal after the final 
Hearing before the Industrial Commission which resolves all of the remaining issues in this 
case; 
(6) An Interlocutory Appeal at this stage of the litigation will double the Supreme Court's 
workload and waste scarce judicial resources because the Court will have to hear and decide 
2 appeals in this case; and, · 
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(7) Permissive Interlocutory Appeals undermine the effective administration of justice because 
they encourage piecemeal litigation and multiple appeals over the course of several years 
while the Claimant is being deprived of his substantive legal rights and the worker's 
compensation benefits that are promised to him by the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. 
Respectfully submitted this 2ih day of June, 2011. 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DeFRANCO, P.L.L.C 
Attorney's For Claimant I Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2J1h day of June, 2011, I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Claimant I Respondent's Brief In Support of Motion For Involuntary Dismissal, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Susan R. Veltman: 
Gardner & Breen 
1410 W. Washington 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
P.O. Box 2528 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorney For Claimant I Respondent 
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Rick D. Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & DeFranco, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Telephone: (208) 336-1843 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8945 
Idaho State Bal' No. 3872 
Fi~cs 
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Attorney for Claimant Wcf:/ & l!lf:'J~~N 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




vs. ) J.C. No. 2010-000114 
) 










COMES NOW Claimant, Michael Vawter, and, pursuant to J.R.P. 8 (C), hereby requests 
that the Commission calendar this claim for Hearing on the following grounds: 
The requesting party hereby states: 
(1) Readiness For Hearing 
The Claimant is ready for Hearing. 
(2) Disputed Issues To Be Heard and Decided 
The following issues are before the Commission to be heard and decided: 
Vawter I Claimant's 5.3.10 Request For Calendaring 
EXHIBIT 
(a) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 bendL.11g over to tie his work/ snow boots accident arise out 
of and in the course of his employment with UPS? · 
(b) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident either cause a new injury or aggravate, 
accelerate, light-up, combine with or contribute to a pre-existing back condition and 
result in the need for medical treatment? 
(c) Are the Defendants liable for medical benefits as required by the Claimant's attending 
physician or needed immediately after the Claimant's 12.18 .09 industrial accident I injury 
arid a reasonable time thereafter pursuant to Idaho Code § 72w432? 
( d) Are the Defendants liable for the payment of total temporaiy disability (TTD) and I or 
temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits to the Claimant during his period of recovery? 
(e) Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident cause the Claimant to suffer any 
permanent physical impairment (PPI) and, if so, to what extent? 
(:t) Did the Claimant suffer any disability in excess of his physical impairment (PPD > PPI) 
as the result of his 12.18.09 industrial accident I injmy, including whether the Claimant is 
totally and permanently disabled under the 100% method or the odd-lot doctrine? 
(g) Are the Defendants liable for the payment of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-
804? 
(3) Location of Hearing 
The desired location of the Hear'ing is Boise, Idaho. 
(4) Claimant's Counsel's Unavailable Dates 
At the present time, the Claimant's attorney is not available fol' Hearing on the following 
dates: 5.6.10 - 5.7.10; 5.31.10; 6.11.10; 6.18.10; 7.2.10; 7.5.10; 7.29.10; 7.30.10, 
8.12.10; 9.6.10; 11.19.10-11.29.10; 12.24.10-12.31.10. 
(5) Length of Hearing 
The estimated length of time to present the Claimant> s case in chief is one (1) full day. 
(6) Full Commission Participation 
This case does not present any unique, unusual or bizarre factual, legal or medical issues 
that need to be heard by the full Corr_,mission. 
(7) Translation Services 
Vawter I Claimant's 5.·3.10 Request For Calendaring Page 2 
The Claimant does require translation services. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of May, 2010. 
Ellsworth, Kallas> Talboy & Defiance> P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I BEREBY CERTIFY tliat on the 3rd day of May, 2010, I served the Claimant's Request For 
Calendaring on the Defendants by the method indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Susan R. Veltman, Esq. 
GARDNER & BREEN 
1410 West Washington 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Vawter I Claimant's 5,3.10 Request For Calendaring 
[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ J Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
Page 3 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850) 
GARDNER & BREEN 
1410 W. Washington- 83702 
Post Office Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
Attorney for Defendants 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MICHAEL P. VA WIER, 
Claimant, 
v . . 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, 
Employer, 
and 



















I.C. Case No. 2010-000114 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR 
HEARING/MOTION TO 
BIFURCATE 
I. Statement of readiness for hearing and request to bifurcate issue of accident/injury: 
Defendants assert that Claimant's request for a hearing on his stated issues, including PPI and 
PPD, is premature. Claimant has not yet been certified at MMI and no physician has assigned a PPI 
rating. Since Claimant has not yet been certified at MMI, it is premature to evaluate Claimant's 
permanent restrictions and otherwise assess PPD. Additionally, once Claimant reaches MMI and 
RES PONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING/ MOTION TO BIFURCATE, P. 1 
EXHIBJT 
l '1 l 
receives a PPI rating, Defendants will likely need to obtain an expert opinion on the issue of 
apportionment, based on Claimant's pre-existing back injuries and conditions. A vocational 
assessment may also be necessary. 
The primary dispute in this case is whether Claimant's bending over to tie his shoe 
constitutes an accident arising out of employment as a UPS driver. Defendants are ready to proceed 
to hearing on this issue. Defendants agree that issues regarding medical treatment and temporary 
disability could also be heard at a bifurcated hearing. At the request of Claimant, the issue of attorney 
fees could also be litigated. If the Referee agrees to bifurcation of the issues, Defendants do not 
object to scheduling the hearing any time after June 15, 2010. If the Referee concludes that allissues 
should be adjudicated at the same time, Defendants object to scheduling the hearing prior to 
November 2010, since Claimant's date of MMI is currently uncertain and additional preparation will 
be necessary once a certification is issued. In the event that Defendants prevail on the primary 
dispute, all other issues will be moot. In the event that Claimant prevails on the primary dispute, 
informal resolution of the other issues is possible. 
II. Issues- Defendants request that the issues be bifurcated and that only the following 
issues be set for hearing at this time: 
1. Whether Claimant's injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in the 
course of employment; 
2. Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a pre-existing injury 
or disease or cause not work-related; 
3. Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as 
provided for by Idaho Code § 72-432, and the extent thereof; 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING/MOTION TO BIFURCATE, P. 2 
4. Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and/or temporary total disability 
(TPD/TTD) benefits, and the extent thereof; and 
5. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer/Surety's 
unreasonable denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804. 
III. Location of hearing: Boise, Idaho 
IV. Desired dates of hearing: Defendants anticipate being ready for hearing by September 1, 
2010 and request a hearing on or after that date. 
v. Unavailable dates of counsel: June 1, 2,3, 11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 29; 
July 7, 8, 9, 12; 
August 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 19, 20; 
September 3. 
VI. Estimated length of hearing: One-half day. 
VII. Settlement Negotiations: Have not occurred, based on the nature of the primary dispute. 
VIII. Full Commission Participation: Not required. 
IX. Special Services: None requested. 
DATED this 11th day of May, 2010. 
Susan R. Veltman - of the firm 
GARDNER & BREEN 
Attorney for Defendants 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING/MOTION TO BIFURCATE, P. 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11th day of May, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to be served upon: 
Rick Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & DeFranco 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, 
the last known address as set forth above. 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING/MOTION TO BIFURCATE, P. 4 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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MAY 20 2010 
INDUSTRfAL COMMISSION 
A telephone conference will be conducted by Referee Michael E. Powers, pursuant to the 
Revised Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Workers' Compensation Law, on June 7, 2010, 
at 11:00 a.m. All parties shall be prepared to discuss Claimant's Request for Calendaring, 
Defendants' Response to Request for Hearing/Motion to Bifurcate, and Claimant's Response to 
Defendants' Motion to Bifurcate. 
Rick Kallas may be reached at (208) 336-1843. 
Susan Veltman may be reached at (208) 387-0881. 
If there are any changes to these numbers, please contact us immediately. You may do this 
by calling the Industrial Commission at 334-6019. . tb 
DATED this ~o day of May, 2010. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Michael E. Powers, Referee EXHIBIT 
NOTICE OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE -1 I 10 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
i:!l . 
I hereby certify that on the cX) day of May, 2010, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE was served by regular United States mail upon each 
of the following persons: 
RICK D KALLAS 
1031 EPARKBLVD 
BOISE ID 83712 




NOTICE OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE - 2 
01/15/2010 15: 31 FAX 2083 58 Idaho Industrial Comm 
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rJUL 1.5. 2010 
INDUSTAfAL. COMMISSION 
f4J 0001/0002 
Pursuant to Claimane s verbal request, a telephone conference will be conducted by Referee 
Mich.a.el E. Powers, pursuant to the Revised Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Workers' 
Compensation Law, on July 19, 2010, at 9:30 a.m. 
Rick Kallas maybe reached at (208) 336-1843. 
Susan Veltman may be reached at (208) 387-0881. 
Jf there are any changes to these numbers, please contact us immediateiy. You may do this 
by calling the Industrial Commission at 334-6019. 
DATED' this 15th day of July, 2010. 
INDUSTRIAL CO:MMISSION 
NOTICE OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE -1 EXHIBIT 
l _............11 
/57 
07/15/2010 15:32 FAX 208 Idaho Industrial comm ~0002/0002 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of July, 2010, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE was served by facsimile transmission upon each of 
the following persons: 
RICK D KALLAS 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN 
ge 
FAX: (208) 345-8945 
FAX: (208) 387-3501 
NOTICE OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE- 2 
•• 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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GARDNER & aReeN 
IC 2010-000114 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
FILED 
!JUL 20 2010 
INDUSTflAL COMMISSJmJ 
Pursuant to the telephone conference conducted by Referee Michael E. Powers with the 
parties on September 28, 2010, 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GNEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter on 
September 28, 2010, at 9:00 a.m., for one-haif day, in the Industrial Commission hearing room, 
700 S. Clearwater Lane, City of Boise, County of Ada, State ofldaho, on the following issues: 
1. Whether Claimant suffered a personal injury arising out of and in the course of 
employment; 
2. Whether Claimant's injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in the 
course of employment; 
. 3. Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as provided 
for by Idaho Code § 72~432, and the extent thereof; 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
EXHIBIT 
I -~1 l lt:f9 ... __ _ 
4. Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and/or temporary total disability 
(TPD/TID) benefits> and the extent thereof; 
5. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer/Surety's 
unreasonable denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804. 
DATED this ClO-tlJ day of July, 2010. 
INDUSTRIAL C011.MJSSION 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Qo-J±i day of July, 2010 a true and correct copy of the NOTICE 
OF HEARING was served by United States Certified Mail upon each of the following: 
RICK D KALLAS 
1031 EPARKBLVD 
BOISE ID 83712 
SUSAN R VELTMAN 
POBOX2528 
BOISE ID 83701 
E-mailed to Dean Willis 
ge 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
l [ 
November 23, 2010 
Scott Harris, MD 
PO Box 1047 
McCall ID 83B38, 




ROY TYLER FRIZZELL, M.D., Ph.D. 
Certified American Board of Neurological Surgery 
222 N. 2nd Street, Suite 307 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 344-1000 • Fax: {208) 344-1331 
I had the pleasure of seeing Mr. Vawter back in clinic. This is for follow up of his work injury 
December 18, 2009. 
~fli 
Mr. Vawter had x-rays performed, 1,vfrit h show solid fusion. There is no adjacent level instability. 
On examination he has flexion of 48 degrees, extension 19 degrees, right tilt 18 degrees, !eft til t 
18 degrees. He notes continued axial back pain without significant lumbar radiation. Mr. Vawter 
has fu! I motor strength and ambulates without an antalgic gait. 
At this point Mr. Vawter is medically stable from his Q~cember 18, 2009, work injury. I will 
address permanent restrictions and impairment in a sep~'(~te communication . He will see me 
back on an as-needed basis. 1T""··· 
Sincere ly; 
{}_!}~~ 
R. Tyle r Frizzell/ MD, PhD 
RTF/I mg 
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ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, P.L.L.C. 
Joseph L. Ellswo1th 
Rick D. Kallas * 
John C. DeFranco 
Licensed in Idaho and Oregon 
Via Facsimile & U.S. Mail 
(208) 387-3501 
Susan Veltman 
Gardner & Breen Law Offices 
P.O. Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
September 7, 2011 
Phone: (208) 336-1843 




Claimant's 2nd Request For Payment of Past Denied TTD Benefits 
Claimant's 2"d Request For Payment of Past Denied Medical Benefits 
Claimant's 2nu Request For Payment of Statutory Interest Per Idaho Code §72-734 
Vawter v. UPS and Liberty Ins. Corp. 
I.C. No. 2010-000114 
Dear Ms. Veltman: 
(A) Updated Procedural History 
ldJOOl/004 
On August 9, 2011, the Claimant submitted a request to Employer I Surety for the payment of past denied TTD 
benefits and past denied medical benefits as Ordered by the Industrial Commission in its May 17, 2011 decision. 
Since the date of the Claimant's 8.9.11 request for payment, the Defendants have failed and I or refused to pay 
the Claimant his past denied TTD benefits, his past denied medical benefits and applicable statutory interest as 
Ordered by the Industrial Commission in its May 17, 2011 decision. 
On September 7, 2011, the parties pa1ticipated in a Pre-Hearing Telephone Conference with the Commissioners. 
During that telephone conference, the Commissioners made it very clear that the Commission deems its May 17, 
2011 Order to be a final Order and they made it very clear that they expected Employer I Surety in this case to 
comply with the Industrial Commission's May ! 7, 2011 decision and pay the Claimant his past denied TTD 
benefits and past denied medical benefits as ordered by the Commission. 
After the 9.7.201 I telephone conference, the Industrial Commission entered an ORDER VACATING 
HEARING AND ESTABLISHING BRIEFING SCHEDULE which gave the Defendants 10 days after the date 
of the Commission's 9.7.2011 Order to submit a legal brief on the issue of whether the Industrial Commission 
should stay the payment of benefits required by the Commission's May 17, 2011 Order. However, the 
Commission made it clear that the Commission's preliminary legal research indicated that there was no legal 
Vawter/ 9.7.11 2"d Request For Payment of Denied TTD Benefits I Denied Medical Benefits & Interest EXHIBIT 
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authority which justified the granting of a stay which relieved the Defendants of their obligation to make 
payment to Claimant in accordance with the Industrial Commission's May 17, 2011 Order. 
During the 9.7.201 I telephone conference, I indicated that I would contact tbe Claimant and determine if he 
would be willing to waive his right to make demand for the current payment of his past denied TTD benefits and 
past denied medical benefits that the Defendants were Ordered to pay the Claimant in the Commission's May 
17, 2011 Order. 
After careful consideration, the Claimant determined that it would be in his best interest to make a second 
request to Employer I Surety for the direct payment (through Claimant's counsel) of past denied TTD benefits, 
past denied medical benefits and accrued statutory interest as Ordered by the Industrial Commission in its May 
17, 2011 Order. In accordance with those instructions, I hereby make the Claimant's second request for the 
payment ofTTD benefits, medical benefits and accrued interest in accordance with the Industrial Commission's 
May 17, 2011 Order. 
Since the Claimant's original 8.9.2011 request for payment, additional interest has accrued by operation of 
Idaho Code §72-734. The amount of money that the Defendants now owe the Claimant pursuant to the 
Industrial Commission's May 17, 2011 Order will be calculated below. 
(B) Second Request For The Payment of Past Due TTD Benefits Per 5.17.11 Order 
In its 5.17.11 decision, the Industrial Commission Ordered the Defendants to pay the Claimant retroactive TTD 
benefits from 12.28.09 - 12.6.10 (See Conclusions of Law and Order No. 2 on pg. 21 of the 5.17.11 decision). 
Based on that Order, the Defendants now owe the Claimant $28,025.61 in retroactive TTD benefits calculated as 
follows: 
2009 TTD Benefits Due 
Based on the Claimant's Average Weekly Wage, his TTD Rate would be calculated based on the statutory 
maximum benefit of90% of the Average Weekly State Wage (AWSW) for the State offdaho per Idaho Code 
§72-408 and §72-409. In 2009, 90% of the A WSW was $572.40 and the daily rate was $81.77. The 
Defendants owe Claimant 4 days at $81.77 per day or $327.09 (i.e., 12.28.09-12.31.09 = 4 days). 
20 I 0 TTD Benefits Due 
In 2010, 90% of the A WSW was $578.70 and the daily rate was $82.67. The Defendants owe the Claimant 48 
weeks + 3 days. 
48 weeks X $578.70 = 
3 days X $82.67 




Combined Total TTD Benefits Due: $327.09 + $28,025.61 = $28,352.70. 
Please ask UPS to send me a check in the amount of$28,352.70 in accordance with the Industrial Commission's 
5.17.11 Order within thirty (30) days (i.e., on or before 10.7.2011). ff your calculations indicate that the 
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09/07/2011 WED 18:56 FAX ~45 8945 EKTD 
ld!003/004 
Claimant's TTD award for the time frame 12.28.09 - 12.6.10 is either higher or lower, please provide me with 
an explanation of your calculations so that the Claimant can understand how you arrived at a different TTD 
benefit calculation. 
(C) Second Request For Direct Payment of Past Denied Medical Benefits Due Per 5.17.11 Order 
Based on Idaho Code §72-432 and the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Neel v. Western Construction, 147 
Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), the Defendants are liable for the direct payment to Claimant of 100% of the 
invoiced amount of all past medical benefits incurred by Claimant in connection with his 12.18.09 industrial 
accident I injury from the date of the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident to the date when the Industrial 
Commission deemed this claim compensable on 5.17.11, including, but not limited to, the $149,033.68 in past 
denied medical benefits that the Industrial Commission Ordered the Defendants to pay Claimant in its 5.17.11 
decision (See Order No. 3 on pg. 21 of its 5.17.11 decision). 
Please send me a check in the amount of $149,033.68 in accordance with the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 
Order within thirty (30) days (i.e., on or before 10.7.2011) 
(D) Second Request For Payment oflnterest Pursuant to Idaho Code §72-734 
The combined amount of past denied benefits that became due and payable on 5.17.11 is $177,356.38 (i.e., 
$28,352.70 + $149,033.68 = $177,356.38). Pursuant to Idaho Code §72-734, interest became due and payable 
on the entire amount as of the date of the decision based on the rate set forth in Idaho Code §28-22- I 04(2). 
The legal rate of interest from 5.17.11to6.30.l l was 5.375%. Effective 7.1.11, the legal rate of interest changed 
to 5.25% (Source: Idaho State Treasurer's Web-Site@ http://sto.idaho.gov/Reports/Lega!Rate011nterest.aspx). 
Interest Due from 5.17.11 - 6.30.11 Using 5.35% Interest Rate 
Total amount of $177,356.38 X 5.35% = $9,488.57 per annum + 365 = $26.00 per day 
May= 14 days X $26.00 = 




Interest Due from 7. l .11 - 8.9.11 Using 5.25% Interest Rate 
$1,144.00 
Total amount of $177,356.38 X 5.25% = $9,311.21 per annum+ 365 = $25.51 per day. 
July= 31 days X $25.51 = $790.81 
August= 3 ! days X $25.51 = $790.81 
September= 7 days X 25.51 = $I 78.57 
Subtotal 
Total Interest Accumulated Since 5 .17.11 
$1.760.19 
Vawter/ 9.7.1 l 2"d Request For Payment of Denied 1TD Benefits I Denied Medical Benefits & Interest 
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The Defendants' combined liability for the payment of past denied medical and income benefits plus statutory 
interest which is now due and payable as of 9.7.2011 is $180,260.57 calculated as follows: $177,356.38 + 
Interest of $2,904.19 = Total Amount Due and Payable of $180,260.67. Based on the current statutory rate of 
interest, this amount will continue to increase by $25.51 each day until the amount due has been paid in full. 
(E) Second Request For Payment of Aii Benefits Due Per Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 Order 
In order to avoid the payment of unnecessary additional interest charges which continue to accrue and become 
due each day at the current rate of $25.51, please request UPS to pay the entire amount of$180,260.67 which is 
now due in accordance with the Industrial Commission's 5. 17. 11 decision within the next thirty (30) days (i.e., 
on or before 10.7.2011). 
If UPS refuses to pay the Claimant the entire amount which is due at the time payment is made within the next 
thirty (30) days (i.e., on or before October 7, 2011), Mr. Vawter has instructed me to take all appropriate 
collection action against UPS including, but not limited to, the issuance of District Court judgment against UPS 
in accordance with the process and procedure set forth in Idaho Code §72-735 and Idaho Code §72-736. 
Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. 
CC: Michael P. Vawter 
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SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850) 
GARDNER & BREEN 
1410 W. Washington - 83702 
Post Office Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
Attorney for Defendants 
Zfll SEP I b p 4: 50 
I RECEIVED 
INDUSTRIAL COMHISSJQH 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MICHAEL P. VAWTER, 
Claimant, 
v. 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, 
Employer, 
and 



















LC. Case No. 2010-000114 
AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN R. VELTMAN 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MEMORANDUM REGARDING 
THE ISSUE OF PAYMENT 
OBLIGATIONS 
Susan R. Veltman, being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states the following: 
1. I am an attorney authorized to practice law in the State ofldaho and make this Affidavit 
based on personal knowledge. 
2. I am the attorney of record for the Defendants in this matter. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM REGARDING PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 1 
3. A true and correct copy of the following Exhibits are attached hereto and incorporated by 
reference as though fully set forth in support of Defendants' Memorandum Regarding the 














Defendants' I Appellants' Brief in Support of Defendants' I 
Appellants' Response to Claimant I Respondent's Motion for 
Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal dated July 8, 2011. 
The Idaho Supreme Court's Order Dismissing Appeal dated July 
27, 2011. 
Defendants' I Appellants' Motion for Clarification dated August 1, 
2011. 
The Idaho Supreme Court's Order Denying Motion for 
Clarification dated August 15, 2011. 
Claimant's demand for payment to Defendants' dated August 9, 
2011. 
Claimant's May 3, 2010, answer Interrogatory No. 16. 
Claimant I Respondent's Brief in Support of Motion for 
Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal dated June 27, 2011. 
Claimant's Request for Calendaring dated May 3, 2010. 
Defendants' Response to Request for Hearing I Motion to 
Bifurcate dated May 11, 2010. 
Notice of Telephone Conference dated May 20, 2010. 
Notice of Telephone Conference dated July 15, 2010. 
Notice of Hearing dated July 20, 2010. 
Dr. Frizzell's November 23, 2010, letter to Dr. Harris. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM REGARDING PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 2 
I& 
' 
Exhibit 14: Claimant's demand for payment to Defendants' dated September 7, 
2011. 
DATED this 16th day of September, 2011. 
Su~ancR. Veltman - of the firm 
GARDNER & BREEN 
Attorney for Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM REGARDING PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16th day of September, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon: 
Rick Kallas 
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, 
the last known address as set forth above. 
/ 
)\/J~ '- \c{ ffrrZ ~ ,_ 
= 
SUSAN R. VELTMAN 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM REGARDING PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 4 
